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ABSTRACT
Studies of locative prepositions have suggested that there 
are regularities in the order of acquisition. This thesis 
describes an investigatation of whether a general order of 
acquisition for locative prepositions applies to British 
children learning English as their first language. In a 
study involving eighty children aged between two and five 
years old, both the production and comprehension of 
locative expressions were tested.
Results confirm a general order, broadly consistent with 
the hypothesis being tested, but with the prepositions 
BEHIND and, to a lesser degree, IN FRONT occurring earlier 
in the hierarchy. These prepositions (in their various 
featured and non-featured forms) and the errors made with 
them are looked at in some detail, and the findings give 
new support to evidence from other studies in this area.
The conclusion is reached that there is. a general order 
for the acquisition of locative prepositions, but that the 
materials used for testing, especially the nature and 
orientation of reference objects, are very important. 
This is particularly so for BEHIND and IN FRONT with 
featured objects ie those with inherent fronts such as 
people or houses - the more complex their circumstances, 
the later their appearance in the acquisition order.
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PREFACE
There have been many research studies in the field of 
psycholinguistics including a number which have looked at 
the specific area of language development and locative 
prepositions.
My own research study, described in this thesis, looks at 
the acquisition of the locative prepositions IN, ON, 
UNDER, BESIDE, BEHIND and IN FRONT by children learning 
English as their first language. Other studies already 
published in this and related areas were useful as a 
background; the cross-linguistic study by Johnston and 
Slobin (1979) provided a particularly useful base for my 
own research. This study looked at the development of 
locative expressions in four languages including 
(American) English, It confirmed a general order of 
acquisition determined by cognitive factors which spanned 
all language groups (and which would be modified by 
linguistic factors from the specific language concerned).
The research study I undertook was to look at the 
acquisition of locative prepositions in children from age 
two to five years. It was, in part, to consolidate other 
studies done in this area (and confirm the acquisition 
order for British English as opposed to American English) 
and also to provide further information and a detailed
V I 1
data base for a range of locative expressions.
In the event, my research results have provided not only 
new information on the acquisition order of prepositions, 
but also some very interesting findings regarding errors 
made with prepositions, shedding new light on a particular 
area of liguistic and cognitive development.
Vlll
1 COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC DEVELOPMENT
The relationship between cognitive development and 
language acquisition has intrigued and occupied both 
psychologists and linguists for a large part of this 
century. It is this complex area of developing
psychological processes and linguistic behaviour which 
will form the basis for discussion in this first chapter, 
providing a foundation for the subsequent discussion of 
studies particularly concerned with the acquisition of 
locative expressions in young children.
1.1 Language and Thought
Initially, language was treated by psychologists very much 
as a product or consequence of cognitive development, with 
relatively little attention directed towards the question 
of how language emerged from the concurrently developing 
cognitive structures of the child (Moore, 1973). By the 
middle of this century, language development became
recognised as a subject worthy of investigation in its own 
right and discovering the nature of the connection between 
linguistic and cognitive ability became crucial to
understanding language acquisition.
The study of language acquisition in children is now the
best developed branch of psycholinguistics (Crystal, 1985: 
251) and it would seem appropriate here to review some of 
the main issues and influential authors, before looking in 
more detail at how a child's mind develops (section 1.2).
When investigating the relationship of language to other 
cognitive and social kinds of knowledge, the most
influential author in this area is Jean Piaget (1896-1980)
whose writings have provided detailed accounts of child 
development. In 1926, Piaget published a study called 
"The Language and Thought of the Child". Looking at the 
speech used by children in a Genevan kindergarten Piaget 
found, amongst other things, that whilst much of their 
speech was adapted to the needs of a specific listener, a 
fair proportion of it was addressed to anyone who happened 
to be within hearing range and gave no evidence that the 
child was attempting to take into account the knowledge or 
interests of a specific listener. This speech he called 
egocentric speech and he saw it as a reflection of the
thought processes of the young child, which he then went 
on to investigate in considerable detail.
Piaget held the view that language primarily reflects
thought and does not shape it. He maintained that the
child has to develop into a social being from a stage of
being imperfectly socialised and he therefore regarded
childhood egocentrism as a cognitive deficit, an
intellectual inability to put oneself in another person's
shoes. I shall question, amongst other ideas, the notion 
that children are necessarily egocentric later on in this 
chapter (section 1.2.1).
Piaget believed that the child constructs an understanding 
of the way the world works largely by his or her own 
actions. A child's intelligence at any time is a product 
both of the environment and of certain mental structures 
interacting with each other. In tracing the development 
of these structures, Piaget concluded that the child 
passes through a series of stages. Each stage is 
characterised by certain properties of the child's thought 
and each child has to pass through the stages in a fixed 
order, although the rate at which he or she does so may 
vary from one child to another. The major stages are:
- the sensorimotor stage (from birth to 18 months);
“ the pre-operational stage (18 months to 7 years);
- the stage of concrete operations (7 to 11 years); and 
“ the stage of formal operations (11 years and over).
The ages given are approximate, as some children may take 
longer than others to pass from one stage to another. For 
much of the discussion in this thesis about language 
acquisition in general and prepositional expressions in 
particular, the children fall into the pre-operational 
stage (18 months to 7 years).
Language is only one way among others to represent 
knowledge and one example of Piaget's views can be seen in 
the area of representation. Representation in general 
does not appear until the end of the sensorimotor period, 
when, for example, a move from A to B can be retraced by 
the child to find the starting point A. Simultaneously 
and in close connection with this action structure, 
objects acquire what Piaget calls permanence; that is to 
say, no longer does the child act as if the objects have 
ceased to exist when they disappear from his/her field of 
action, but he/she knows that he can find them again, even 
if they are successively hidden in different places (as 
long as he/she has seen the moves) by using the newly 
acquired action structure.
Piaget has frequently been criticised for underestimating 
the importance of language in cognitive development 
(Elliot, 1981:43). In his writings, language appears 
largely as a source of data rather than as an object of 
development and often its operation is seen in a negative 
light.
The Russian Psychologist Vygotsky (1893-1934) had a 
different interpretation of the egocentric speech of young 
children. Whilst agreeing with Piaget about its existence 
and that it was a transitional phenomenon, he saw it as a 
precursor to verbal thought. For him, it was "speech on
its way inward" (Vygotsky, 1962: 46). He saw language and 
thought as having independent origins and his work led him 
to propose the "indisputable fact" that "thought 
development is determined by language ie by the linguistic 
tools of thought and by the sociocultural experience of 
the child" (Vygotsky, 1962: 51).
The conclusions drawn by Piaget and Vygotsky are 
frequently opposed in discussions of the question "Does 
language precede thought or thought precede language?" 
(although it should be stressed that Vygotsky's views are 
in no way a photographic negative of Piaget's).
This concept of "thought being determined by language" is 
more traditionally associated with the linguist and 
anthropologist Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897-1941) who proposed 
that the linguistic categories of our native language 
affect the way in which we think. In its strongest form, 
the Whorfian Hypothesis claims that our linguistic 
categories actually determine our cognitive categories and 
that, consequently, our language traps us in a fixed mode 
of thought as far as our concepts and perceptions are 
concerned.
According to Whorf, therefore, people who speak very 
different languages perceive the world in very different 
ways. Much of the evidence cited in favour of this 
hypothesis is based on vocabulary differences. For
example, English has only one word for snow, while Eskimo 
has four (Hilgard, Atkinson and Atkinson, 1979). 
Consequently, speakers of Eskimo may perceive differences 
in snow that speakers of English cannot. But do these 
observations constitute strong evidence? Critics of the 
hypothesis such as Slobin (1973) and Clark and Clark 
(1977) argue otherwise. According to them, language may 
embody distinctions that are important to a culture, but 
it does not create those distinctions, nor does it limit 
its speakers to them. English speakers may have the same 
capacity for perceiving variations in snow as Eskimo 
speakers, but since such variations are more important in 
Eskimo cultures than in British/American cultures, one 
language assigns different words to the variations while 
the other does not.
Also, the mere fact that languages can and are translated 
from and to each other argues against the strong form of 
the Whorfian hypothesis and it is now more usual to find 
a weaker form of it - if this theory is supported at all ~ 
whereby linguistic categories predispose us to think in 
certain ways; predispositions which can, though, be 
overcome (Atkinson, Kilby and Roca, 1989).
Work on the differences in the perception of colours has 
added to the evidence against language determining 
thought; at one time, many linguists believed that
languages differed widely in how they divided up the 
colour spectrum and that this led to differences in the 
perception of colours. Later research indicated just the 
opposite. Of particular importance is the work of two 
anthropologists, Berlin and Kay (1969) who studied the 
basic colour terms of many languages and found striking 
things in common in such terms across languages. For one, 
every language took its basic colour terms from a 
restricted set of ten names. In English these are: 
"black", "white", "red", "yellow", "green", "blue", 
"brown", "purple", "pink" and "grey". No matter what 
colour terms a language had, they inevitably corresponded 
to some subset of the above plus "orange". Furthermore, 
if a language used fewer than eleven terms, the basic 
terms chosen were not arbitrary. If a language had only 
two terms (none had fewer), they corresponded to "black" 
and "white"? if it had three, they corresponded to 
"black", "white" and "red"? if it had six, they 
corresponded to these three plus "yellow", "green" and 
"blue". Thus the ordering of basic colour terms seems to 
be universal rather than varying from language to 
language.
In addition, people whose languages used corresponding 
basic colour terras agreed on what particular colour best 
represents a colour term. Suppose two different languages 
have terms corresponding to "red". When speakers of these 
languages are asked to pick the best example of "red" from
an array of colours, they make the same choice. Even 
though their boundaries for what they would call "red" may 
differ, their idea of a good "red", a quintessential "red"
is the same. Their perceptions are identical though their
vocabularies are different.
Further work by Rosch (1974) suggests that the Dani, whose 
language has only two basic colour terms, perceive colour 
variations in exactly the same way as people whose 
language has all eleven. Later experiments by Rosch
(1975) confirmed the idea of "true colours" for example 
some reds are redder than others. And the same applied to 
many other kinds of categories such as birds and 
vegetables (where the best examples or "prototypes" were 
robins and peas respectively).
Prototype theory, deriving from ideas put forward by
Rosch, has been influential in the study of child 
language, particularly in connection with children's early 
acquisition of referential words (words used to refer to 
objects, people and events). The idea of ideal examples 
or prototypes presents itself again in section 1.2.1 
relating to the development of visual perspective taking 
and in section 4.2.3 in connection with a possible 
prototype for the prepositions BEHIND and IN FRONT. 
Other hypotheses/theories accounting for the development 
of word meanings are considered in section 4.5.1.
Knowledge about concepts is fundamental and is one of the 
most important things children learn. We get some idea of
how children acquire concepts by looking at their first
use of words. At about age one, children begin to name 
things, ie relate the knowledge that they have already 
gained about the world to words that adults use. To learn 
which word goes with which concept, children often appear 
to pick out only one or two properties of a concept, when 
a whole cluster of properties is relevant. A two year old 
child might hear "doggie" spoken in connection with the 
family dog and focus on the fact that it has four legs and 
moves (Hilgard, Atkinson and Atkinson, 1979). He or she 
then may hypothesise that these two features define 
"doggie" and apply the word to cats and other four legged 
animals.
Another common overextension at around this age is the
word "dada" used to refer to all men. The subject of
overextensions (together with underextensions, overlap and 
mismatch) is discussed in more detail later on in section 
4.4.2.
By age three or four years, a child's overextensions are 
less obvious, but closely related concepts can still lead 
to confusion. When told to place one toy below another on 
a staircase, the child may place it above the other 
instead. It is as if the child knows "above" and "below"
have some properties in common, since both refer to the 
same kind of spatial relationship, but he or she does not 
know how they differ and so maps both onto the concept of 
"above". Perhaps the concept "above" is the simpler one. 
Or perhaps the child is using a strategy that says "when 
you have to place an object, but you're unsure of where, 
try the topmost part of surface" (Clark, 1977). This is 
an area which will be explored in more detail later in 
relation to non-linguistic strategies (section 2.2).
Theories about concept learning vary (see, for example, 
Joan Lucariello's 1987 paper on concept formation) and 
perhaps there is no entirely satisfactory account. Jerry 
Fodor, in the debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky 
(Piatteli-Palmarini, 1980) claims that there are no
theories of concept learning - for example, no theory can 
tell us how a concept such as "red and square" is 
acquired. He maintains that any theories of learning 
essentially tell us how beliefs are fixed by experiences 
(inductive logic). Fodor explains that the mechanism 
which shows how beliefs are fixed by experiences makes 
sense only against the background of radical nativism. His 
extreme innatist stance is a stumbling block to those who 
are in favour of a "compromise" between the ideas of 
Chomsky and Piaget (see below).
Children do not generate hypotheses about language at
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random, and there is good evidence to suggest that 
children come into the world genetically programmed to 
look at language in certain ways; that operating 
principles may be part of our biological heritage (Fodor, 
Bever and Garrett, 1974). Children progress from simple 
to complex sentences, acquiring new grammatical 
constructions in a predictable order, despite large 
variations in how often adults around them use the 
constructions and despite what they actually hear, which, 
as Chomsky points out:
"consists to a large extent of utterances that 
break rules, since a good deal of normal 
speech consists of false starts, disconnected 
phrases and other deviations" (Chomsky, 1967:
441).
Chomsky maintains that there is evidence that language is 
a special, pre-programmed activity and his belief that 
humans are genetically imprinted with knowledge about 
language is often referred to as "the innateness 
hypothesis". The first enthusiasm for language being an 
innate capacity came in the 1960s when Chomsky set the 
scene, and there was a rush to embrace Chomsky's theories 
as an instrument for disposing of behaviourism (Pinker, 
1994). Then, in the 1970s, ideas about language swung 
back to the notion of language as something purely 
cultural and learnt, reflecting the emphasis psychologists
11
had always put on slow learning mechanisms being the force 
behind human intelligence (Pinker, 1994).
In the past five to ten years, the claim that language is 
innate has been strengthened by empirical findings 
supporting Chomsky, and by renewed interest in the 
biological nature of language; how language is encoded in 
genes and in the neural structures of the brain. Whilst 
it is now generally recognised that something specific to 
language is innate, opinions still vary as to what this 
something consists of. Language cannot be explained 
simply as an offshoot of general intelligence, even though 
we undoubtedly make use of general cognitive abilities 
when we speak, in a way as yet undefined (Aitchison, 1989: 
267).
The pattern of language acquisition may be much the same 
for all children. However, if the fixed sequence of 
language development depends on the orderly development of 
perceptual and motor skills and language development 
simply reflects the development of other skills, it could 
not be considered innate. A crucial point raised by 
Jaques Monod in the debate between Piaget and Chomsky 
(Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980) was this: if language
development in the child is strictly associated with 
sensorimotor activities, then children suffering from 
extreme motor disabilities should not be able to talk, or 
at most, should develop very poor language. Inhelder
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replied (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980) that although such 
experiments had not been carried out by the Geneva group, 
she expected, even in these extreme cases, that language 
would be fairly complete. She argued, however, that a 
variety of "actions" could serve the purpose, for example 
acoustical, visual or tactile.
Another aspect of innate behaviour is that it often 
depends on exposure to the right cues at the right time 
period. There is evidence of a critical time period in 
language development, but it is not conclusive. According 
to Lenneberg (1967), if individuals are not exposed to any 
human language before the age of 14 or so (the so-called 
critical period), then they might be unable to acquire 
language. For a critique of and suggested modifications 
to Lenneberg's proposals, see Elliot (1981: 23-8).
So, we have seen on the one hand, that there are strong 
claims for children having a tacit knowledge of principles 
of universal grammar; Chomsky and those who work with him 
have proposed a task-specific biological programme for 
language development. On the other hand, there is the 
view that the rules and structures of language somehow 
grow out of other aspects of cognitive abilities, innately 
given perhaps, but not unique to language. The most 
widely discussed claims for this non-specific basis of 
linguistic development have been associated with Piaget
13
and his followers.
The claim that language development involves an innate 
capacity that is unique to language is sometimes called 
innatism (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980) or specificity
(Goodluck, 1991) and the opposing claim, that language 
development is an outgrowth of other cognitive skills, is 
often known as constructivism following the terminology of 
Piaget in various writings (Goodluck, 1991).
However, the perspectives of Chomsky and of Piaget are not 
necessarily as contradictory as is sometimes made out. 
Hermine Sinclair, herself a Genevan psycholinguist, 
suggests that "it is Chomsky's work that is making 
possible the study of language acquisition within a 
Piagetian framework" (Sinclair, 1971: 204). It is not
impossible that Chomsky and Piaget are both right (Cromer, 
1974: 252) or perhaps there is a compromise solution
between innatism and constructivism, likened to two faces 
of the same coin (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980: 143).
This section has dealt with a range of questions 
concerning the mechanisms involved in language learning 
and in many of the areas touched on, there have been 
important and often unresolved problems. Language 
development appears to broadly exhibit the properties of 
biologically programmed behaviour (stages, a critical 
period and partial independence from input), and the
14
complexity of what is acquired and the limitations on the 
nature of the input (the speech the child hears) support 
the view that the child tackles language learning with the
aid of innate knowledge of a universal grammar.
In examining the evidence, Goodluck concludes that
cognitive growth may indirectly promote linguistic growth, 
but the two are distinct phenomena (1991: 168). The fact
that linguistic constructs cannot be derived from other 
contructs or principles is a further argument for the
innate nature of linguistic knowledge.
15
1.2 The Developing Mind: A Child's Way of Viewing Things
This section aims to explore certain aspects of a child's 
"point of view". A point of view can refer to many 
different sorts of experience, but I shall outline 
developments on just the following:
1.2.1 Development of visual perspective taking
1.2.2 The artist's point of view
1.2.3 Conversational role taking and deixis
These topics are useful not only as a general 
psychological background to the child's linguistic 
development, but also as particularly relevant to later 
discussions on deixis and position for viewing (see 
section 3.4.1) and perspective (section 4.4.5).
1.2.1 Development of visual perspective taking
The ability to understand what people see - ie visual 
perspective taking - is not merely of academic interest; 
it is part of our interaction with others from an 
extremely early age. We need to know what other people 
are attending to and referring to; conversely, we need to
be able to draw others' attention to objects or people
that we are concerned with. These visual abilities are 
particularly important in the pre-verbal phase of
16
development when young children do not yet possess words 
to refer to things, but they also continue to be a 
fundamental part of our face-to-face interaction with 
others.
If an adult does not appreciate that his own view is 
simply one of a number of possible alternatives, he might 
be regarded as narrow-minded or inflexible or even as 
egocentric. However, he would not be regarded as 
cognitively incapable of considering alternative views; 
he would more likely be taken as lacking the sensitivity 
or inclination to do so. When considering young children 
therefore, we may think of their egocentrism also as a 
lack of awareness of the need to take account of other 
views; on the other hand, those supporting Piaget's ideas 
would see children's egocentrism as a cognitive deficit, 
an intellectual inability to put themselves in another 
person's shoes. Whilst this view was first introduced in 
Piaget's book "The Language and Thought of the Child" 
(1926) it has now become associated with his investigation 
of visual perspective taking (Piaget and Inhelder, 1956).
Many researchers (such as Bower, 1974 and Butterworth, 
1981) are opposed to Piaget's constructivist theory of 
perception. Although they would agree with Piaget that 
the baby's "knowledge" is not the same as the adult's and 
has yet to be developed, nevertheless they would not agree 
that the newborn baby lives in a chaotic world which can
17
only gradually be structured through the infant's own 
activity. In contrast, they take a "Gibsonian" view (eg 
Gibson 1950, 1966, 1979) that some properties of objects
in space (such as three-dimensionality) are directly 
perceptible by the sensory system and not dependent on the 
experience mediated by motor activity.
So, do children realise that other people's views may be 
different from their own?
During the infant's first few years, he or she develops a 
considerable understanding of other people's visual 
percepts. From the beginning, the baby takes considerable 
interest in the human face and engages in "conversations" 
with those around him or her. The baby begins to identify 
the body parts involved in adults' gestures and can 
produce imitative gestures himself (eg Meltzoff and Moore 
1983 and 1985 who maintain this occurs much earlier than 
Piaget). The infant can follow another's line of gaze or 
pointing and can fixate the object or event the observer 
sees. Conversely, he can produce particular visual 
percepts in others by pointing out or showing objects to 
them. The child can search for and retrieve objects from 
other people. He comes to understand that the observer may 
see an object which he himself cannot see, and vice versa. 
It is well-known that babies below the age of about four 
months will not search for an object that goes out of
18
their sight; this fascinating observation illustrated for 
Piaget (1954) that babies treat these objects as non­
existent or "out of sight, out of mind". A number of 
researchers have subsequently cast doubt on this claim. 
Bower and Wishart (1972) for example, dangled a toy on a 
piece of string in front of a baby and when the lights 
were turned off and the toy was literally out of sight, by 
using an infra-red TV system they found that the baby 
would reach towards the toy even after a delay of 1.5 
seconds.
There appears to be evidence then that young children 
below the age of four years have a considerable 
understanding of other observers and other views, although 
Piaget and Inhelder dismiss as pointless any attempt to 
study perspective-taking in children aged four or below 
because they do not understand the meaning of the 
questions put to them (Piaget and Inhelder, 1956; 212).
The popular interpretation of this position has been to 
describe young children as totally egocentric and not able 
to understand anything at all about other people's points 
of view. For example. Bee (1975; 185-6) says:
"It's not that the child knows that there are 
other ways of looking at things and just can't 
visualise them; rather she is actually a 
prisoner of her own point of view but doesn't 
know it."
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I shall now describe briefly some studies of children's 
perspective-taking, firstly by Piaget and Inhelder and 
then more recent work.
With a single-object task, Piaget and Inhelder asked 
children aged four to twelve to imagine what the apparent 
shape of a needle and a disc would be when placed in a 
number of different positions. A doll was placed at right 
angles to the child, looking at the same object, and the 
child was then asked to imagine how the needle or disc 
appeared to the doll (for example, a needle seen end-on to 
the child would appear full-length to the doll). The 
child was first asked to draw the shape and, to counter 
possible deficiencies in motor skill, was also asked to 
choose a shape from a selection of pictures.
Figure 1; Examples of presentation of needle and disc in perspective (from Piaget and Inhelder)
I I , O O o
needle disc
Piaget and Inhelder also had a "three mountains" task to 
study the child's representation of a group of objects 
seen from different viewpoints.
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Figure 2: A three mountains model showing (above) the child's view and (below) a bird's eye view
According to Piaget and Inhelder, a full appreciation of 
the way views differ according to different viewpoints 
does not develop until at least the age of about eight- 
and-a-half years. Not only do children up to about age 
seven behave in an "egocentric" way, but below age four 
they have no notion of the problem at all.
Rather than dwell on the young child's difficulties with a 
complex perspective-taking task, Flavell (1974 and 1978) 
devised a sequence of graded tasks which he used to
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demonstrate children's improvements in perspective-taking 
as they develop. This may help to explain why the young 
children failed Piaget and Inhelder's tasks. Flavell 
proposed the following levels:
Level 0: practical knowledge of space; internal
psychological processes like seeing are simply 
not yet objects of cognition.
Level 1: child can represent which objects each person
sees but not which particular view.
Level 2: child can represent how different observers see
objects.
Level 3: child can also represent the apparent shape and
size of the objects viewed by different people.
No studies are without their problems, and one criticism 
of Flavell's account is his idea of what constitutes 
symbolic representation. This is the main criterion which 
distinguishes the Level 0 child from the Level 1 child. 
Since, according to Flavell, a Level 0 child may be able 
to specify verbally which object the observer is looking 
at, but cannot represent the view visually, it seems that 
language is not accepted as a means of symbolic 
representation. This issue was taken up by Ives (1980) 
who compared a verbal and a visual response mode. 
Children had to describe verbally which side of an object
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(front, back or side) could be seen from a particular 
position of a camera and select an appropriate picture. 
Ives found that the results implied that a linguistic 
response was more accessible than picture selection:
Table 1: Discrepancy between verbal and visual responses
correct verbal selected approp-description riate picture
3 year olds 89.5% 38%
5 year olds 92.5% 51%
Moreover, Ives maintained that children in the picture 
selection task first formulated the verbal label, often 
spontaneously, of what the other person saw, and then 
searched for the appropriate picture. Perhaps language is 
functioning here as a mediator, and may even be a 
necessary part of the process of locating the correct 
pictorial representation. In this way, it may be that 
Flavell's levels (including various sublevels) do reflect 
a developmental sequence, but that this may occur much 
earlier when a child's verbal description of a view is 
considered rather than his or her representation using, 
say, a picture selection task.
Much of the literature on perspective-taking reports that 
Piaget and Inhelder found that children select their own
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view of the objects (needle, disc or mountains) in error 
(Cox 1991). Because Piaget and Inhelder regard these 
young children as egocentric, the own-view error has 
become known as the "egocentric error". But this 
misrepresents Piaget and Inhelder's findings and their 
position. Children selected their own view in error only 
in the three-mountains task. In the needle and disc 
tasks, their errors were different: typically, they
selected stereotyped or "best" views of the objects, that 
is a full-length needle and full-circle disc. In the 
mountains task, the three mountains did not have a 
familiar stereotype in the same way, so the child adopted 
his or her own view as the stereotype.
This means that a child may be aware of different views of 
objects, but he does not represent them, he only 
reproduces the stereotype. This idea is endorsed by tests 
using occluded arrays; Liben (1978), Liben and Belknap 
(1981) and Light and Nix (1983) have all found that 
children in the three to six year range do not respond 
with their own view but with a "good view" of the array. 
These "best views", stereotypes or prototypes are also 
referred to as "canonical views" and in some tasks, the 
stereotyped view may coincide with the child's actual view 
of the scene.
Some kinds of relationship may be more difficult than 
others. Piaget and Inhelder claimed that the "before-
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behind" relationship is amenable to perspective changes 
earlier than "left-right". The reason for this, they 
argued, is that "there is a bigger difference between a 
background beyond the reach of immediate action and a 
foreground directly subject to it, than there is between a 
left and right which are equally near or distant" (Piaget 
and Inhelder, 1956: 215). Piaget and Inhelder were
talking about the three-mountain array, and most of the 
research comparing the two sorts of dimensions has also 
used multi-dimensional arrays. According to Cox (1991), 
rather than reflecting any "real" difference in 
psychological difficulty between the dimensions, the 
responses may simply reflect a particular order of 
processing of the two dimensions: first before-behind and
second left-right. Or it may be that account needs to be 
taken of other confounding variables such as the presence 
of masking, which is usually present in the before-behind 
arrangement but not in the left-right.
Before concluding this section on the development of 
visual perspective taking, I should like to discuss some 
of the better known experiments Piaget carried out in 
relation to the pre-school child's understanding of the 
conditions under which quantity is conserved. A child 
passing these tests of conservation is known as a 
"conserver". In a typical test of the conservation of 
number, the child is shown two rows of counters, with the
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same number of counters in each row and placed in such a 
way that the counters in the two rows are in one-to-one 
correspondence with each other. Thus the two rows are of 
the same length and the same density. The experimenter 
asks the child whether there is the same number of 
counters in each row and the child generally agrees that 
there is. The experimenter then spreads out the counters 
in one of the rows, making that row longer and less dense 
than the other row. The question about the number of 
counters in the two rows is repeated. A non-conserving 
child will then usually judge that there are more counters 
in the longer row whereas a conserving child will 
correctly indicate that changing the length of the rows 
does not change the number of counters in the rows.
Figure 3 : Test of conservation
Are there the same number of counters in each row?
Similar tests were designed to test whether the child 
knows that the length of a piece of string is conserved 
despite changes in its shape, that the volume of liquid in 
a glass is conserved despite changes in the shape of the
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glass and that the weight of a ball of clay is conserved 
despite changes in its shape from a round ball into a long 
sausage. Children do not learn to conserve in all these 
media at once. They tend to learn to conserve number 
before volume, and volume before weight (Elliot, 1981; 
47). See also the discussion of length as a criterion of 
quantity (under MORE/LESS in section 4.5.2) and tests 
comparing the descriptions of different objects by 
conservera and non-conservers (under SAME/DIFFERENT in 
section 4.5.2).
1.2.2 The Artist's Point of View
The idea that an artist should draw only what he or she 
sees from a particular point of view (the linear 
perspective system) has become the accepted way of 
representing the three-dimensional world on a two- 
dimensional surface. However, it has long been observed 
that young children typically draw a scene from a variety 
of different viewpoints. Piaget and Inhelder's
explanation for this is that these children have not yet 
developed a co-ordinated system of perspectives; they 
cannot successfully adopt a particular viewpoint, even 
their own.
It is only in the last 15 years or so that there has been 
renewed interest in children's drawings from the cognitive
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aspect rather than from shedding light on personality or 
emotional difficulties or mental maturity.
Research on single objects has shown that children often 
draw the canonical (or stereotype) view of a particular 
object rather than their actual view (Davis, 1983). For 
example, when asked to draw a cup (with its handle turned 
out of sight), 60% of the four to six year olds being
tested included the handle. Davis suggested that the 
reason why most children included the hidden handle was 
that they did not realise orientation was important. The 
juxtaposition of two cups in different orientations made 
this more salient and most children then omitted the 
hidden handle. In particular, the naming of the object 
for or by the child seemed to elicit a canonical view, 
whereas withholding the name elicited a more visually 
realistic picture. Most of the research has concerned 
children over five years of age and less is known of the 
behaviour of younger children; it could be that canonical 
views are more prevalent. What defines "cupness" for the 
young child (having a handle) may tie in with the young 
child's understanding of other concepts such as "doggie" 
(has four legs and moves) which led to the overextensions 
discussed earlier in section 1.1,
If one object is placed behind another so that it is 
completely hidden, will children draw only what can be 
seen (Luquet's stage of visual realism) or will they
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include the hidden object in the same way that they 
include a handle on a cup (Luquet's stage of intellectual 
realism)? Results from a study by Cox and Martin (1988) 
with five to nine year old children and adults, where a 
small green cube was placed behind an opaque black beaker, 
suggested that when there is no necessary structural link 
between the objects, most children, like adults, will omit 
the object they cannot see and draw only the one they can 
see. Perhaps it is because the cube is not part of the 
mental image or stereotype of the beaker that it is easier 
to omit it, whereas the handle is part of the stereotype 
of a cup.
With partial occlusion, where one object only partially 
masks the object placed behind it and young children are 
asked to draw the two objects, they tend to separate them 
and draw the whole contour of each object (up until around 
age eight with a simple test of one ball behind another 
conducted by Cox, 1978 and 1981b).
Figure 4 ; Example of vertical-separate arrangement in partial occlusion study
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There are discrepancies between studies, possibly because 
of the angle from which subjects view the objects, but 
this does not detract from the question of why children 
under about eight do draw separate objects. To check that 
a partial occlusion configuration is not simply too 
difficult for children to produce, Cox (1985a) carried out 
a copying task which showed a high rate of accuracy, 
showing that at least the children do not lack the 
necessary motor skills to draw a full circle and attach an 
arc to it.
Figure 5: Example of copying task (partial occlusion)
Maybe it is the case that children cannot draw (rather 
than copy) a scene "how it looks" - or are the 
experimenters simply failing to get the message across to 
them that this is what is wanted? With a request to "Draw 
exactly what you can see" the child may not realise that 
what the experimenter is getting at is that it is how each 
object appears. This can be compared with Flavell's model 
of which object can be seen by an observer coming before 
how the objects can be seen, as described in the previous 
section. There may also be some connection with what
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could be termed a "trying to please" factor, where 
children may be anxious to draw what they think is wanted, 
for example two balls or a picture of a cup.
More task-specific tests have involved a game where a 
robber was chased by a policeman and hid, but the 
policeman could see where he was because his head was 
visible over a wall (Cox 1981b).
Figure 6: Robber hiding behind a wall (task specific partial occlusion)
( \ '
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The majority of children aged six and over represented the 
scene (from the policeman's view) with a partial 
occlusion: 86% at age six, rising to 95% at age ten.
Interestingly, even 44% of four year olds drew a partial 
occlusion too. This then demonstrates that young 
children, at least at age six and to some extent at four, 
can draw a view specific picture. They can inhibit any 
tendency to draw the whole contour of the occluded object 
and any tendency to separate the two objects on the page. 
Variations with task materials using two balls as well as 
the wall and man, and using the terms "hiding behind" as
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well as "behind", seemed to show that it is not necessary 
to present the materials in the form of a game and it is 
not even necessary to talk about "hiding" at all; simply 
placing a man behind a wall is enough to elicit partial 
occlusions, whereas placing a ball behind a ball is not. 
However, Cox later found evidence that calling something a 
wall rather than a block made a difference, because people 
may hide behind walls and that this type of contextualised 
task was particularly important for the younger children 
to draw "how a scene looks" (Cox 1991).
Other work by Cox (1985a) has shown that the more similar 
the two objects in a scene, the less likely the children 
are to use partial occlusions; instead, they tend to 
separate the two objects on the page. This emphasises the 
great importance of testing materials and the caution that 
must be used when interpreting results from experimental 
work - a subject that will be raised again later in 
section 5.1.
Before concluding this section on visual perspective 
taking, I should like to consider briefly the idea of 
visual illusions, Pychologists have studied geometric
illusions for many years but still do not totally agree on 
their explanations.
Some illusions are based on relative size in contrast with
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the surroundings.
Figure 7: Illusion based on relative size
: 6 :O
Other illusions may be understood if we suppose the 
figures to be projected in the third dimension. For 
example, with the Ponzo illusion, the two horizontal lines 
are the same length but the upper one appears longer.
Figure 8: Ponzo illusion
The fact that the Ponzo illusion becomes greater from 
childhood to adulthood suggests that the illusion depends 
on learning to use perspective cues in two-dimensional 
drawings (Parrish, Lundy and Leibowitz, 1968); in the 
Ponzo illusion the comparison could be a railway track.
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There is also the effect of context on perception. Below, 
the figure in the centre is ambiguous and the way we see 
it depends on whether we look from left to right or from 
top to bottom.
Figure 9; Effect of context on perception
1 2  A B C 
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À new concept in vision and illusion is that of computer 
generated 3D images where a hidden image develops before 
your eyes (once you have mastered the method of "seeing") 
eg stereograms produced by Kunoh and Takaoki (1994).
The evidence from the illusions I have illustrated 
suggests that adults are not always able to perceive 
things correctly - if being tested, they might not always 
score full marks. We should bear this in mind when 
testing children against supposedly perfect adult scores.
This subject of adult fallibility is revisited in my study 
on locative expressions when I disclose the results of 
adults tested with the same questions as the children in 
one of the games (see section 4.2.3).
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1.2.3 Conversational role taking and deixis
We saw earlier how children can describe verbally 
another's view before they can represent that view 
pictorially. I shall now examine the child's use of 
language, not as a means of representing overtly his or 
her knowledge about a cognitive task but in the 
communication process itself, in the context of ordinary 
conversations, which nevertheless reveals the child's 
cognitive understandings. In particular, I shall consider 
the area of deixis.
The words "deixis" and its adjective "deictic" come from 
the Greek word for pointing and indicating, gestures which 
commonly accompany spoken language. The referents 
(person, place, time) of deictic terms will change as the 
speaker changes. For example, "I" or "me" may change to 
"you" when another speaker takes over the conversation, 
and the locations referred to as "here" and "there" by one 
speaker may become "there" and "here" to another. Thus 
the point of view shifts from speaker to speaker. This is 
problematic enough, but it is further complicated in a 
number of ways. The speaker may not always speak for 
him/herself: he or she may for instance use "we" to
include him/herself and another body or to indicate that 
the addressee is also included in the term. In some 
languages there are distinct pronouns for each of these 
uses (Cox 1991).
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Another complication is that many deictic expressions may 
also be used in non-deictic ways, eg in "the ball is IN 
FRONT OF the doll" the expression IN FRONT OF is used non- 
deictically if it means the ball is located near the 
doll's face regardless of the doll's orientation in 
relation to the speaker. However, if the term is used 
deictically, it means that the ball is located between the
speaker's face and the doll, whether the doll faces the
speaker or not. In the non-deictic sense, the description
can be used by any speaker regardless of viewpoint. In
the deictic sense, it can only be used if the ball 
intervenes between the speaker and the doll; a speaker in 
a different location will describe the relationship 
differently. These situations of deictic and non-deictic 
uses are illustrated in the following figures:
Figure 10a: Deictic uses of IN FRONT OF and BEHIND
speaker 1
"ball is BEHIND the doll"
< —doll Oball speaker 2
"ball is IN FRONT OF the doll"
speaker 1 speaker 2
"ball is BEHIND the doll" "ball is IN FRONT OF the doll"
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Figure 10b; Non-deictic uses of IN FRONT OF and BEHIND
speaker 1 - >doll
"ball is IN FRONT OF the doll"
Oball speaker 2
"ball is IN FRONT OF the doll"
speaker 1 0 - > speaker 2
"ball is BEHIND the doll" "ball is BEHIND the doll"
The child's acquisition of deictic terms in English 
provides a good opportunity for linguists and 
psychologists to study the ability to decentre and take 
account of different points of view. As Elliot (1981: 59) 
states, the correct use of deictic terms "depends on the 
ability of both speaker and addressee to work out each 
other's point of view..."
a) Person deixis
Children first understand pronouns referring to themselves 
(which they hear as "you", "yourself" etc). Later, they 
understand those used for others ("I", "me" etc). When 
children come to actually use pronouns for themselves.
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they use those which refer to themselves first ("I", "me", 
"my") and then those which refer to others ("you" etc). 
However, just because we know what children do say this is 
not necessarily what they can say. There may be a good 
reason why children do not use a particular word or 
construction in a particular context other than they do 
not understand its use.
b) Place deixis
Whereas "I" and "you" refer to speaker and addressee, 
"here" and "there" are not necessarily related to a place 
near the speaker and a place near the addressee: rather
they refer to a place near and a place further from the 
speaker. But whereas "I" and "you" are mutually exclusive 
(except where "you" is used in the sense of "one"), "here" 
and "there" may also be the applicable terms for the 
addressee's position - much depends on the positioning of 
the two participants in relation to the places being 
contrasted.
Moreover, there is no clear boundary of when "here"
becomes "there", and they also have non-deictic uses for 
example "there are two books on the table".
Both the terms "here" and "there" appear early in
children's speech but are used in different ways. "There"
is often used to indicate an action has been completed
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(Griffiths, 1974, Carter 1975) and "here" is used more by 
children with a gesture, usually pointing either to a near 
location or one further away. Adults also often use 
gesture as an accompaniment to their deictic terms.
Whereas "I" and "you" are used correctly by about age two 
to two and a half years, the contrastive use of "here" and 
"there" is not achieved until around the age of four 
(according to Clark and Sengul's study, 1978). However, 
many studies of the deictic terms have omitted gesture, 
which is so important for both "here" and "there" (for the
sound reason that they wanted to study the child's
understanding of the linguistic terms) and so this may 
underestimate the child's abilities in normal interaction.
A study by Charney (1979) found different results from 
Clark and Sengul - for example she found more correct
responses to "there" when the speaker was at the same side
as the child. Charney argues that the instructions given 
in other tests had been too complex (eg "make the horse 
over here/there jump up and down") saying that if the 
child has limited processing abilities she may use most of 
them on deciding which action to perform. Charney's 
instructions were simply asking the child "which one is 
over here/there?". This appears to be another example of 
the impact of experimental design on results.
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c) IN FRONT OF and BEHIND
IN FRONT OF and BEHIND are mutually exclusive in that what 
is in front of a reference object cannot also be behind 
it. However, when the terms are used deictically, the 
point of view to which they relate is not so clear. 
Whereas "here” and "there" are related to the speaker's 
viewpoint, "in front of" and "behind" may be related to:
- the speaker's viewpoint
- the addressee's viewpoint
- some other perspective
At times, the speaker may need to be explicit such as 
saying "it's behind the tree from where you are looking".
Cox and Taylor compared a situation where the experimenter 
sat next to the subject and shared her perspective, with 
one in which the experimenter sat opposite the subject. A 
fence was stretched across the table. The subject was 
given a small brick and was told to put the brick in front 
of (or behind) the fence. Overwhelmingly, most subjects 
aged between four and nine years and a group of adults 
related the terms to their own viewpoint:
IN FRONT meant near themselves and
BEHIND meant away from themselves
De Villiers and de Villiers (1974) in a production task
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also compared conditions where the experimenter (ie 
recipient of the message) sat beside or opposite the 
child. This time the child told the experimenter where to 
place the object. The children used the terms in relation 
to the experimenter's viewpoint.
Thus it is the recipient's perspective, not the speaker's, 
to which these terms seem to relate (Cox, 1991: 149).
We might expect that the terms BEHIND and IN FRONT OF 
would first be used in a non-deictic way since the terms 
can be tied to a particular feature (eg using the features 
of a doll). Tanz (1980) found that the non-deictic system 
precedes the deictic one in her study of three to five 
year olds.
When "featured" objects (which have an inherent front or 
back such as people, houses and dolls) are used, since 
both deictic and non-deictic interpretations of the terms 
are possible, there is potential ambiguity. These 
coincide when for instance a doll faces the observer, but 
conflict when it faces away. When there is no gesture to 
clarify the terms, most people normally assume the non- 
deictic rather than deictic sense. This is particularly 
true of children (Tanz 1980, Cox 1981a) but a minority of 
adults do take the deictic option.
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since children, at least by age seven, can respond 
deictically in tasks involving non-featured objects 
(Kuczaj and Maratsos, 1975; Tanz, 1980; Cox, 1981c), an 
experiment was carried out by Cox (1985b) to see if 
children would respond deictically in a featured-object 
task. Cox wanted to find out if children were actually 
aware of the possible deictic interpretation of terras like 
IN FRONT OF and BEHIND even when the non-deictic 
interpretation of terms may be very dominant. In an 
experiment with a clocktower (featured object), and clues 
such as "in front of/behind the clock", subjects had a 
first and second guess where the treasure was hidden. 
Four to eight year olds responded randomly on the second 
guess, ten year olds and adults tended to repeat their 
first guess.
So, there was no evidence of an understanding of the 
deictic interpretation of the terms, even among adults. 
In fact many subjects stated verbally that no other 
location was possible ie they all used a non-deictic 
interpretation.
In a second experiment, subjects were rewarded by finding 
treasure first in a non-deictic interpretation location. 
Then the location of the treasure was changed to a deictic 
one. The speed with which the subjects switched strategy 
(measured by the number of trials to criterion) increased 
with age: most adults were successful but many of the four
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year olds continued to use a non-deictic strategy and did 
not find the treasure even after twenty trials.
It seems very difficult therefore for young children to 
appreciate that the prepositional terms IN FRONT OF and 
BEHIND when referring to featured objects could have a 
deictic meaning, and indeed most adults do not normally 
interpret the terms in this way either. But this may be 
true only in certain kinds of tasks.
Cox and Isard (1990) tested tasks equal or even biased 
towards the deictic response. Five to six year olds and 
nine to ten year olds were asked to position a little man 
IN FRONT OF or BEHIND a toy car which pointed either away 
from them or to the right. When the observer's viewpoint 
was not emphasised, both the age groups responded in the 
predicted non-deictic way, placing the man near the 
front/back of the car regardless of orientation. Then the 
observer's viewpoint was emphasised: "let me see the man
standing IN FRONT OF the car" and "hide the man BEHIND the 
car". Children still responded in a non-deictic way. 
Then a more contextual ised task was attempted by 
introducing a game format. Children were asked to take a 
(pretend) photo of the man IN FRONT OF the car and they 
also had to hide him BEHIND the car. This time the 
responses were split: half the children in both age groups 
opted for the deictic and half for the non-deictic
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interpretation. So, even in a task in which the 
observer's viewpoint is made highly salient, the non- 
deictic response has not been overridden.
Finally, the spatial terms were taken out and the children 
were asked where the man should stand a) to have his photo 
taken and b) to hide. Only under these conditions did 
most of the children respond in a deictic way.
This shows that although children can respond deictically 
when non-featured objects are used or when the spatial 
terms are omitted from a featured objects task, the terms 
IN FRONT OF and BEHIND with featured objects have a 
powerful effect: children respond in a non-deictic manner.
A similar piece of work looking at positions in relation 
to a car was carried out by Durkin (1981), and the results 
are discussed in the next chapter, which looks 
specifically at research in connection with prepositions. 
A more detailed look at BEHIND and IN FRONT OF is also 
taken in chapter 4 (sections 4.4.3 and 4.6) when these two 
interesting prepositional expressions are revisited and 
some of the errors made with them considered.
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2 THE ACQUISITION OF PREPOSITIONS
Various studies have been carried out involving the 
acquisition and/or use of prepositions and these provide a 
useful background to this work. Whilst I shall consider a 
selection of them under general headings below, other more 
specific studies will be discussed where relevant in the 
text.
2.1 Longitudinal (developmental) studies
Roger Brown's study of the Harvard children Adam, Eve and 
Sarah, recorded in his book "A First Language" (1973), is 
still one of the definitive works on the acquisition of 
much child language. In discussing prepositions 
generally. Brown points out that the selection of 
particular prepositions is in part dependent on the 
particular noun, for example in the sentences:
the party was ON Monday 
the party was AT noon 
the party was IN May
It is also clear that the selection of prepositions is in 
part dependent on verbs, as in the sentences:
he flew TO Bombay 
he approved OF Bombay
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In terms of the actual prepositions looked at in his study 
of child language. Brown himself examined just IN and ON, 
since these were the only prepositions used frequently 
enough to yield fairly continuous data in the longitudinal 
study. The acquisition curve for both IN and ON for Eve 
showed a sudden increase in the percentage of obligatory 
prepositions supplied, rising from between 0%~30% up to 
around 90% at age 1;9 (1 year 9 months). The acquisition 
curves for the other two children for IN and ON were 
similar to Eve's.
Figure 11: The prepositions IN and ON in Eve's first12 samples (Brown, 1973: 263)
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Unlike Brown, but in common with many of the longitudinal 
studies on child language development, Ann French used her 
own child as the basis of the study. In her paper (1987) 
on early strategies for dealing with function words (words 
whose role is largely or wholly grammatical eg articles, 
pronouns, prepositions), she describes her study of 
Andrew's language development. He was a somewhat late 
talker, producing his first word at age 1;4, and he was 
the elder of two boys. As far as prepositions are 
concerned, no prepositional contexts could be identified 
up to 2;1. At 2 ; 2 there were contexts for IN but no 
prepositions supplied:
eg m a n  car
The preposition IN first appeared at 2;3, following direct 
modelling, but its form was [enna] or [nn3], suggesting 
that "in the" was treated as a unit:
eg no you [enna] doors meaning "don't go indoors"
(The schwa [9] is a neutral vowel heard at the beginning 
of a word like "ago". It is also the usual pronunciation 
of the vowel in words like "the", "a", "an" and "and".)
Children do often learn stock phrases such as "in there" 
without being able to segment the phrase and recombine its 
parts with other lexical items and so produce fresh 
phrases such as "on there" (Elliot, 1981: 81).
47
The form [enna] occurred at 2;3 in French's study meaning 
"in there" (as well as "in the") also suggesting its use 
as a unit or stock phrase.
At 2;4, UP became separated from "there" and combined with 
nouns as well:
eg UP tree
A context for ON occurred but was left empty: 
eg s o a p   finger
With UNDER [Ana] at 2;5 it was not clear whether this was 
just the preposition or the determiner as well. A similar 
variant appeared to mean both "on the" and "on".
A sudden expansion of prepositional contexts occurred at 
2;7, with omissions occurring for AT and possibly WITH. 
BY occurred meaning WITH, ROUND occurred correctly and at 
2;8 [a] was used for FROM:
press it BY [a] foot 
peep ROUND [a] door 
bringed it [a] Shelagh's
A summary of Andrew's development can be made as follows:
a) avoidance of prepositional contexts
b) use of units derived from preposition plus article
c) more prepositional contexts attempted, involving
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omission and substitution of prepositions, including 
replacement by [a].
One of the problems with this work is that it involves 
just one child. However, the results of this study can be 
compared with other studies and a general pattern can be 
seen to emerge.
Eve Clark (1993) confirms that in English, children often 
first mark their awareness that there is some term needed 
where an adult would use a locative preposition by 
inserting a schwa [a] in the preposition slot, as in "sit 
[ a] chair". She also describes some of the difficulties 
encountered with terms such as BY and WITH, suggesting 
that although each relational entity conventionally calls 
for a different linguistic expression in English, children 
may initially mark them all with the same term FROM (not 
the case with the examples from French's son Andrew 
described above). Clark gives the following source 
expressions which are taken from a number of children's 
spontaneous speech:
it came FROM my book box (PLACE)
look at that knocked down tree FROM the wind (NATURALFORCE)I not tired FROM my games (CAUSE)
you can be a mum FROM two babies (POSSESSION)
this seat is getting too small FROM me (COMPARISON)
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Clark maintains that children appear to be marking a 
category of sources that may at first contain only places. 
They learn that locative sources can be indicated in 
English by means of the prepositions FROM, OUT OF, or OFF. 
But OUT OF and OFF are both restricted, with OUT OF used 
only for three dimensional sources and OFF for two 
dimensional ones. As children add other kinds of sources 
to the conceptual category, they find a consistent marking 
for them all in FROM. They produce it first for sources 
that are places; then sources that are agents 
(conventionally marked with BY); causes (conventionally 
marked with BECAUSE); standards of comparison 
(conventionally marked with THAN) and possessors.
An elicitation study carried out by Clark and Carpenter 
(1989) seems to confirm the generalisation of FROM. 
Children aged two to six were asked to repeat and repair 
sentences containing grammatical and ungrammatical uses of 
FROM, BY and WITH. Two year olds retained ungrammatical 
FROM for agents and natural forces in sentences like 
"birds are scared from big cats" (80% of the time) and 
also substituted ungrammatical FROM for BY in sentences 
like "the dog was patted by the little girl" (30% of the 
time). Overall, two year olds assigned FROM to mark 
locative sources and chose FROM more often than BY to mark 
oblique agents. They chose WITH for instruments. From 
age three on, children showed less reliance on FROM to
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mark agent phrases and instead repaired ungrammatical FROM 
40% of the time when it marked agents. Older children
reserved WITH for instruments and BY for agents not in 
subject position - the conventional assignments for 
English.
Clark maintains (1993) that children also rely on their 
conceptual categories as a source of possible meaning in 
the domain of spatial relations, including containment and 
support. Some of her work on spatial prepositions like 
IN, ON and UNDER is looked at in the next section (2.2).
The subject of Michael Tomasello's study (1987) was his 
daughter Travis who was the only child in the family and 
who was relatively advanced linguistically. Her use of 
prepositions (amongst other things) was documented between 
the ages of one and two.
Uses and omissions of prepositions were classified
according to the semantic/referential context and with 
regard to the syntactic context. The following case
relations were distinguished:
LOCATIVE: designation of a spatial relationship
eg one object being ON or OVER
another, or an object being AT a
location.
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DIRECTIONAL;
COMITATIVE
DATIVE;
designation of a spatial relationship 
between a source and a goal eg a car
headed TO Mexico or FOR Mexico.
designation of a relationship of
accompaniment in an activity eg 
someone going WITH someone to the 
shop.
designation of a relationship between 
an action of transfer and an animate 
goal eg someone giving something TO 
someone.
designation of a relationship "for the 
sake of" eg to do something FOR 
posterity or FOR someone.
INSTRUMENTAL: designation of a relationship of
instrumental support eg doing 
something WITH a knife or BY memory.
BENEFACTIVE
GENITIVE: designation of a relationship of 
possession or "belongingness" eg the 
day OF the festival.
With regard to syntax, four levels of relational usage 
were distinguished in Tomasello's study based on what 
aspects of the relation were linguistically expressed:
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OMISSION:
HOLOPHRà SE:
COMBINATION :
PREPOSITION;
the relational word is not expressed, 
but the relation is implicit in the 
utterance and its non-linguistic 
context eg "bug monkey bars".
only the relational word is expressed 
eg "on" (this occurs much more often 
with terms such as OFF or OUT).
the relational word and one of the 
related items are expressed eg "bug 
on" or "on monkey bars".
the relational word and both of the 
related items are expressed eg "bug on 
monkey bars".
Travis's early use of words which are prepositions in 
adult language came exclusively from four pairs of polar 
oppositions referring to the spatial distinctions:
UP/DOWNON/OFFIN/OUTOVER/UNDER
Most of the earliest uses were verb-like, that is, were 
used to request or comment on an activity:
eg "up meaning "pick me up"
and not to indicate a spatial relationship between objects
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or an activity and an object, which they all came to do 
later. This could present difficulty in distinguishing 
use as a preposition from use as what, in adult terms, is 
a verb particle acting as a verb. However, the syntactic 
status of verb particles is not a problem in the light of 
contemporary assumptions; they can be viewed simply as 
intransitive prepositions. So, for example, "in" could be 
used transitively as in "in the box" or intransitively as 
in "go in".
All but one of Travis's spatial oppositions were preceded 
by a period when the preposition was bound to another 
word, for example "up-here" or "get-out" (with reference 
to the high chair or car seat) and all could be used 
holophrastically (as a one word utterance standing for a 
whole sentence) for example "on" as a request for putting 
clothes on. All the oppositions were used extensively 
with the prolocatives HERE and THERE, for example "pillow 
down here". Omissions were rare for all except IN (eg 
"bug eye") and ON (eg "man cycle") and it is interesting 
to note that omissions were found with ON even after 
Travis had seemingly learned its correct use (which does 
of course beg the question of when something can be 
considered learned - a subject which is considered later 
in section 3.2 in relation to the definition of 
acquisition). With the exception of IN, misuses were 
nonexistent.
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None of the spatial oppositions was distinctly homonymie 
in its relational usage (where the same form relates to 
different meanings), although several had non-relational 
uses, for example ON/OFF as a description of the TV or 
radio, and OVER to indicate the end of an activity.
The other prepositions Travis used during her second year 
do not form as neat a group as the spatial oppositions. 
The remaining, later-learned prepositions were:
WITHBYTOFORATOF
These prepositions were mostly learned after the spatial 
oppositions (though several of them had at least one
spatial sense) and they revealed a very different 
acquisition pattern: none could be used holophrastically
to request activities and they were mainly used in
sentences or phrases right from the beginning. All six 
were preceded by omissions in at least one sense. For 
example, BY was omitted in the utterance "Pete hurt car" 
(after the dog had been injured). Four out of the six 
later-learned prepositions were distinctly homonymie, that 
is, had the same form but different meanings. For example 
BY had two distinct uses: as an instrument as in "hurt by
swing" and in the locative sense of BESIDE as in "put it
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up there by the window".
For two case relations (instrumental and dative) there was 
a period of substantial confusion. Synonymity (where two 
words express the same or a very similar concept) seemed 
to be associated with misuses, for example WITH and BY as 
instrumentals. This can be seen when, for a while, Travis 
frequently used the instrumental BY as a preposition, 
mostly as an inappropriate substitute for WITH as in her 
question "Can I pick it up by my hands?" Omissions and 
misuses were considerably more frequent for the later- 
learned prepositions than for the spatial oppositions. 
For instance, Travis's first clear attempt at using TO as 
a dative was incorrect when she said "Get raisins to me".
Tomasello's results appear to confirm for (American) 
English speaking children the findings of Grimm (1975) and 
Vorster (1984) on German and Afrikaans speaking children 
respectively, that is, that spatial relations are learned 
before those designating other relations. It is also 
plausible, although there is no direct evidence from 
Tomasello's study, that the acquisition order can be 
explained as a more or less direct reflection of the 
developmental order of the underlying concepts.
However, it is also possible, and there is some evidence 
for this, that the pattern of Travis's early learning and 
use of prepositions is best explained by cognitive and
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linguistic factors, using the metaphor of Johnston and 
Slobin's (1979) "waiting room". According to this view, a 
linguistic form enters into the "waiting room" when the 
child discerns, primarily on non-linguistic grounds, a 
particular concept. The linguistic form leaves the 
waiting room when the child acquires a means for 
expressing that concept in the language he or she is 
learning. Thus a linguistic form might appear later 
relative to another either because it entered the room 
later (cognitive development) or because some 
characteristic of adult use made acquisition more 
difficult for the child (linguistic factors). The
concept of Johnston and Slobin's waiting room will be 
discussed in more detail later (section 2.3).
While a cognitive hypothesis is possible in relation to 
Tomasello's study, there is no clear evidence from his 
work to support it. In fact, there are are two pieces of 
evidence that seem to argue against it. Firstly, several 
prepositions designating spatial concepts very similar to 
those designated by the spatial oppositions were learned 
later: TO as a directional locative, and AT and BY as
static locatives. If the concepts are no more complex 
than those of the spatial oppositions, their relatively 
late acquisition must be explained in terms other than 
pure cognitive ones. Secondly, during the period when the 
spatial oppositions were first being used prepositionally,
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all of the later-learned prepositions designating non- 
spatial relations were being omitted from appropriate 
sentences. These omissions indicated to Tomasello that 
non-spatial concepts were in some sense available to his 
daughter as early as those designated by the spatial 
oppositions. In fact, studies of early two-word 
sentences invariably find attempts to express 
instrumental, dative, comitative and genitive relations at 
the same developmental period as attempts to express 
locatives (Brown, 1973). If it is true that these 
concepts are available to the child as early as those of 
the spatial oppositions, then explanations of 
developmental order should perhaps be sought in something 
other than cognitive factors.
Tomasello concludes that it seems likely that the concepts 
underlying almost all of Travis's prepositions were 
available at around the age of 1; 7 and spatial oppositions 
were early to appear because they were used by adults 
either holophrastically or in highly stressed and salient 
positions such as "Do you want UP/DOWN/IN/OUT" and "Do 
you want this ON/OFF?". Travis could have learned these 
as action or location words and used them holophrastically 
at first. Then, when she needed their use as a 
preposition, she already had them available for 
generalisation (cf Slobin 1973 on "new functions are first 
expressed by old forms"). As a consequence, their stay 
in the "waiting room" was brief and linguistic expression
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came early.
Whilst this type of adult modelling and early child use 
seems to work well for the spatial oppositions, the 
situation is not so simple for the later-learned 
prepositions (with one exception described below). 
Rather, adults use these words embedded without stress in 
complex sentences or phrases and Travis would have needed 
to employ some type of analytic learning strategy to be 
able to extract them as independent lexical items. The
one exception was Travis's early use of the comitative 
WITH which was very similar to her early use of the 
spatial oppositions; she learned it early, using it first 
holophrastically and then prepositionally. Tomasello 
argues that adult models for this expression were very 
similar to the spatial oppositions, eg "Do you want to
come WITH me?" and "Will you come WITH me?". This
exception thus seems to provide further support for the 
view that the way Travis learned and used the spatial
oppositions was due not so much to the nature of the 
underlying concepts but rather to the way adults around 
her used these words. Looked at in this way, adult use is 
an important factor surrounding child language acquisition 
of prepositions.
This subject of adult use affecting children's early 
lexical development is considered by Barrett, Harris and
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Chasin (1991). Here, the conclusion is reached that 
although there is a strong relationship between maternal 
speech and children's initial word uses, the relationship 
between maternal speech and children's subsequent word 
uses was very much weaker.
Frequency of adult use with prepositions is mentioned 
again in section 2.3 in relation to work by Slobin (1985), 
Moerk (1980) and Mills (1985), but the whole subject of 
adult input is a controversial one and will not be covered 
in detail in this thesis.
The related area of prepositions in literature would be 
interesting to study and although I have not conducted an 
extensive survey of books for children in the two to five 
year age group (the age under consideration in my study), 
it does seem that where books specifically contain 
prepositional expressions, they are often those frequently 
used in everyday life when looking for things or doing 
things (see Appendix 1 for examples). In particular, 
there is a noticeable absence of the prepositional 
expression IN FRONT OF (cf discussions in section 2.3 on 
the development of BEHIND and IN FRONT in connection with 
cross-linguistic studies).
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2.2 Non-linguistic strategies
A key piece of research into the understanding and use of 
some locative prepositions was undertaken by Eve Clark 
(1973a). Clark set out to find an order of acquisition 
for the prepositions IN, ON, and UNDER and tested children 
aged 1;6 to 5;0.
In the first experiment, children were asked to put a 
small object (x) such as a toy mouse IN/ON/UNDER a 
reference point (RP). The six RPs were chosen because 
each allowed two of the three spatial relations. The box 
on its side and the tunnel each allowed an object to be 
placed either IN or ON. The dump truck and the crib 
allowed either IN or UNDER and the table and bridge 
allowed either ON or UNDER.
Seventy children were divided into seven age groups of 
six-month intervals and each child was interviewed
separately. The children were asked to put x IN/ON/UNDER
the RP for both possible relations with each RP. Clark 
found that the young children (under 3;0) were nearly
always correct with IN items, next most successful with ON 
items and hardly ever correct with UNDER. The errors
showed a very consistent pattern, which indicated the 
following simple, ordered rules which are based on the 
child's non-linguistic knowledge of the usual or expected
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spatial relationship between x and the RP;
RULE 1: If the RP is a container, put x inside it 
RULE 2; If the RP has a horizontal surface, put x on it
These two rules are strictly ordered in that Rule 1 is 
always applied and if it fails. Rule 2 is applied next. 
The use of Rule 1 predicts the error of ON going to IN and 
of UNDER going to IN while Rule 2 predicts the error of
UNDER going to ON. The use of two such ordered rules
accounted for 92% and 91% of the errors made in the two 
youngest groups (1; 6-1;11 and 2 ; 0-2 ; 5).
Clark referred to the rules as non-linguistic strategies  ^
where the child supplements his or her partial semantic 
entry for the preposition (assumed to be something like 
[+locative] for all prepositions). For example, when a 
child treats ON as if it means IN, this is done not 
because he or she thinks ON means [tlocative] and
[+containment ] but because he or she thinks ON means 
[tlocative] and because he or she is using a non-
linguistic strategy in conjunction with this partial 
meaning.
Clark then conducted another experiment, designed to 
provide independent evidence for the non-linguistic 
strategies that seemed to be used by the younger children 
in the first experiment. This tested if the non-
62
linguistic strategies would be used in situations where no 
locative words were heard. Children were asked to copy a 
configuration of x and RP modelled by the experimenter. 
The hypothesis was that if a child was using a non- 
linguistic strategy he/she should "correctly" copy any 
configuration that conformed to Rule 1 or 2, but those not 
conforming should produce predictable errors. Fifteen of 
the 20 subjects in the experiment made a total of 40 
errors, of which 38 were "predicted errors", eg didn't 
copy the experimenter's pattern of x beside an upright 
glass, but put x in the glass. The two unpredicted errors 
occurred where x was placed on an upside-down glass and 
both consisted of the child turning over the glass and 
placing x inside it. One of the children even turned over 
the experimenter's glass and did the same thing with it!
The results of experiment 2 therefore provided strong 
evidence for the non-linguistic strategies (the child 
schema) that appeared to be used in experiment 1. Young 
children rely on the same non-linguistic strategies in a 
copying task as they do in a comprehension task using the 
words IN, ON and UNDER.
Semantic knowledge (the adult schema) and non-linguistic 
strategies (the child schema) may coincide in the kind of 
responses given by the child. In the case of the word IN, 
it may be impossible to find out which basis the young 
child is relying on for his or her response. However,
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both ON and UNDER in experiment 1 allowed some separation 
of the child and adult schemas and a third experiment 
carried out by Clark attempted to look at the transition 
from child to adult schema. In this experiment, each child 
was presented with a pair of RPs, identical in all 
respects except orientation. The child was then given an 
instruction eg "put the x on an RP". The RPs were plastic 
tubs, plastic glasses and plastic boxes, and they were 
always presented in pairs (in a previous pilot study 
efforts to get the children to manipulate a single RP to 
conform to the instruction had failed, hence the 
introduction of pairs).
The results of this third experiment provided further 
support for the existence of non-linguistic strategies and 
also gave evidence that the transition from use of a child 
schema (non-linguistic strategies) to use of an adult 
schema (semantic knowledge) is fairly near to completion 
for all three locative terms IN/ON/UNDER at age 2;6 to 
3;0.
If reliance on non-linguistic strategies is widespread 
amongst young children during the acquisition of language, 
then it is possible that these strategies play a role in 
determining the order of acquisition of certain linguistic 
distinctions. Slobin (1973) proposed that the main 
determinant of order of acquisition for linguistic
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(semantic) distinctions was their relative cognitive 
complexity (although it is difficult to know how best to 
measure the cognitive complexity of different linguistic 
forms). Clark suggested that the non-linguistic 
strategies may provide a basis for the child's linguistic 
hypotheses about the meanings of words. If so, it is 
important whether or not the responses based on strategies 
coincide with those based on semantic knowledge. Where 
the responses coincide, the child has little to learn, but 
where they do not, he or she has much more to learn before 
that meaning is acquired. This would make IN cognitively 
simpler than either ON or UNDER because it requires
minimal adjustment of the child's hypothesis about its 
meaning (that is. Rule 1 applies). On this basis, ON 
should be more complex than IN because the child has to 
learn that only the second of the two ordered rules
applies, and UNDER should be more complex still because 
neither Rule 1 nor Rule 2 will produce any responses that 
coincide with the actual meaning of the word. This matter 
of the cognitive order of difficulty is looked at again 
in the next section with reference to more locative 
prepositions.
Following on from Clark's work, Wilcox and Palermo
(1974/5) pointed out that the physical properties of the 
reference objects were not the only features to be 
important. Children were also sensitive to whether
something was congruent or not. By selecting small
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objects carefully, they showed that if a child was asked 
to put a piece of track in a truck, he/she was likely to 
incorrectly place the track under the truck (ie where you 
would normally expect it to go). Thus the child's 
expectation of which arrangement is more natural is an 
important factor, especially with two-year-olds. This is 
compatible with the proposal made by Strohner and Nelson 
(1974) that, in understanding passive sentences, two and 
three year olds follow a probable event strategy.
Work done by Grieve, Hoogenraad and Murray (1977) provides 
further evidence for the importance of probable event 
strategies, where experiments with blank boxes which were 
assigned names (eg baby, bath) revealed that children put 
a lot of meaning into the materials used in experiments.
Macrae (1976) explored the range of prepositions four year 
olds would use to describe objects vertically aligned and 
found that while ON TOP OF, UNDER and UNDERNEATH were 
frequently used, OVER and BELOW were very infrequent and 
ABOVE was never used. There were virtually no confusions 
of polarity by children at this stage. Some of them 
produced interesting composite constructions such as "up 
beside" and "down beside" during the experiment.
Macrae also noticed that there were some constructions 
which the children seemed to avoid using. For example.
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when asked for the position of a television set in a 
picture containing a vase of flowers on top of a 
television, the children would avoid saying "the 
television is under the flowers" and would either hesitate 
and then produce the more natural description:
"the television is... the... the flowers are on top 
of the television" (ie reversing the order)
or they would say things like;
"the television is over in the corner",
When four year old children were asked to point to a 
picture reflecting a rather strange sentence "the chair is 
under the cushion" they would in fact point to the picture 
of a cushion under a chair, despite the fact that this 
arrangement is less congruent or normal than the picture 
of a chair with a cushion on (which was the picture that 
should have been pointed to). Macrae concluded - 
questionably perhaps, given the strange nature of much of 
the test - that although nursery children appear to have a 
good grasp of some of the locative prepositions and rarely 
use the incorrect word order with them, they do not in 
fact have a syntactic rule associated with their use. 
Macrae maintained that what children do is assign the 
status of referent object to one item (either on 
perceptual or discourse grounds rather than from the order 
mentioned) and then use the preposition as a clue to the
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relative positioning of the objects. Consequently, the 
children are using pragmatic rules for comprehension and 
production which are qualitatively different from those 
which adults are supposed to use but which, outside 
psycholinguistic experiments, coincide with the adult 
rules. There is, however, good reason to suggest that 
the children in Macrae's experiment were confused by the 
strange nature of the questions asked.
I replicated some of Macrae's work with my own research, 
using a picture of a clock on top of a television set and 
asking where the television was (see picture in Appendix
6 ). As one might predict from Macrae's results, this did 
produce problems for the children, but not just for the 
children. I also tested a number of adults with the 
picture cards (to check adult use of prepositions) and the 
television/clock picture was the card which gave rise to 
the most errors and delays in responding. In some cases I 
don't think the adults were listening properly to the 
question and automatically assumed I had asked "where is 
the clock?" which is the more natural question; in other 
cases they would realise their "slip of the ear" and after 
first replying (incorrectly):
"it's on top of the television"
would suddenly realise their mistake, usually laugh and 
correct themselves either by saying;
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"it's under the clock" 
or by turning round the sentence and saying:
"the clock is on top of the television"
In such situations, nobody would assume that adults do not 
understand prepositions or syntactic rules, so surely we 
should not be too hasty drawing those conclusions for 
children.
In the course of everyday life the child's lack of 
understanding of certain prepositions normally goes 
unnoticed, because the combination of non-linguistic and 
probable event strategies means the child copes 
efficiently with the normal situations that arise;
eg "let's put the puzzle back in the box"
"put your beaker on the table"
"your shoes are under the bed"
"I last saw your red tractor behind the sofa"
In psycholinguistic testing, however, it becomes apparent 
that the child does not always fully understand the 
prepositions (and even adults can be "caught out" if they 
are not concentrating Î)
Kevin Durkin (1981) investigated British children's grasp 
of prepositions and showed that their acquisition is a
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protracted affair, continuing well into the early school 
years. The children, aged 3;10 to 7;10, showed an 
increasing willingness to use spatial prepositions with 
increasing age, as might be expected. Durkin also found 
that many of the children's responses contained 
idiosyncratic deviations from presumed adult descriptions:
eg "quite in"
"halfway at"
"nearly facing to"
Other evidence from Durkin's research pointed to more 
specific differences between children's grasp of the
meaning of prepositions and that of adults. It is
conventionally held, for example, that the terms IN FRONT 
OF and BEHIND are opposites. However, there are a number 
of fairly complex considerations involved in actually 
using these terms in the real world depending on whether 
the speaker intends (or is assumed to intend) to refer 
objectively to the properties of a reference point (RP) or 
subjectively to the space between him/herself and the RP:
eg "stand in front of the car" could mean
a) stand in the space adjacent to the front of the
vehicle; or
b) stand in the space adjacent to whichever side of 
the vehicle is facing the speaker (or hearer)
When children were asked to place an object IN FRONT OF or
70
BEHIND a toy car, placed sideways between child and 
experimenter, very few clearly defined errors were 
obtained and many responses were correct. But almost 20% 
of the sample gave asymmetrical responses; that is, in 
response to IN FRONT OF the child might place the object 
at the front of the car, but the same child would respond 
to BEHIND by placing the object on the experimenter's, or 
his own, side of the vehicle. Although other asymmetrical 
pairs of responses were recorded, this type with a 
correct, object-oriented response for IN FRONT OF, but a 
subjectively oriented response for BEHIND, was the most 
common.
Durkin concluded that this asymmetry partly reflects the 
child's uncertainty with the terms, and partly the fact 
that IN FRONT OF explicitly refers to the properties of 
the object, while BEHIND does not. This asymmetry of 
responses contrasts with some American findings, where 
comprehension of IN FRONT OF and IN BACK OF was tested; 
for instance, Harris and Strommen (1972) found that 97.5% 
of their subjects' responses were symmetrical. One 
important consideration here is whether the experiments 
were identical (which is unlikely) in order to achieve 
comparable "asymmetry scores". Another consideration is 
whether asymmetries are found with adults. If this is the 
case, then it would call into question the notion of 
linguistic/semantic uncertainty with the terms which
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Durkin refers to. My own testing of adult subjects with 
picture cards did provide one instance of adult asymmetry 
where something was described as BEHIND a side-facing 
featured object yet something else was described as AT THE 
SIDE OF (rather than IN FRONT OF) another side-facing 
featured object. Whilst one example (amounting to less 
than 8% of the adult subjects) hardly provides conclusive 
evidence, it does suggest that adult patterns and errors
should also be considered before drawing too many
conclusions about children.
The idea of the child's point of view in terms of
deictic/non-deictic responses has already been considered 
in section 1.2.3 and the issue of subjective/objective 
viewpoints is considered again in relation to my own 
research: perspective is considered in section 3.4.1 and
asymmetrical responses with featured items facing the side 
in section 4.2.3.
Durkin also tested children's understanding of proximity 
prepositions such as NEAR, BESIDE and BY (1978). Although 
the semantics of these prepositions are relatively less 
well studied than those of other prepositions, it is
generally agreed that they denote a type of spatial 
relation which is highly context dependent and 
subjectively evaluated. The children's responses to these 
prepositions were very interesting, as often they placed 
object X in contact with object y (when asked to place
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NEAR, BESIDE, BY etc). One could argue that the 
children's interpretations of these prepositions are not 
awry, as their "meanings" do not necessarily preclude 
physical contact. Yet it seems to be another area where 
the child's "point of view" differs somewhat from the 
adult one.
Other prepositions which seemed to hold problems for young 
school children in Durkin's (1981) study were ABOVE, BELOW 
and BETWEEN, where some of the errors were reversal ones 
(for example the child gave the response appropriate to 
ABOVE for BELOW) but many appeared to be the result of a 
failure to make the necessary prior action (such as 
lifting an object to place another below it).
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2.3 Cross-linguistic studies
Judith Johnston and Dan Slobin (1979) looked at the 
development of locative expressions in English, Italian, 
Serbo-Croatian and Turkish. This development was viewed 
in terms of
- non-linguistic growth in conceptual ability 
(COGNITIVE FACTORS)
- language specific differences to the order in which 
the locative expressions were acquired (LINGUISTIC 
FACTORS)
On the basis of the cognitive factors, a fairly universal 
sequence would be expected. However, because languages 
differ, cross-linguistic differences in the rate and 
sequence of development of particular linguistic forms 
should appear.
Seven basic locative relations were examined:
IN, ON, UNDER, BESIDE, BETWEEN, BACK and FRONT
On conceptual grounds, notions of containment, support and 
occlusion predicted early acquisition of IN, ON and UNDER 
(Piaget and Inhelder, 1956). Other developmental 
linguistic studies supported this prediction (eg Brown, 
1973; Clark, 1977). BESIDE, encoding a purely spatial
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proximity relation, independent of object features or 
viewpoint of speaker should, argued Johnston and Slobin, 
follow IN, ON and UNDER, but be conceptually simpler than 
BETWEEN, BACK and FRONT. BACK and FRONT have two uses: 
for reference objects with inherent fronts and backs (eg 
people, cars, houses) referred to as featured (BACKf, 
FRONTf) and for objects without inherent orientational 
features (eg trees, blocks, drinking glasses) where the 
terms encode a projective notion with regard to the 
position of the speaker ie non-featured (BACK, FRONT). 
The projective notion, requiring attention to the 
speaker's point of view, as well as a co-ordination of the 
relative proximities of speaker, reference object and
located object, is conceptually more difficult than the 
non-projective BACKf and FRONTf and should be acquired
later (Piaget and Inhelder, 1956). BACK and FRONT were 
therefore predicted by Johnston and Slobin to be acquired 
later, as they were considered conceptually more 
difficult. BETWEEN requires a co-ordination of two
proximity relations and was judged to appear after 
BACKf/FRONTf which require a specification of object 
features.
There is also evidence (eg Tanz, 1976) that the child is 
likely to focus on disappearing or inaccessible objects, 
which together with the improbability of asking where a 
visible object is, suggests that BACK will be developed 
before FRONT in both featured and non-featured instances.
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The locatives were therefore expected to appear in the
order:
IN/ON/UNDER <BESIDE <BACKf <FRONTf <BETWEEN <BACK <FRONT
where f denotes reference to a featured object 
< denotes "followed by"
Against this background, a number of factors or
predictions were examined which might affect the order:
a) The three Indo-European languages (English, Italian
and Serbo-Croatian) are prepositional while Turkish
is post-positional. There is some evidence that
postpositional systems are more easily acquired than 
prepositional ones because children reportedly pay 
more attention to the ends of words (Slobin, 1973), 
and so an additional advantage for Turkish was
predicted on these grounds.
b) Another linguistic factor is lexical diversity in the 
expression of a particular notion. For example, 
English BESIDE, BY, NEXT TO, NEAR TO, CLOSE TO 
compared with the one Turkish word YANINDA. Johnston 
and Slobin predicted that lexical diversity would 
delay acquisition of the means for encoding a 
relation.
c) Some terms have clear etvmoloay eg English BACK which 
names a body part and makes acquisition easier since
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the word relates to something tangible ("at the BACK 
of teddy" for instance) compared with a locative 
where the word meaning is not so clear eg BETWEEN. 
Clear etymology was predicted to facilitate 
acquisition.
d) Morphological complexity should delay acquisition eg
English ON TOP OF and other expressions using 
numerous adpositions.
e) Some surface forms are homonyms for more than one
underlying notion. In the study, the terms for both 
BACK and FRONT are both homonyms, in that they encode 
relations to featured and non-featured objects with
no difference in surface linguistic form. On the 
grounds that children prefer one-to-one mappings
between semantic concepts and surface morphemes 
(Slobin, 1977), homonymity should impose a measure of 
linguistic difficulty on acquisition.
Around 48 children from each language group aged between 
2;0 and 4;8 were examined. They were tested twice, the 
second time four months after the first. The test 
consisted of a reference point (RP) in front of the child 
(such as a plate) and a small named object eg a stone was 
then placed in relation to the RP. The child was then 
asked where the stone was.
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The youngest children often gave deictic responses, in the 
sense of pointing and saying "there", but the overall 
results were very positive. Children in all language 
groups learned locatives in a consistent order. The exact 
order was language specific, but there was also a general 
order which spanned all language groups (and which tied in 
closely with the predicted order). This general order 
was:
IN/ON/UNDER/BESIDE <BACKf/FRONTf/BETWEEN <BACK/FRONT
and was based on the results from the four languages, as 
set out in the following table:
Table 2: Order of acquisition of locative expressions and % of subjects producing each (from Johnston and Slobin, 1979: 537)
English Italian Serbo-Croatian Turkish
IN 90 IN 91 ON 88 IN 90ON 83 ON 88 IN 84 ON 80UNDER 81 UNDER 84 BESIDE 82 UNDER 79BESIDE 74 BESIDE 77 UNDER 72 BESIDE 79
BETWEEN 49 BETWEEN 57 BACKf 31 BACKf 71FRONTf 30 BACKf 42 BETWEEN 26 FRONTf 53BACKf 21 FRONTf 41 FRONTf 19 BETWEEN 50
BACK 14 BACK 23 BACK 16 BACK 7FRONT 3 FRONT 18 FRONT 12 FRONT 4
Note that the order of acquisition was established from 
the order of difficulty experienced with the locative
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expressions, as measured by Guttman scaling procedures 
(see section 4.2.1).
Italian and Turkish children seemed to learn the locatives 
more quickly and at earlier ages than the English and 
Serbo-Croatian ones. They also had a larger repertoire 
and made few substitution errors as well as learning more 
terms in the four month re-test period.
It was interesting to see how conceptual and linguistic 
factors could be interlinked. For example, there was an 
eleven month age difference between the Turkish and 
Yugoslav children whose most advanced locative was BACKf. 
Johnston and Slobin proposed that the young child learning 
Turkish might acquire featured BACK before becoming aware 
of its homonymity, because the word is linguistically 
easy. In contrast, the child speaking Serbo-Croatian, due 
to morphological complexity and lexical diversity, may 
still be acquiring featured BACK when he or she develops 
the capacity for projective judgments. Thus the 
homonymity of featured BACK would pose additional 
problems, Homonymity could then have a differential 
effect upon locative acquisition. Lexical diversity, 
particularly with English and Serbo-Croatian, often 
resulted in a guessing strategy, as well as slowing down 
the child's search for mapping regularities.
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It was the results of this work that inspired Johnston and 
Slobin's "waiting room" concept, where the key into the 
room is the underlying notion and the key out is the 
linguistic form. A linguistic form therefore enters the 
waiting room when the child learns, primarily on non- 
linguistic grounds, a particular concept. The linguistic 
form leaves the waiting room when the child acquires a 
means of expressing that concept in the language he or she 
is learning. Thus one linguistic form may appear later 
relative to another either because it entered the waiting 
room later (cognitive development) or because a certain 
characteristic, for example adult use, made acquisition 
more difficult for the child (linguistic factors).
Figure 12: The "waiting room" concept
cognitive development 
conceptual factors
WAITING ROOM
semantic and morpho-syntactic problems to be solved here linguistic
form
Whilst Johnston and Slobin's work provides a neat 
explanation for cross-linguistic language acquisition, 
there are some potential flaws which should be examined.
Firstly, the underlying assumption of universal develop-
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ment of conceptual factors is a cause of concern since, as 
we saw in chapter 1, there are differing theories about 
how concept learning actually takes place.
The assumption that meanings arise in the child 
independently of knowledge of the forms with which to 
express them is an important issue with cross-linguistic 
comparisons as there is often no check on the assumption 
that given communicative intentions arise in all children 
at about the same age regardless of their local language. 
If, in fact, properties of the language being learned 
systematically influence the time at which given 
intentions emerge (a possibility recognised by Slobin, 
1982) then time of acquisition per se cannot provide an 
unambiguous guide to linguistic complexity. A further 
crucial assumption is that the time of acquisition of a 
form is influenced by only two factors: the difficulty of
the meaning it expresses and its formal complexity for 
children. Given only these two assumptions, one can 
reason - as Johnston and Slobin did - that if meaning is 
held constant and time of acquisition varies across 
languages, then difficulty of form must be the determining 
factor. Conversely, if formal difficulty is held constant 
across a set of forms expressing related meanings, 
variations in time of acquisition can be attributed to 
differences in the difficulty of the meanings, as Melissa 
Bowerman points out (1985).
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But are cognitive and linguistic complexity the only two 
factors that can influence time of acquisition? Looking 
at cross-linguistic evidence for the language-making 
capacity, Slobin himself (1985) discusses evidence for the 
role of two additional factors: the relative pragmatic
usefulness for the child of different structures and 
differences in frequency of modelling. The role of 
frequency is another controversial area. However, even 
investigators who consider it relatively unimportant 
acknowledge that extremely frequent or infrequent 
modelling probably influences time of acquisition (eg 
Brown, 1973) and frequency also seems to play a 
significant role in determining which formal devices a 
child will learn first to express a given meaning when the 
language provides more than one option (Snow, 1977).
Gentner (1982) found that words for relational meanings 
are consistently learned later than words for concrete 
objects. After ruling out various other explanations (eg 
that adults model object words more often than relational 
words), she argues that this discrepancy reflects 
differences in the cognitive "naturalness" of the 
corresponding concepts: objects concepts are more "given", 
whereas relational concepts are more imposed by the 
structure of language and so require additional time to be 
constructed. Bowerman (1978) and Gopnik (1980) proposed 
that children at the single word utterance stage
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generalise words to novel referents on the basis of not 
only their non-linguistic concepts but also their 
observations of regularities across situations in which 
adults use the words.
Soonja Choi and Melissa Bowerman (1991) looked at the 
relationship between non-linguistic cognition and language 
input in children's acquisition of spatial expressions in 
English and Korean. Their findings challenge the 
widespread view that children initially map spatial words 
directly to non-linguistic spatial concepts and suggest 
that they are influenced by the semantic organisation of 
their language virtually from the beginning. Language 
specificity in semantic organization has rarely been 
considered in studies of the acquisition of spatial 
expressions as most investigators have assumed that the 
meanings of spatial words like IN, ON and UNDER reflect 
non-linguistic spatial concepts rather directly. The 
results from Johnston and Slobin's study do, however, 
appear to show that children acquire English spatial 
prepositions and their counterparts in other languages in 
a relatively consistent order and that this order seems to 
reflect primarily the sequence in which the underlying 
spatial concepts are mastered, Choi and Bowerman accept, 
then, that non-linguistic spatial understanding is 
important in the development of spatial words. But, they 
suggest, there is reason to doubt whether it directly 
provides spatial concepts to which words can be mapped.
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In their study, Choi and Bowerman (1991) contrasted the 
way motion is lexicalized by English and Korean children 
and examined spontaneous speech from the period of single 
word utterances and early word combinations. They found 
that although the children learning English and Korean 
talked about similar motion events in the second year of 
life, they did not do so in similar ways. English 
speaking children relied heavily on Path particles such as 
INTO, OUT OF, UP, DOWN. They started out using some of 
these in restricted or idiosyncratic ways, but soon 
extended them to a wide range of spontaneous and caused 
motion events that share similar abstract Paths. Note 
that in English, Path is marked the same way whether a 
motion is spontaneous or caused (cf "The ball rolled 
INTO/OUT OF the box" vs "John rolled the ball INTO/OUT OF 
the box"). Korean children did not use words in the same 
way. Like Korean adults, they distinguished strictly 
between words for spontaneous and caused motion. They did 
not acquire intransitive Path verbs for spontaneous motion 
IN, OUT, UP and DOWN until long after English learners 
began to use Path particles for spontaneous motion. Once 
they did learn verbs for UP and DOWN, they never 
overgeneralised them to posture changes or used them as 
requests to be picked up and carried, both favourite uses 
of UP and DOWN by English speaking children.
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The children in the study (both nationalities) also made 
certain errors, even with topological relationships
eg "in" (putting ping-pong ball between knees)
which suggested that some spatial words are more difficult 
than others, presumably for cognitive reasons (Choi and 
Bowerman, 1991: 114).
So, in rejecting the hypothesis that children's early 
spatial words are mapped to non-linguistic concepts, Choi 
and Bowerman do not mean that non-linguistic spatial 
cognition plays no role in spatial semantic development. 
They agree that across languages, children learn words for 
topological relationships (eg IN and ON) before words for 
projective relationships (eg IN FRONT OF and BEHIND) and 
presume that this bias reflects the order of emergence of 
non-linguistic spatial understanding. They conclude that 
the meanings of children's early spatial words are 
language specific and that language learners are sensitive 
to the semantic structure of the input language virtually 
from the beginning. By age three, for example, English 
and German speaking children differ strikingly from 
Spanish and Hebrew speaking children in how they express 
spatial information in a story-telling task (Berman and 
Slobin, 1987). How children figure out language specific 
spatial categories remains uncertain though.
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Whilst claiming that the meanings of children's early 
spatial words are language specific, Choi and Bowerman 
(1991) acknowledge that existing cross-linguistic studies 
do not show which is more important in very young 
children's acquisition of spatial language; non-linguistic 
spatial knowledge or the semantic organisation of the 
input language.
Van Geert (1985/6) also questions that the terms IN, ON 
and UNDER are mapped onto pre-verbal conceptual 
organisation of spatial relations. He suggests a modular 
theory: that knowledge of spatial relations is represented 
mentally in three structurally distinct forms: perceptual, 
praxic (practical) and linguistic. According to this 
view, the child must learn which lexical contexts belong 
with which preposition (he discusses English and Dutch, 
both of which use prepositions to mark spatial relations). 
Van Geert argues that there are no theoretical grounds for 
claiming that IN is less complex than ON or that ON is 
less complex than UNDER. However, there are praxic 
differences associated with the terms. In order for an 
object to be placed UNDER another, the reference object 
must be lifted, and when an object is IN a container, it 
is also ON (the bottom of) the object. In addition, van 
Geert claims that perceptually something that is ON is 
more salient than something that is UNDER. According to 
van Geert's view, the concepts represented by the 
prepositions are, from the beginning, based in the lexical
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distribution rules relating to the three distinct forms 
(perceptual, praxic and linguistic).
There are also other insights to be gained from looking at 
the acquisition of prepositions in other languages. How 
then does the order suggested by Johnston and Slobin 
(1979) hold up in these languages?
In French, the first preposition to appear is "à" (AT/TO). 
This seems to appear first in possessive or benefactive 
settings, as in "à moi" (to me/mine, for me) (Sabeau- 
Jouannet, 1978). "De" (OF/FROM) also appears early with 
animate nouns, to indicate possession. However, the line 
between possessive and locative is somewhat tenuous in the 
earliest stages, and very young children may equate the 
two (cf Greenfield and Smith, 1976). The next spatial 
preposition to appear is "dans" (IN), followed soon after 
by "sur" (ON), which, according to Sabeau-Jouannet (1978), 
contrasts with both "à" and "dans" in the two-year-old's 
speech. The further contrast of "sur" (ON) with "sous" 
(UNDER) takes a little longer to emerge. In 
comprehension, children appear to master terms that 
contrast on the vertical axis eg "sur" (ON) and "sous" 
(UNDER), "en dessus de" (ON TOP OF) and "en dessous de" 
(UNDERNEATH) before those for the horizontal, front-back 
axis eg "devant" (IN FRONT OF) and "derrière" (BEHIND) 
(Pierart, 1977) which generally parallels the English data
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(Clark, 1980). Later still, they acquire terms like 
"entre" (BETWEEN) and "au milieu de" (IN THE MIDDLE OF" 
(Pierart, 1975).
Although the general order of acquisition in production in 
French seems to follow that found in comprehension, there 
are some discrepancies within production when Sabeau- 
Jouannet 's data are compared with Pierart's. Such 
discrepancies could be the result of subtle differences in 
the varieties of French spoken by and to the children, or 
the result of the elicitation methods used to obtain 
production data in some experimental settings (E Clark, 
1985).
In Italian, the main data available are observations of 
early production, some elicited production, and some data 
on comprehension (E Clark, 1985). The first locative 
preposition to appear is "a" (TO/AT) at around age two and 
then, as seen in the previously described cross-linguistic 
study by Johnston and Slobin (1979), the equivalents to IN 
("in", "nel", "dentro"), ON ("sul", "sopra"), BESIDE 
("vicino a"), UNDER ("sotto"), BETWEEN ("tra", "in mezza 
a"), BEHIND ("dietro") and IN FRONT ("davanti"). Like 
English, the Italian terms for BACK and FRONT are 
sufficiently complex linguistically to retard the 
emergence of these terms in relation to terms for BETWEEN, 
even though BETWEEN is a conceptually more advanced notion 
(Slobin 1985). In English we have two terms for BACK
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rather than one (BEHIND and IN BACK OF) and in Italian, 
the expression "dietro a" is also morphologically complex 
and does not correspond to the word for the body part 
"back”. As Johnston and Slobin put it: "Wherever
conceptual complexity fails to predict actual order of 
acquisition, we find some pocket of relative linguistic 
difficulty" (1979: 541).
The data for Spanish are not as extensive, but show a 
similar pattern with "a" (AT/TO) and "en" (IN) amongst the 
earliest prepositions used. Taking the available Spanish 
data with those for Italian and French, we can see that in 
the Romance languages, the earliest spatial prepositions 
acquired are terms for AT or IN, followed very quickly by 
ON, UP and DOWN, and by OUT or OFF. These forms enter 
during the second year, from age 2;0 to 2;6 onwards. 
Children then also begin to acquire the various verbs of 
motion that contain directional information. In the 
Romance languages, such verbs typically combine notions of 
motion with those of direction, eg Spanish "subir" (to go 
up), "entrar" (to go in), or French "entrer" (to go in), 
"sortir" (to go out). This is in contrast to English, 
where verbs usually combine motion with manner rather than 
direction eg run, scramble, crawl (Talmy, 1975) - see (l).
(1) The baby is running/crawling (around) in the 
kitchen.
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Directional information in English is provided by locative 
particles like IN, OUT, ON, or TOWARDS added to the verb:
(2) The baby ran/crawled into the kitchen.
In German, case markings are important to show general 
location (dative case) or change of location (accusative 
case):
(3) Das Baby krappelte in der/die Kuche.
(The baby crawled in/into the kitchen.)
In contrast, in the French equivalent showing a change of 
location (4), the main verb (est entre) combines motion 
with path, while manner is expressed by other means 
("courant"/"en rampant");
(4) Le bébé est entré dans la cuisine courant/en 
rampant.
(The baby entered in(to) the kitchen by 
running/crawling.)
Other recent research has examined children's use of 
spatial devices in discourse across languages, showing 
that typological differences (ie differences in the 
type/structure of language) affect what spatial 
information adults and children focus on and how they 
organise the flow of information in discourse (Hickmann, 
forthcoming). For example, static locations must be
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inferred from Paths in English as in (5) below, whereas 
Paths must be inferred from Path verbs and static 
locations in Spanish (6):
(5) The boy put the frog down into a jar.
(6) El nino metio la rana en el frasco que habia 
abajo.
(The boy inserted the frog in/on the jar that 
was below.)
In the acquisition of German, prepositions are frequently 
omitted by children under 3;0 (Grimm, 1973) and when they 
are used, certain ones predominate, leading to incorrect 
use in locative and temporal expressions. According to 
the data reported by Grimm (1975), the prepositions most 
frequently used in locative expressions by children 
aged 2;6 to 6;0 are "in" (IN), "auf" (ON), "zu" (TO) and 
"bei" (AT). "Unter" (UNDER) is far less frequent, 
although it has a level of conceptual complexity similar 
to IN and ON. It is possible that "unter" (UNDER) is not 
produced so often by children because it reflects adult 
use, as the prepositions most frequently used by the 
children in Grimm's study (1975) match those which are 
most frequent in adult German speech (Meier, 1954). 
Moerk (1980) also concludes that the relationship between 
input frequency and the acquisition of the grammatical 
morphemes is worth another look and that Brown (1973) was 
wrong when he dismissed it as an insignificant variable.
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Although frequency of usage may be a factor explaining 
which prepositions are first acquired, cognitive 
simplicitiy of the relations to be expressed does appear 
to be relevant in German too (Mills, 1985). As far as
the acquisition of prepositions in German is concerned, 
more data would be needed to disentangle the influence of 
linguistic and cognitive factors.
Hebrew-speaking children appear to acquire spatial 
prepositions in an order consistent with that noted for 
other languages - a study by Kolman (1979) with children 
aged 1?6 to 4;6 revealed the following order in both 
comprehension and production tasks: ON, IN, UNDER, NEXT
TO, BEHIND and IN FRONT OF (with the terms dividing up 
into two developmental groups - IN, ON, UNDER and then 
NEXT TO, BEHIND and IN FRONT OF) while Yif'at (1981) found 
that four to five year olds still had difficulty with the 
preposition "beyn" (BETWEEN, AMONG). These findings are 
highly consistent with those of Johnston and Slobin (1979) 
and together with developmental patterns for the 
acquisition of pairs of dimensional adjectives such as 
BIG/SMALL in Hebrew, indicate clearly that a cognitive 
grasp of spatial and dimensional relations dictates 
developmental order and that conceptualisation of these 
relations precedes the linguistic encoding of such 
distinctions (Berman, 1985).
Although Japanese data on locative expressions are rather
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sparse and unsystematic, there is some evidence that 
Japanese children acquire locatives in a stable sequence 
(Clancy, 1985). Usually the first locative to be acquired 
is "ni", which covers the semantic range of English IN and 
ON, as well as AT and TO. In Clancy's data, after several 
simple post-positions had emerged, locatives which are 
linguistically and cognitively more complex began to 
appear, such as the Japanese equivalents of BESIDE, INSIDE 
etc. Since these forms are constructed in a manner 
similar to the corresponding Turkish locatives, Japanese 
would provide an interesting test case for the tests of 
acquisition carried out by Johnston and Slobin (1979).
The data from many languages for the early stages of 
locative expressions therefore show strong parallels in 
which notions are expressed first. These parallels 
suggest that the conceptual complexity of many spatial 
notions is a primary factor in determining when children 
learn expressions for them in their first language. 
Children first look for linguistic expression of those 
notions which they have already mastered conceptually. 
Complex notions take longer to grasp and so are available 
only later in the development.
In this domain, then, the pace set for the acquisition of 
spatial terms appears to be largely determined by 
children's cognitive development. We should not forget.
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however, that there may be other factors at work too, such 
as the frequency of input (adult use) and the semantic 
structure of the language itself, as we saw earlier in 
this section when considering the work of Bowerman and 
Choi (1991).
Some other work looking at the influence of language 
specific properties in the acquisition of locative 
expressions was carried out by Edith Bavin (1990) who 
studied children speaking Warlpiri, a Pama-Nyungan 
language spoken by about 3,000 people in central 
Australia. Bavin proposed that if there was a universal 
tendency for "support” and "containment" to be the 
concepts which are first mapped onto linguistic forms, 
then young children from very different language 
backgrounds would be expected to use their language to 
express these concepts before others. If, on the other 
hand, she found that children do not distinguish between 
these, but that observations of their acquisition are 
correlated with the way their language divides up spatial 
relations, one could argue that children do not just 
search for ways to express these pre-linguistic concepts; 
rather that the development of the concept may be 
influenced by language experience (as suggested by Choi 
and Bowerman, 1991).
In Warlpiri, locative terms are nominals and are used in 
combination with a locative case marker on the reference
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object; directional affixes may be added to them. There 
is no one-to-one correspondence of Warlpiri lexical items 
with English ones. Bavin's studies involved 33 children 
aged 3;11 to 8;0 years. It is interesting to note that 
preliminary work had shown that younger children were not 
able to complete the tasks and that Warlpiri children are 
not expected to be capable of following explicit verbal 
instructions nor question-answer routines until they are 
exposed to the school system (although Bavin does not say 
at what age this is).
Four main tests were conducted to look at the following 
locative terms:
kankarla-rra "up-thither" meaning ON
kanunju-mparra "down-across" meaning UNDER
kaninja-rni "down-hither" meaning IN
kulkurru BETWEEN
kamparru FRONT
pirdangirli BEHIND
a) Test 1 (placing task)
This looked at comprehension - children were asked to 
place objects in a particular location in relation to a 
reference object. The materials were later used as a 
production test with some of the children.
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b) Test 2 (selection task)
Three months later - the IN, ON, UNDER locations were 
examined in more detail and with different tasks. 
Children were presented with five arrays, one at a time 
and subjects were asked to choose which of four identical 
objects was in a particular location. Production data 
were also collected from some of the subjects.
c) Test 3 (production)
This test was to try to elicit further production of terms
for IN, ON and UNDER using a round styrofoam container
with no handle or design as the reference object (which 
could be inverted to allow the ON location).
d) Test 4 (selection task)
Fifteen months later - the FRONT/BACK dimension was 
investigated in more detail using featured, non-featured 
reference objects and placed objects to test which item 
would be picked for the location term being tested.
For example, the arrays in the following figure (amongst 
many others) were used for Test 4;
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Figure 13: Examples of arrays used in Bavin study
t
t 0 i
t
where 0 is a non-featured reference object (RO) 
eg a round featureless can 
f is the direction of a featured placed object 
eg a dog
and
+
+  — >  -f-
+
where -> is the direction of a featured reference 
object (FRO) eg an animal 
+ is a non-featured placed object eg a stone
Results from the tests showed that the order in which 
Warlpiri children acquire the means available in the 
language to express locative concepts showed some 
similarity with other studies, but also some differences. 
ON/UP was an early acquisition and was contrasted with 
DOWN. However, there was no linguistic evidence that IN 
was a separate concept for the young child to be mapped 
onto an expression. In contrast with previous studies on
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other languages such as Johnston and Slobin (1979), it was 
found that "kulkurru" (BETWEEN) was acquired before 
"pirdangirli" (BEHIND) and "kamparru" (FRONT). Warlpiri 
children did not use an early deictic strategy in 
determining locations for "pirdangirli" (BEHIND). This 
could be interpreted as RIGHT, LEFT or FRONT of the 
reference object. "Space close to self" appeared to be 
the most general understanding of "kamparru" before the 
children started to use features of a reference object for 
orientation at around age six (although it was found that 
orientation of the reference object as well as features of 
the placed object affected interpretation).
"Pirdangirli" (BEHIND) and "kampurru" (FRONT) were not 
considered opposite poles of one dimension for the 
youngest Warlpiri children (aged three and four) and even 
after age six the Warlpiri child did not assume that they 
represented opposites on a line between two points. 
There was also evidence that the case marker and locative 
nominal could be interpreted independently, for example in 
test 4 where a featured reference object (FRO) was facing 
away from the child and four placed animals were facing 
towards the child: some subjects resolved the conflict
arising because the back of the FRO and the backmost 
animal were not in the same position by choosing to 
interpret the sentence "which dog is at the back of the 
cow" as "the back dog".
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That the language structure itself influences the 
acquisition of forms to express locations was also 
illustrated by the fact that the Warlpiri child first uses 
the locative case marker on a reference object or the 
locative nominal alone before the case marker and nominal 
are used in combination. In Warlpiri, the case marker on 
a reference object is the only marker of location that is 
necessary; the use of specific nominals allows for more 
specific information, but it is the speaker's option to 
add these.
Bavin's studies appear to support the idea that the child 
acquires locative expressions gradually based on 
linguistic input. This lends support to the views of 
Choi and Bowerman (1991) on the importance of semantic 
organisation of the language being learned and contrasts 
somewhat with Johnston and Slobin's view of the paramount 
importance of conceptual factors in the acquisition of 
prepositions, the order of which is then modified by 
linguistic factors.
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3 RESEARCH STUDY
3.1 Hypothesis/aims of research
Following on from the research on prepositions and 
prepositional expressions already carried out (and 
detailed in the previous chapter), I decided to conduct my 
own research to investigate the area further and to try to 
confirm Johnston and Slobin's (1979) findings for British 
English speakers (rather than American English ones). I 
wanted to test the following hypothesis:
"There is a set order for the acquisition of 
locative expressions in first language 
acquisition which is consistent with 
comprehension and production,"
The order of locative concepts to test was:
IN/ON/UNDER/BESIDE <BEHINDf/FRONTf/BETWEEN <BEHIND/FRONT
where < means "is followed by"
f denotes BEHIND or IN FRONT OF a featured 
object eg a teddy bear which has a distinct 
front and back (compared with a non-featured 
object eg a round, featureless tin)
This is the general order described by Johnston and Slobin
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(1979) which spanned all language groups and tied in 
closely with the predicted order on the basis of 
conceptual factors. The American preposition BACK has 
been replaced by the more frequently used English BEHIND.
A secondary aim was to use the opportunity of testing the 
children to collect details of any errors which they might 
make during the course of the sessions. These could then 
be examined to see if they would provide any information 
on the acquisition process or on the mental 
representations children have of locative expressions.
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3.2 Definition of acquisition
It is difficult to determine the exact time of acquisition 
of a form in any language. It is also difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify the time of "first intention" to 
express a given meaning. Children's initial appropriate 
uses of a form are often based on relatively superficial 
knowledge; "acquisition" beyond this point may be a drawn- 
out process in which the child discovers successively 
deeper levels of structure and regularity at the levels of 
both form and meaning (Bowerman, 1985).
One can therefore make a distinction between emergence 
(the first appearance of a form) and acquisition (its 
reliable use). How does one define "reliable" though,
and how should "acquisition" be defined for the purposes 
of my study into prepositions and prepositional 
expressions?
In the case of grammatical morphemes, something is 
considered acquired if it occurs in at least 90% of the 
contexts in which it is required (Brown, 1973: 258).
Clearly in my research study there would be a limited 
number of required contexts so it would be difficult to 
apply the same criterion. In other research projects with 
prepositions, acquisition has been measured by allocating 
credits for expressing a particular locative notion if the
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child produces it more often in appropriate contexts than 
in inappropriate ones (the "more often right than wrong 
principle" seen in Johnston and Slobin, 1979) or if the 
target lexicalisation was used at least twice during the 
testing session (Johnston, 1984). I decided to adopt an 
approach similar to Johnston and Slobin's for my 
definition of acquisition - a term would be considered 
acquired in each test if it was used in the correct 
context and not used more often in an inappropriate 
context (the "more often right than wrong" principle).
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3.3 Method
3.3.1 Subjects
In all, eighty children between the ages of 2;0 and 5;0 
were tested for the study. This age range was chosen so 
that at the lower end, children would just be starting to 
acquire the locative prepositions to be tested, and at the 
upper end, most of them would have been acquired (based on 
Johnston and Slobin's 1979 results). There was a fairly 
even number of boys and girls (53% boys compared with 47% 
girls) and a good distribution of ages. The age range 2;7 
to 3;3 was well represented, and this range proved 
particularly interesting from the point of view of 
results. Full details of ages and sexes are shown in 
Appendix 2.
There was a fairly homogeneous child profile: mainly
white, middle-class and from southern England, since all 
groups were held in or around Guildford, Surrey. To begin 
with, this worried me slightly when planning the research 
as I had been used to much larger research projects. 
However, I realised that not only would it be impossible 
to obtain a representative sample of the child population 
from a geographical/social/family structure point of view 
within the limitations of the project, but it was also not 
necessary. The important thing to be tested was the
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acquisition order of prepositions and prepositional 
expressions in British children. I wasn't looking for 
specific deviations depending on social or cultural group. 
The homogeneous child profile should, of course, be kept 
in mind when judging the results.
3.3.2 Location and profile of children
The testing was carried out in homes familiar to the 
children so that they were as relaxed, co-operative and 
forthcoming as possible. This was achieved by recruiting 
"volunteer" homes with children in the target age groups. 
These homes then acted as hosts for the research sessions, 
to which three to five other children (normally friends 
and neighbours) were invited. Children were seen 
individually, at staggered intervals throughout the 
morning or afternoon, normally in a fairly quiet room 
without too many toys or other distractions. As well as 
the child being on familiar ground, the child's mother 
was also present in the room if needed. Mothers were 
asked to observe rather than actively participate with 
their children in the "play sessions".
Bearing in mind the relative homogeneity of the children 
studied in terms of social and geographical background, I 
could use this to some advantage if I wanted to look at 
other factors which might contribute to any differences 
observed. For example, would there be a difference in the
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acquisition order or speed of acquisition between the
sexes? Did the child's position in the family have any 
impact on his or her linguistic development?
I therefore took details of the following at the beginning 
of each session:
a) Position of the child in the family (first born,
youngest, only child, twin etc) ie how many and what 
ages were any brothers or sisters. In a number of 
instances two children from one family attended the 
same session if they both fell into the 2;0 to 5;0 
year age range.
b) Did the child attend a nursery school or playgroup
and if so for how many mornings/afternoons a week? 
Was the child cared for primarily by the mother or 
was there a significant amount of time spent with a
childminder or other carer?
c) Were there any other details like hearing problems 
(which might have been rectified by the time of 
testing but which could still have affected speech 
development)? Details of the nationality of the 
parents were also taken where necessary (one little 
boy had a Japanese father and a number of Japanese 
words in his vocabulary).
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3.3.3 Timing and set-up details
Most of the research was carried out in June 1989 and I 
allowed half an hour for each child (which included an 
introductory session). I also did a small "second round" 
of four children a year later (hosted at my house when my 
oldest son and some of his contemporaries were around 
3;0). My son's results were recorded for interest only, 
since I did not want to include results that might have 
been subconsciously biased by my own particular interest 
in prepositions.
For the research testing (known as "play sessions" to the 
children) I had the help of a research assistant to make a 
note of results as well as using a tape recorder 
throughout. Examples of the forms used for annotating 
results are given in Appendix 3. Since I was interested 
in both the production and comprehension of prepositions, 
I devised games which would test both of these. The games 
followed a short introductory session so that the child 
could get used to me. During this time I made a note of 
the child's name and age etc, and explained briefly that 
we were going to play some games. The child then helped 
me unpack my bag; all the children seemed curious to see 
what was in there and it was also a good opportunity to 
make sure that each child was familiar with the vocabulary 
of the items.
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The three games I used to elicit responses are described 
in detail in section 3.4. At the end of the session each 
child was given a small packet of raisins to take away, a 
great incentive for the next child to come and 
participate!
3.3.4 Order of testing
Following a pilot study, I decided to carry out the three 
games in a fixed order. The first game would test which 
prepositions and prepositional expressions children could 
produce before they had heard any from me, the second 
would test comprehension and the third would look again at 
production (and the children might possibly achieve higher 
scores here because they would have heard the prepositions 
used in the second game and this might act as a reminder).
Methodologically, it is unsound to conduct the studies in 
a fixed order and ideally there should perhaps have been 
subgroups with each subject being put through the tests in 
one of the possible six orders. However, this would have 
complicated the design considerably and if combined with 
rotating the order of the prepositions themselves would, I 
felt, have not only been very time consuming but would 
also have made the experiments far harder to carry out and 
not nearly as flowing and natural (if, for example, I had 
to keep checking which preposition was to be tested next).
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In addition, it would have been much more time consuming 
tabulating and analysing the results.
My decision to maintain a fixed order for the testing of 
prepositions was not, however, based predominantly on ease 
of execution and a desire to keep the tests simple, but
more so out of a desire to build confidence in the
children. By starting off with (purportedly) the easiest 
preposition (IN) and gradually moving on to the harder 
ones, I felt that the children would be encouraged to 
progress better if they had made a confident start. An 
incident in the pilot study had suggested that if asked a 
"difficult" question which the child was unable to respond 
to, he or she might be reluctant to participate in any 
further questions, regardless of their relative ease or 
difficulty linguistically. This isolated instance could 
well have been due to obstinacy on the part of the child, 
(ie refusing to co-operate with the easier question had 
nothing to do with it coming after the harder one) but the
confidence issue remains nevertheless a valid one in my
opinion. An analogy can be made with having two puzzles 
for a child to try and complete; a hard one and an easy 
one. If the child is asked to do the hard one first and 
cannot, he or she may not even want to attempt the second 
one because of prior experience. Any advantages gained 
from the confidence point of view do not of course obviate 
the necessity or desirability of a sound testing method.
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One concern I had which was allayed by the pilot test was 
whether the attention span of the young children would be
long enough to last the full length of the session. On
this I needed to have no worries, as the variety, fun and 
short length involved in each task meant that even the 
youngest children had no problems staying the course. If 
attention span had proved a problem, I would have 
changed the experimental design, since I did not want 
children scoring badly because they had "switched off" 
towards the end of the session.
One thing I did change after the pilot test was some of
the testing materials: I had tried using small gold
chocolate coins as placed objects in one of the games, 
thinking that these could be given to the children at the 
end as a reward. However, one or two of the children were 
more intent on whether they could eat the coins there and 
then than telling me where they had found them! I 
subsequently chose a small soft red ball as the placed 
object.
I thus concluded that the research design I had chosen was 
best within the constraints of the project, despite the 
methodological drawbacks of a fixed testing order. It is 
also interesting and perhaps pertinent to note that other 
analyses of prepositional data have found no significant 
effect for task order (Johnston and Slobin, 1979; 
Johnston, 1984).
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3.4 Games to test production and comprehension
Production and comprehension abilities are not the same, 
particularly where children are concerned, and young 
children often do understand forms well before they can 
produce them. Infants under one year old, for example, 
can understand some words for many months before they try 
to produce them, and older children usually understand 
comparative word forms long before they try to use them 
(Clark, 1993: 245). This asymmetry between production and 
comprehension has been documented in a number of studies 
(eg Clark and Berman, 1984) and so I thought it would be 
useful to test for both production and comprehension of 
locative prepositions and prepositional expressions. If 
acquisition is charted from production data only, there is 
the chance that what children understand about locative 
prepositions (or language in general) may be seriously 
underestimated.
I wanted therefore to look at both production and 
comprehension and so I devised three basic games to elicit 
responses when testing locative prepositions and 
prepositional expressions:
3.4.1 Hide-and-seek
The aim of this game was to see how many prepositions
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formed a natural part of the child's vocabulary and if 
there was a distinct order in which they were used (ie the 
production of prepositions was being tested). If my 
hypothesis was correct, and the prepositions were acquired 
in the predicted order (broadly based on cognitive 
factors) then the children would only be able to use the 
"harder" prepositions like BEHIND or IN FRONT correctly 
once they were in command of the "easier" prepositions 
like IN and ON.
I devised a simple game of hide and seek to encourage the 
children to use the target prepositions. The game used a 
hand puppet called Gordon (Gordon the Gofer from 
Children's BBC) who needed to find a soft coloured ball 
(about the size of a tennis ball). I would hide the ball 
with one hand in various locations (see below) and the 
child then had to tell Gordon where it was. Gordon (on my 
other hand) would then make an excited squeak, pick up the 
ball in his mouth and return it to me to hide again.
The hide-and-seek locations were:
IN a bucketIN(SIDE) a round biscuit tinON a child's chairUNDER a blanketBESIDE/NEXT TO some bricks BEHINDf a teddy bearIN FRONTf the same teddy bearBETWEEN a book and the tinBEHIND the tinIN FRONT the tin
Please see Appendix 4 for a photograph of the items used
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in the hide-and-seek game.
Following the pilot test I had done with a group of pre­
school children, I decided, somewhat reluctantly at first, 
to place a small scarf over Gordon's eyes. The reason for 
this was that one of the main obstacles to competent 
execution of the hide-and-seek game was the children's 
natural instinct to point and say "there" (deictic 
responses) when telling Gordon where the ball was instead 
of giving more precise instructions such as "in the 
bucket" etc. I was initially reluctant to use the scarf 
because it seemed incongruent with the idea of Gordon 
looking for something and also because there had been 
criticism of Carol Chomsky's use of a blindfold on a doll 
(Cromer, 1970). However, in the testing by Chomsky 
(1969), the blindfold was central to the question "is this 
doll easy to see or hard to see" and was more likely to 
affect the children's responses. Chomsky's results were in 
any case confirmed by Cromer using different testing 
methods (Cromer, 1970). In my research, the scarf (which 
was not very obvious anyway) was simply there if needed 
to give a reason for giving fuller responses if deictic
ones were being used eg "yes, but can you tell Gordon with
words because he can't see exactly where you're pointing". 
This also helped to get over the potential problem of 
looking for the ball when it was not concealed eg when IN
FRONT of the teddy or tin.
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since it was the prepositions and not vocabulary that I 
was interested in, I accepted responses such as "in 
there" or "behind there" as equally valid. That is, a 
"behind there" would score a correct point just as well as 
a more detailed "behind the brown teddy bear sitting on 
the carpet".
In order to avoid any potential confusions with 
subject/object orientated responses, I made sure that the 
child would see the teddy face on (so that BEHIND the
teddy would be BEHIND from the point of view of both the
child and the teddy and not potentially at the side). I 
also made sure that the child and I viewed things from the 
same angle to avoid any possibility of the child giving 
information to me/Gordon that had been specially adapted 
for us. In effect this simplified things compared with 
many real life situations and, indeed, compared with other 
testing situations. Recall, for example the discussion of 
deictic and non-deictic uses of BEHIND and IN FRONT in
section 1.2 where "the ball is IN FRONT OF the doll"
could be used non-deictically if it meant the ball was 
located near the doll's face regardless of the doll's 
orientation in relation to the speaker, or, if used 
deictically, it meant that the ball was located between 
the speaker's face and the doll, whether the doll faces 
the speaker or not.
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Figure 14 : Some positions used/avoided with BEHIND
where o is the ball being hidden
f and —> are the teddy (featured RP) with the arrow indicating the direction teddy faces
0 is a featureless RP (eg tin)
CH is the child
T/G is the tester/Gordon (puppet)
a) o
\l'
not b)
CH T/G CH T/G
ball is BEHIND teddy 
for both child and 
tester. This is the 
configuration I used 
to test BEHINDf
ball is BEHIND teddy's 
back but might be 
considered NEXT TO from 
child and tester's 
viewpoint (although 
unlikely)
not c) T/G
o
CH
or d) T/G
o0
CH
in c) and d) child and tester would be at opposite 
sides of ball and teddy/tin so BEHIND could refer to 
the space BEHIND the tin from the tester or the 
child's point of view, ie it could be ambiguous.
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3.4.2 The "putting" game
The aim of this game was to test the comprehension of 
prepositions by asking each child to put a small object in 
various positions. Positions similar to those used in the 
hide-and-seek game were ruled out, since they would have 
encouraged a considerable degree of "probable event" 
strategy (see chapter 2 of this thesis) and it would have 
been difficult to assess whether the child had put the 
object on the chair because he/she understood the 
preposition ON or whether it was just a logical guess.
Since children do assign great importance to the materials 
used (Wilcox and Palermo, 1974/5; Grieve, Hoogenraad and 
Murray, 1977), I devised a game whereby the small object 
(a yellow toy key) could be put in various positions in 
relation to the same reference point. In this way, I 
tried to minimise the children's reliance on probable 
event strategies and assigning roles to the materials. 
For the reference point I used a plastic Duplo box (see 
Appendix 5) which had a front opening (facing the child 
and myself) and which was raised slightly on Duplo "legs" 
(to facilitate the UNDER location). The box was placed on 
the flat seat of the child's chair used in the previous 
game so that it was a convenient height for the children 
to work with.
Since the box had an interior, a surface and an underneath
116
there were of course several "options" for the children 
and so, of course, I could not rule out the non-linguistic 
strategies described by Eve Clark (1973a) being used. By 
using the plastic box on legs, I was able to ask each 
child to put the toy key in the following positions:
IN the boxON the boxUNDER the boxBEHIND the boxIN FRONT the boxBESIDE the box
To test the location BETWEEN, an additional item was 
needed on the chair seat, and for this I decided to use a 
very small teddy bear. I could then not only test the 
BETWEEN preposition but also check BEHIND and IN FRONT 
with a more featured object (the teddy) to see if there 
was any difference in comprehension. Thus the following 
positions were also tested:
BETWEEN the box and the little bearIN FRONTf of the little bear BEHINDf the little bear
Finally, out of interest and to vary the game a little at 
the end, I introduced a second, identical toy key and 
placed one IN and one ON the box. The children were then
asked to take a key
OUT OF the box (ie remove the one IN the box)OFF the box (ie remove the one ON the box)
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The immediate reaction of some of the younger children in 
the pilot study was to take the key OFF the top of the box
and put it IN the box with the other key. Another
response was to pick up both keys and hand them to me.
For these reasons, I had to stress to the children that I
only wanted one key and that they had to listen carefully 
to see which one it was.
For detailed results of the OUT OF/OFF test please see 
section 4.2.4.
3.4.3 Cards
The card game was really a supplementary game to add to 
the information on production which had been gained in the 
earlier hide-and-seek game.
I had produced a series of large white cards with pictures 
by cutting out and sticking on pictures from a children's 
book (please see Appendix 6). Most of the cards showed 
two items and the child would be asked to describe where 
one of them was
eg Q: Where's the cat?
A: In the basket.
There were, however, some important differences in the
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information gained from the cards game compared with that 
from hide-and-seek. Firstly, the child would already have 
heard the prepositions being tested (in the putting game) 
which might have acted as a reminder if the words had not 
been forthcoming when playing hide-and-seek.
Secondly, the cards were by their very nature more 
abstract and sophisticated than the physical game of hide- 
and-seek and so they tested a slightly different kind of 
perception (eg what were the pictures representing rather 
than the physical side of things ie the answer to "where's 
the cat?" was not "stuck on the card").
Thirdly, using pictures enabled me to test a whole range 
of ideas relating to the area of prepositions, including 
using incongruent situations and featured animals facing 
to the side with another animal either behind them (not at 
their rear end) or in front of them (not at their head 
end).
To help facilitate answers to the card game, I introduced 
it by giving one or two examples which I had prepared on 
additional cards.
For example, I would say "where's the egg? ....  in the
egg cup" or "where are the matches? .... in the matchbox".
The cards tested the following:
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Question Answer
Where's the... 
catteddy bearballtractorteddy bearcarhatguitarballoonliongoattelevisionumbrellaballballwhat's the ball
basket
IN the basket ON the chair UNDER the table NEXT TO the tree BEHIND the piano (f)IN FRONT of the house (f) BETWEEN the shoe and the sock BEHIND the drum IN FRONT of the bricks BEHIND the crocodile (fs)IN FRONT of the horse (fs) UNDER the clock (i)OVER the duck (i) at the TOP of the ladder at the BOTTOM of the ladder doing now? (moving it)... going UP the ladder ... going DOWN the ladder it's AROUND/UNDER the cat (i) (same picture on first card)
Notes
(f)(fs)(i)
is a featured object facing the child/tester is a featured object facing the side is an incongruent question ie it would be more natural to ask "where's the clock?" rather than "where's the television?"
So that I could compare the children's responses to the
cards with the "target" prepositions which would be
expected from an adult (particularly where the more 
unusual arrays using featured animals and incongruent 
items were concerned) , I asked a number of adults to
"play" the card game (for results please see section
4.2.3).
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RESULTS OF THE STUDY
4.1 Introduction
As mentioned before, the main purpose of the study was to 
look at the order in which locative prepositions are 
acquired rather than other factors such as the age of the 
children when they manage to use a certain preposition 
correctly. Statistical procedures in themselves cannot 
tell us exactly how we acquire prepositions, but all 
errors, omissions and substitutions were important in 
trying to build up a picture of how the prepositions were 
learnt and how sure the child was of each one.
It was apparent at the actual time of testing that the 
same "mistake" was being made by a number of children. 
This was an interesting finding and one which seems to 
relate to errors in other areas of child language 
acquisition (and which will be discussed later on in this 
chapter). The analysis subsequently carried out brought 
to light a lot of information that was not immediately 
apparent from conducting the sessions with the children.
Detailed notes had been taken on the responses given at 
the play sessions, for example, whether the prepositions 
were used correctly at the first attempt or not. If not, 
it was noted whether prompting helped to elicit the target
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response (eg an initial response of pointing or saying 
"there" could sometimes be converted to a preposition with 
a little coaxing). A note was also made as to whether 
there was a delay in retesting, that is, whether the 
child was asked the question again straight away or at the 
end of the game when it would be relatively "fresh" and 
more detached from any previous response.
I looked at each child's results and, as mentioned before 
(section 3.2), considered a preposition acquired if it was 
used in the correct context in the games individually, 
provided it was not used more than once in an 
inappropriate context (the "more often right than wrong" 
principle).
There was, in effect, only one obligatory context per 
preposition per game (as the various forms of BEHIND and 
IN FRONT were being considered as separate notions).
In most cases, children either got the preposition correct 
or made a deictic response (by pointing or saying 
"there"). If, as a result of a repeated question or 
prompting following
a) a deictic prolocative (it's "there");
b) a non-verbal response (pointing); or
c) no response at all
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a child subsequently improved on the initial response by 
producing the correct response then a credit was given for 
the preposition. I felt this was comparable to what 
happens with adults (who have acquired prepositions but 
may not always use them unless asked to be explicit), for 
example :
Adult 1; Where's the butter?
Adult 2: Over there (nodding in general direction)
Adult 1: Where?
Adult 2; Over there by the toaster.
There was, in all, a whole mass of information available
to analyse or refer to if more details were needed on a 
particular point. On the whole, I have tried to
concentrate my analysis on
- testing the acquisition order of prepositions (section 
4.2) which is the main focus of the study;
- examining the influence of other variables such as age 
and sex (section 4.3);
- looking at the most significant errors and other
substitutions (section 4.4);
- comparing the results with other studies on relational 
terms (section 4.5);
- considering the locative expressions BEHIND and IN 
FRONT in other studies (section 4,6),
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4.2 Order of acquisition
My study of prepositions and prepositional expressions was 
a cross-sectional one, effectively taking a snap shot of 
the linguistic abilities of a number of children of 
different ages at a certain point in time. From this, I 
wanted to try and extrapolate developmental trends to test 
the hypothesis that prepositions are acquired in a set 
order.
As a reminder, the order of prepositional concepts being 
tested was as follows:
IN/ON/UNDER/BESIDE <BEHINDf/FRONTf/BETWEEN <BEHIND/FRONT
Essentially, my data provided an indication of the 
difficulty experienced with various prepositions and 
prepositional expressions (ie whether the child could 
produce/understand the locative expression or not).
Guttman scaling
I needed a systematic way of looking at the data in order 
to come up with an order or scale of difficulty (which 
could then be equated with an acquisition order). 
Implicational scaling (often referred to as Guttman 
scaling) is a good way of combining individual case study
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data to show similar patterns and is useful for studies 
like mine on first language acquisition as well as for 
second language acquisition. It is the method used in 
other, perhaps more complicated studies on prepositional 
acquisition and was deemed the most appropriate one for my 
research data by several statistical advisers.
To give a rough idea of how implicational scaling works, I 
have compiled a simple "ideal" model based on eight 
children and eight language features (prepositions), where 
the presence (1) or absence (0) of correct usage of the 
relevant preposition is marked.
Table 3; Ideal model for Guttman scaling 
Prepositions
Easy Subiect PI P2 P3 P4 P5 Difficult P6 P7 P8
SI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1S2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1S3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0S4 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0S5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0S6 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0S7 1 1 ! 0 0 0 0 0 0S8 iJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
From this "ideal" table we can see that subject 1 is the 
most advanced - he or she has credits for all the 
prepositions being tested. The preposition PI would be 
the easiest, since everyone got this one right and P8 
would be the hardest, since only subject 1 accurately used
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it. If the results from a set of data do give such a nice 
neat chart, it is possible to make predictions about 
individual learners. For example, we could predict that 
if a subject has P4 correct, then this subject would also 
have P3, P2 and PI correct.
Obviously, it is not the case that every given piece of 
data will fit or match such scaling, but there must be a 
relationship among the items as far as difficulty is 
concerned and there must be a range of proficiency in the 
subjects. If all items are of equal difficulty and all 
subjects of equal proficiency there is no scale at all. 
For example, if my subjects were all too young and the 
prepositions too difficult then the table would be full of 
zeros. On the other hand if the subjects were too 
advanced and all the items easy, again there would be no 
scale because all the entries in the table would be ones. 
Also, if PI were difficult for SI but not for anyone else; 
P2 difficult for 82 but not for anyone else; P3 difficult 
for S3 but not for anyone else etc; again there would not 
be a scale.
If we have the "ideal" model as set out in Table 3 above, 
we can then compare this accuracy order with the observed 
acquisition order and see if they are the same. Of 
course, the "ideal" table above contains only hypothetical 
data and a complete match would not be expected, 
especially with a much larger number of subjects and
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prepositions being tested.
A sample of actual data from my study ready for 
statistical analysis is given in Appendix 7.
4.2.1 Assumptions for analysis
I had to apply strict and consistent criteria when 
carrying out the statistical analysis for the acquisition 
order of prepositions. The following assumptions applied 
to the analysis of data for games 1 and 3 (which tested 
the production of locative expressions):
a) The child's first verbal response was taken, unless
this was deictic ("there") in which case the next 
response was taken.
b) A credit was given if the response was the correct 
one or an equally acceptable alternative (see 
Table 4 below).
c) The credit could be withdrawn if that particular
preposition was used more often in inappropriate
contexts than in the appropriate one during the 
course of the game (details of overextended uses and 
the withdrawal of credits are given in section 4.4 
which looks at substitutions: errors and alternative 
prepositional expressions).
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The table which follows gives the prepositions and
prepositional expressions which were considered acceptable 
alternatives for the locative notions being tested;
Table 4: Equally acceptable alternatives
INSIDE for IN
UNDERNEATH for UNDER
ON TOP OF for ON
NEXT TO )AT THE SIDE OF) for BESIDEBY )
AT THE BACK OF for BEHIND
Unlike Johnston and Slobin (1979), I have not included IN 
THE MIDDLE as an acceptable response for BETWEEN. Not 
only is there a significant difference between the two 
notions (MIDDLE incorporates a sense of enclosure) but 
it could also be argued that there is no justification for 
crediting the child with the prepositional expression 
BETWEEN solely if he or she uses the preposition IN and
noun phrase THE MIDDLE. Having said this, the two
expressions do appear to express similar locative notions, 
even if they are not as interchangeable as, say, UNDER and 
UNDERNEATH.
The assumptions for the analysis of data for game 2 
(comprehension of locative expressions) were very similar 
to that for the other games, in that the first response
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was taken and a credit given if the item was placed in the 
correct location. However, I did not withdraw credits 
already allocated for understanding a certain preposition 
(eg BESIDE) if an item was subsequently inappropriately 
placed in a similar position, since it was impossible to 
say where exactly the child saw the item as being. For 
example, a single incorrect positioning could be described 
variously as;
a) BESIDE the box
b) somewhere NEAR the box
b) ON the little chair
and it would be inappropriate, I felt, to allocate an 
"assumed understanding" in these instances. In actual 
fact, many of the incorrect positionings were of the type 
predicted by Eve Clark (1973a) ie Rule 1; if the reference 
object is a container, put x INSIDE it.
I shall now examine the Guttman scaling results of the 
tests individually, looking first at the games testing 
production of locative expressions (games 1 and 3) before 
considering those for comprehension (game 2). An 
assessment can then be made as to how consistent the 
results are between the different games and comments made 
on any potential problems arising from the Guttman scaling 
technique. A further statistical technique (Mokken's 
homogeneity model) will then be applied to the games.
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4.2.2 Results of the hide-and-seek game (game 11
There was a good distribution of ability in the hide-and- 
seek game, with a total of 78 children co-operating and 
giving responses. Just under 7% of these children showed 
they had acquired all the prepositions being tested, a few 
showed they had not acquired any, and most came somewhere 
in between.
As discussed earlier in the introduction to this chapter, 
the Guttman Scalogram was considered the most appropriate 
analysis method for scaling to achieve an order of 
difficulty for prepositions. Any missing data meant that 
no data would be used from that child for that particular 
game (if, for example, there was no response at all for 
one or more questions) which effectively reduced the 
number of cases read to 71 for this first game.
Appendix 7 gives full details of the Guttman analysis for 
the individual games, but I shall summarise and discuss 
the key results for game 1 here. In the following table 
(Table 5), the prepositions are listed in order of 
increasing difficulty. A score of 1.00 in the column 
marked "difficulty" would equate to a situation where all 
the children included in the analysis got a particular 
preposition correct and a 0.00 would mean that none did.
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Table 5: Guttman scaling results for game 1
Item order Difficulty
INONUNDERBEHINDfBEHINDIN FRONTfIN FRONTBESIDEBETWEEN
0.9860.8170.7750.5630.5210.3240.2960.2390.141
Coefficient of reproducibility = 0.937
We can see from the table above that there is a good 
spread in terms of difficulty, with the easiest 
preposition (IN at 0.986) reflecting the fact that all but 
one child managed to obtain a credit for this preposition 
and the hardest (BETWEEN at 0.141) indicating that 10 of 
the 71 children managed to achieve this.
The overall measure of the total errors in the scale 
matrix is referred to as the Guttman coefficient of 
reproducibility (C rep) and is defined by the formula:
C rep = total number of errorstotal number of responses
This formula helps to determine whether a given set of 
data is reproducible. The coefficient of reproducibility
should be above 0.90 for us to feel that the subjects'
performance can accurately be predicted. In the case of
the data from game 1, the coefficient of reproducibility
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is 0.937 which suggests that the results are significant 
and that children do learn to express these various 
locative notions in a predictable order.
The scale given by the Guttman analysis of the data for 
game 1 is similar in some respects to that of the order of 
locative notions being tested; for example, the 
prepositions IN, ON and UNDER appear to be acquired first. 
The results also confirm the prediction that featured 
objects are easier to relate to than non-featured for both 
BEHIND and IN FRONT. This is shown by the higher scores 
in the table above for BEHINDf and IN FRONTf compared with 
their non-featured counterparts, and reflects several 
examples where a child had acquired BEHINDf but not 
BEHIND (eg child number 12 and 16) or IN FRONTf but not 
IN FRONT (eg child number 58 and 64).
The main differences between the order implied by the 
Guttman analysis and the original predicted order are the 
appearances of BEHIND and IN FRONT (both featured and non­
featured) at an earlier stage in the hierarchy, 
effectively pushing both BESIDE and BETWEEN to lower 
positions. This has, I believe, much to do with the 
simpler testing method I adopted compared with that used 
by Johnston and Slobin (1979) and has important 
implications for the significance of testing materials, a 
subject which will be considered later in chapter 5.
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4.2.3 Results from the card game (game 3'I
The card game tested the production of prepositions again 
and so provided useful information to supplement that 
gained from the hide-and-seek game. It introduced the 
concept of a featured item not facing the child/tester, 
which I predicted would be harder than both the featured 
items facing the child/tester and non-featured items in 
the hierarchy and so I put the new notions at the end of 
the predicted acquisition order for game 3. BEHINDfs and 
IN FRONTfs therefore stand for behind or in front of a 
featured object which is facing the side - for reference 
please see the pictures in Appendix 6 which show the lion 
standing behind the crocodile (BEHINDfs) and the goat 
standing in front of the horse (IN FRONTfs).
The incongruous items proved difficult for the children 
(for example, "where's the television?" for the card with 
a picture of a television with a clock on it), but these 
were items which were difficult for the adults tested too. 
As mentioned, several adults answered "on top of the 
television" before they had even stopped to think. Some 
of the older, more linguistically advanced children 
adopted one of the adult strategies of turning the answers 
to the questions round with the incongruent items
eg Q: Where's the basket?
A: The cat's sitting in it.
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À detailed analysis of the incongruous items (UNDER, OVER, 
AROUND/UNDER) and the locative nouns (TOP, BOTTOM, DOWN, 
UP) has not been made, since although it is of interest, 
it falls outside the main remit of the study.
It is relevant here perhaps to record the results of the 
adults tested on the card game. As mentioned earlier in 
the description of the games (section 3.3.3), I asked a 
number of adults to "play" the card game, so that I could 
compare the children's responses with those of the adults. 
This was a useful exercise, since it showed that adults do 
not always score 100% when tested in the same games as the 
children. This does not mean that the adults tested have 
not all acquired the locative expressions being looked at, 
but is perhaps more a reflection of the fact that 
different people may respond in different ways to the same 
situation (all four "errors compared to target" involved 
using other very plausible descriptions eg describing the 
balloon as being "just by the bricks" rather than the 
target of "in front of the bricks"). This "failure rate" 
of just under 3% amongst those adults tested should be 
borne in mind when assessing some of the children's 
failures to meet the target preposition - perhaps we 
shouldn't categorically assume that a child hasn't yet 
acquired a certain preposition just because he or she 
hasn't used it.
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As far as evidence for analysis is concerned though, 
whether child or adult, if a particular prepositional 
expression has not been used then no credit can be allowed 
for it.
The results for the adults tested on the cards for game 3 
given in straightforward % terms are as follows:
Table 6: Adult results for game 3
Preposition % responding withbeing tested target preposition
IN 100%ON 100%UNDER 100%BESIDE/NEXT TO 92%BEHINDf 100%IN FRONTf 100%BETWEEN 100%BEHIND 100%IN FRONT 85%BEHINDfs 100%IN FRONTfs 92%
Number of subjects = 13
There also remains the possibility that a child might have 
knowledge of a preposition, but not be able to put it into 
use in the testing games because the cognitive (or other) 
demands were too great. A parallel for adults for this 
would be where a person understands well the meaning of 
the expressions "more" and "less" yet is unable to 
complete a brain teaser along the lines of "if A has more 
apples than B, and D has more than C but less than B....".
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similarly, in an IQ test, someone may fully understand all 
the various elements and the question but still not be 
able to work out the answer eg "How many minutes before 
noon is it, if one hour ago it was three times as many 
minutes after 8 am?" Again, this does not mean that there 
is no linguistic knowledge of the concept or the form of 
any of the words, just that the mathematical ability is 
not up to the task.
The tasks in my study were made as simple as possible for 
the children in order to try and eliminate as many 
extraneous demands as possible (although this is still no 
guarantee). The question of extra dimensions is also 
considered later on in this section, after the children's 
results have been examined.
The results from the Guttman scaling analysis for the 
children from game 3 were similar to those for game 1 in 
many respects;
A good distribution of ability was recorded, with a total 
of 77 children co-operating/giving responses. Of this 
total (which included those participating by pointing 
and/or saying "there"), only 3% managed to successfully 
complete all the prepositions being analysed, a slightly 
lower figure than for the first game, but perhaps to be 
expected since there were an extra two locative notions
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being looked at. As with the first game, a few children 
participated but did not manage to say anything.
Appendix 7 gives full details of the Guttman analysis for 
game 3 but the table below summarises the key points:
Table 7: Guttman scaling results for game 3 
Item order Difficulty
IN 0.935ON 0.805UNDER 0.727BEHINDf 0.545BEHIND 0.364BEHINDfs 0.325BETWEEN 0.247IN FRONTf 0.208IN FRONTfs 0.195IN FRONT 0.195BESIDE 0.130
Coefficient of reproducibility = 0.835
The coefficient of reproducibility for game 3 came out as 
0.835, which is below the target level of 0.90. In order 
to see to what extent the reproducibility had been 
affected by the increase in the number of variables, the 
Guttman scaling procedures were repeated excluding results 
for BEHIND and IN FRONT for the side facing featured 
items. This reduced the number of possible profiles 
considerably from 2048 to 512 and resulted in an increase 
in the coefficient of reproducibility, bringing it up to 
0.882.
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Full details of the Guttman analysis with and without the 
side facing featured results for BEHINDfs and IN FRONTfs 
are given in the statistical appendix.
As far as the additional side facing featured items 
introduced in game 3 are concerned, we can see from the 
table of Guttman scaling results above that BEHINDfs takes 
its position in the Guttman order of difficulty after 
BEHINDf and BEHIND (as I had predicted). IN FRONTfs is 
scaled equal in terms of difficulty with IN FRONT, both 
coming after the featured IN FRONTf. All variants of 
BEHIND are seen as easier to acquire than those for IN 
FRONT.
One interesting feature of the results of the card game 
was the considerable confusion between all the different 
forms of BEHIND and IN FRONT, a subject which will be 
looked at in greater detail in section 4.4 on errors and 
alternative expressions. This section also looks at the 
interesting perspective interpretation for BEHINDfs (which 
children gave to the picture of the crocodile with the 
lion standing behind it).
The featured items facing the side are worthy of specific 
mention now, since they provide additional information on 
the locative prepositional expressions BEHIND and IN FRONT 
and also introduce a more complicated test configuration.
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Featured items facing the side
Only the responses "behind" and "in front" were accepted
for the side facing featured items testing the
configurations BEHINDfs and IN FRONTfs (the lion standing 
behind the crocodile and the goat standing in front of the 
horse - see pictures in Appendix 6), yet responses such as
"AT THE SIDE of the horse" instead of "IN FRONT of the
horse" and "NEXT TO the crocodile" for "BEHIND the 
crocodile" could arguably be considered valid 
alternatives (see also section 4.2.5 on reservations with 
the analysis method). In several cases, asymmetrical 
responses were given by the children to the following 
questions:
Q: Where's the lion?Target A: Behind the crocodile
Q: Where's the goat?Target A: In front of the horse
eg of asymmetry by child 23 (aged 4;9)
"behind the crocodile" for BEHINDfs"at the side of the horse" for IN FRONTfs
eg of asymmetry by child 58 (aged 2;9)
"behind the crocodile" for BEHINDfs"next to the horse" for IN FRONTfs
In these cases, credits were only given for BEHINDfs in 
the analysis.
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These asymmetrical results replicate those obtained by 
Durkin (1981) on asymmetrical responses (in British 
English) with an object oriented response for IN FRONT and 
a subjectively oriented response for BEHIND (discussed in 
section 2.2).
It should be noted that the configurations for Johnston 
and Slobin (1979) were, for featured BEHIND, a small 
object placed
a) at back side of laterally placed featured object 
[truck, house] and
b) at opposite side [truck, house].
Similarly, for featured IN FRONT, a small object was 
placed
a) at front side of laterally placed featured object 
[truck, house] and
b) at the near side [truck, house].
Thus Johnston and Slobin's work included the complex idea 
of a featured item not facing the speaker/hearer (such as 
the laterally placed truck) and responses were only 
accepted which said at the BACK OF or BEHIND (and not, say 
NEXT TO) for the object placed behind the laterally placed 
featured object.
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In the configuration below, therefore, the expressions 
BEHIND/BACK OF would be accepted for the positions of "o" 
but not AT THE SIDE OF the truck for the "o" at the 
opposite side to the child/tester.
o<—  truck o
chiId/tester
The test configuration for BESIDE was
a) at right side of nonfeatured object [block, 
glass]
b) at left side [block, glass].
Effectively, the results then measured whether the child 
took account of the fact that the reference object was 
featured (ie had an intrinsic front) and then, if so, 
whether this fact would alter their response.
Johnston and Slobin's tests for BEHINDf and IN FRONTf were 
therefore more complicated than mine, because I made sure 
that the featured objects (eg the teddy in game 1, the 
piano and house in game 3) were always facing both the 
child and tester. Where I introduced the side facing 
featured animals as reference objects in the card game 
(the crocodile and horse), there was a mixed response of 
BEHIND/IN FRONT and NEXT TO, with well over two thirds of
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the children opting for BEHIND/IN FRONT. As seen in Table 
6, the adults all responded BEHIND for the BEHINDfs 
(featured side facing) situation and nearly all (92%) said 
IN FRONT for IN FRONTfs (featured side facing), which was 
actually slightly higher than the number who said IN FRONT 
for non-featured IN FRONT I Yet by inference from the 
Johnston and Slobin study, there are two possible 
positions for BEHIND/IN FRONT for a side facing featured 
animal: at the rear/head end of the animal and at the
far/near side. We saw earlier in chapter 2 when looking 
at Johnston and Slobin's (1979) study how complexity and 
diversity were predicted to make acquisition harder.
Children have been shown to move from self-oriented 
responses to more object oriented responses with age 
(Bavin, 1990: 65). Bavin suggests around age six for her 
Walpiri subjects (which is older than the subjects for 
both Johnston and Slobin's 1979 and my research). The fact 
that my research showed that most adults described the 
"featured side" situation as IN FRONT of the horse 
(subject oriented) rather than NEXT TO the horse (object 
oriented) does not, I think, suggest that they are still 
in an egoistical, self-oriented phase (1), but rather that 
much depends on the individual situation as to the extent 
to which reference objects are used for prepositional 
orientation. For example, my items to be described in 
relation to the featured side facing animals were other
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(side facing) animals and not small non-featured objects. 
This matter will be discussed further in section 5.1 on 
the importance of testing materials.
If the results of the responses to the side facing 
featured items are included with the front facing featured 
objects (that is, BEHINDfs and IN FRONTfs incorporated 
with BEHINDf and IN FRONTf and an average taken) then the 
accuracy score falls:
Table 8: Correct responses for BEHIND and IN FRONT in game 3 (adapted from Table 7)
Correct responses asa % of total number Adaptedchildren responding scores
BEHINDf 55 44IN FRONTf 21 21
BEHIND 36IN FRONT 20 no change
BEHINDfs 33IN FRONTfs 20 «a*
I think this must be an important contributory factor as 
to why particularly BEHINDf and, to a lesser extent, IN 
FRONTf performed so well in my results; if I had included 
more complicated test configurations with featured items 
facing different directions, I would have had lower 
scores.
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This also raises the question of whether there is perhaps 
a prototype or "best example" for BEHIND and IN FRONT (of 
Rosch, 1975) If "something hidden behind a featured 
object facing the speaker and hearer" is the prototype for 
BEHIND, then one may expect higher results from using a 
method of testing which achieves this. This again could 
explain why my results for BEHIND and IN FRONT were higher 
than for Johnston and Slobin (1979).
So, how does the Guttman order of difficulty for game 3 
compare with the predicted order? As with the results
for game 1, there are many similarities such as the 
initial order of IN, ON and UNDER and presence of BEHINDf 
and IN FRONTf before their non-featured counterparts. 
However, unlike the results for game 1, where the higher
scores for BEHIND and IN FRONT seemed to "oust" BESIDE and
BETWEEN and put them further down the hierarchy, the
Guttman scores for game 3 contain an order of difficulty 
for BETWEEN coming after the various scores for BEHIND and 
before those for IN FRONT, leaving BESIDE effectively as 
the hardest prepositional expression to acquire.
Looking retrospectively at the test material to elicit the 
response of BESIDE for game 3 - the picture of a tractor 
next to a tree - I can't help but wonder if the results 
for this prepositional expression might have been 
considerably different with another picture, for example a 
picture of a boy sitting next to a girl (which might be a
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situation the children were more familiar with). There 
were several instances where children described the card I 
actually used with the picture of the tractor next to the 
tree as having the tractor BEHIND or IN FRONT of the tree 
(and in some cases the preposition NEXT TO was actually 
used later on in the game to describe something else like 
the goat being "next to the horse"). To my mind this 
calls into question the validity of making assumptions on 
any order of acquisition based on responses from certain, 
limited test materials.
One further point from the Guttman scaling results for 
game 3 is the relevance of the coefficient of 
reproducibility (0.835 and 0.882) coming out at below the 
significant level of 0.90. A coefficient of 
reproducibility of less than 0.90 can mean:
a) the Guttman model is too rigid - for example 
children's varied attention results in random errors; 
the model may therefore be inappropriate but the 
theory fine, in which case a further statistical 
analysis could be made which allows for random 
variation. This possibility is addressed later in 
section 4.2.6.
b) the scale is all right but something interesting may 
be going on; a figure for the coefficient of
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reproducibility of less than 0.80 implies that some 
items might not be ordered. Perhaps extra dimensions 
are involved in some of the test items. For example, 
if the test was a mathematical one with questions 
including additions (2+2=?), subtractions (17-4=?), 
multiplication and division and one question asked "X 
has 3 apples, Y gives him 3 more - how many does X 
have altogether?" we might expect children to equate 
this to 3+3=? However, the question involves an
extra dimension ie reading ability and so might not 
produce the same scaling results as a question put as 
3+3=? This possibility suggests close scrutiny be 
made of the test items (see section 5.1).
A Guttman coefficient of reproducibility of less than 0.90 
therefore does not invalidate the Guttman scaling results, 
and in fact may not be too serious. Indeed, in Johnston 
and Slobin's cross-linguistic study of locative 
expressions (1979), the Guttman coefficient of
reproducibility was only over 0.90 for two of the four 
languages studied (English = 0.93; Turkish = 0.91; whereas 
Italian = 0.89; Serbo Croatian = 0.86).
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4.2.4 Results from the "putting" game (game 2)
This game of comprehension, involving placing a toy key in 
various positions in relation to a plastic box, proved 
easier to play than the games testing production, with 40% 
of the children completing all the tasks correctly. This 
confirms that COMPREHENSION of prepositions occurs before 
PRODUCTION, as might be expected, since a child may have 
the conceptual resources for a preposition but may not be 
able to express it yet, ie the term would be in the 
"waiting room" suggested by Johnston and Slobin (1979) 
see Figure 12 in section 2.3. Higher scores would 
therefore be expected for the comprehension test (game 2) 
compared with games 1 and 3.
As we saw earlier in section 3.4, if we chart language 
acquisition only from production, we may seriously 
underestimate what children know both about the lexicon 
and language in general. For a child to be successful in 
the "putting" game, he or she must have access to both the 
phonological form of the preposition and the meaning of 
the preposition. That is, the child's mental
representation must be effectively adult-like. From this 
perspective, any mismatch between comprehension and 
production data is not so much linguistically interesting 
- it reveals something about differential difficulties in 
using linguistic representations, but tells us nothing 
about those representations. It could be argued that
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comprehension data, where available and reliable, provide 
a more accurate reflection of linguistic capacities.
Helen Goodluck points out that tests of comprehension may 
underestimate children's ability for a variety of reasons, 
including the difficulty of the task and the complexity of 
sentences confronting the child (Goodluck, 1991: 174). It 
is, of course, also possible that production tests may 
underestimate children's ability for similar reasons.
Another thing to bear in mind is whether in fact children 
are aware of their shortcomings. In comprehension tests, 
children may readily assign interpretations to the 
structures presented to them - but they are often the 
wrong ones. As Carol Chomsky pointed out:
"They do not, as they see it, fail to understand 
our sentences. They understand them, but they 
understand them wrongly" (Chomsky, 1969:2)
With the comprehension of locatives in game 2 scoring 
higher than production in games 1 and 3, what remained to 
be seen was whether the same order of acquisition applied, 
albeit at an earlier age.
The following table. Table 9, gives the key results for 
the Guttman scaling analysis for children achieving the
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correct configurations in game 2 (for full statistical 
details please see Appendix 7):
Table 9: Guttman scaling results for game 2 
Item order Difficulty
IN 0.100ON 0.878BEHIND 0.743IN FRONTf 0.716BETWEEN 0.689BESIDE 0.676UNDER 0.676IN FRONT 0.676BEHINDf 0.662
Coefficient of reproducibility = 0.799
A glance at the figures above shows that there is not much 
spread between the "easiest" and "hardest" prepositions 
and that there is very little difference in difficulty 
between seven of the nine prepositions (with scores 
ranging between 0.65 and 0.75); in fact, BESIDE, UNDER and 
IN FRONT all have an equal difficulty rating.
The coefficient of reproducibility at 0.799 is the lowest 
yet, suggesting that there are no significant differences 
in the ordering of many items and that it might be 
difficult to replicate the results with exactly the same 
scale ordering. As we saw in the discussion of the low 
coefficient of reproducibility in connection with game 3, 
this might reflect random reasons why children do not fit
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into the model, eg because of attention slips. A model 
could then be looked at which allows for random variation 
(see Mokken's analysis in section 4.2.6).
The comprehension data did not provide such a good 
distribution of ability as that for production, but 
further analysis of the data can still be made to remove, 
for example, the non-discriminating item (IN) which all 
subjects correctly achieved (see Mokken's analysis in 
section 4.2.6).
One interesting thing to note from the results from game 2 
is the relatively good performance of NEXT TO compared 
with the two production games. This endorses the view 
that the cognitive comprehension is there (manifested by 
the ability to put something in the correct position) but 
that production is somewhat harder, maybe because of the 
lexical diversity.
The preposition UNDER did not fare so well in the analysis 
of data for game 2, scoring well below the difficulty 
rating for both IN and ON. In most cases where an error 
took place with UNDER the key was put IN the box instead 
(in line with the non-linguistic strategies discussed in 
chapter 2). I did wonder whether one reason for the 
relatively poor performance of UNDER was a difficulty in 
placing the key under the box, but those with confidence 
in what the preposition meant had no problems (and there
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were even some instances where the configuration UNDER was 
made in error for other prepositions.
With BETWEEN, the item to be placed was often put NEXT TO 
the box, suggesting that the child could only take in one 
set of instructions such as "location + relationship with 
box" and had not managed the concept of BETWEEN yet. I 
did not use the expression MIDDLE when asking the children 
to put the key BETWEEN the box and the bear, as it was not 
the locative expression being tested and would also not 
have been right in that context, yet perhaps it is 
locative expression which they are more familiar with. 
For example there is often talk of the middle seat at the 
back of a car, a position which seems to hold a great 
attraction for children in this age range who often plead 
"I want to sit in the middle!"
There did not appear to be any great distinction in the 
accuracy of placing something BEHIND or IN FRONT of a 
featured compared with a non-featured object, since BEHIND 
scored highest, followed by IN FRONTf, IN FRONT and 
finally BEHINDf. With hindsight I wonder if BEHINDf 
(behind the little bear) was maybe harder for the children 
to reach to. Also, the box itself was not strictly non- 
featured since it had an opening at the front which 
allowed the configurations IN and ON. This could well 
explain why the featured positions did not score
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significantly higher.
OUT/OFF Results
As described earlier, the "putting game" concluded with my 
placing a small yellow key IN the box and an identical one 
ON the box. Children were then asked to remove a key 
from OUT of and then from OFF the box. This was not 
strictly speaking part of my research study, but I thought 
it might be interesting to see if there were any great 
differences in comprehension relating to the two items IN 
and ON the box. There was also the possibility that a 
non-lingistic strategy could be in operation (would more 
children take the key OUT of the box than OFF?)
As can be seen from the table below, slightly more 
children did take the key OUT of the box when asked to 
take the key OFF the box than vice versa, but I do not 
think the evidence is sufficient to draw any real 
conclusions from the exercise.
Table 10: Results for OUT/OFF
Action request Correct Wrong key Both keys"Take the key..." % taken % taken %
OUT of the box 86 8 6OFF the box 79 15 6
Number of children co-operating = 66
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It is also interesting that a number of children insisted 
on taking both keys (despite the request for a key being 
made in the singular). Again there is not enough evidence 
to know whether this response was made because the words 
or concepts relating to OUT/OFF were not understood or 
whether the question was too difficult to interpret. 
Perhaps taking both keys could be a non-linguistic 
strategy for the younger children when faced with this 
particular situation, regardless of what the request is 
(the average age of those children taking both keys was 
2 ; 6 ).
This is an area which although outside the main one 
concerning the acquisition of certain locative 
expressions, is nevertheless of interest and is one which 
could be investigated in a future study.
In their study of English and Korean children learning to 
express motion events, Choi and Bowerman (1991) pointed 
out that in English it is often obligatory to spell out 
Path even when it can be readily inferred from context eg 
"John threw his keys TO the desk/TO the drawer" sounds 
rather odd: ON and IN are needed before the TO. Even when 
it is grammatical to specify Path less completely, fuller 
information is often given, especially in everyday speech; 
compare "John took his keys FROM his desk/FROM the drawer" 
(a bit formal or bookish) with "John took his keys OFF his 
desk/OUT of the drawer" (completely colloquial).
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4.2.5 Reservations about the analysis method
Whilst the Guttman scaling technique lends itself nicely 
to developmental work and is undoubtably the most 
appropriate one to apply to my research data, there are 
a few problems which I shall consider in this section.
The major problem with Guttman scaling is in identifying 
any given feature as correct/incorrect or, as in the case 
of the locative expressions examined in my study, 
acquired/not acquired. For example, if looking at the 
acquisition of articles in English by eliciting free 
speech and using a definition of acquisition as "90% 
correct in obligatory instances" (see section 3.2 on the 
definition of acquisition), then all the scores above 90% 
are converted to 1 for the Guttman analysis and all the 
scores below 90% to 0. The question though, is whether a 
subject might "know" the article if he or she got it right 
in 8 out of 10 obligatory instances instead of 9 out of 
10. This problem is important because it seems quite 
unreasonable to consider a 90% to be a perfect performance 
but an 89% a completely inaccurate performance. Although 
my definition of "acquired" is not based on the 90% 
criterion but rather on the use of a correct prepositional 
expression in the appropriate context (with a credit 
withdrawn if it was used more often in an inappropriate 
context) the same "all or nothing" cut-off point problem 
arises.
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There were, for example, cases where a child would give a 
response that wasn't the target preposition (or one of the 
equally acceptable alternatives), yet it wasn't entirely 
wrong; for example, when children described the position 
of the ball in game 1 as "WITH teddy" rather than "IN 
FRONT OF teddy" (child number 1 and 73) or "NEAR the 
bricks" instead of "NEXT TO the bricks" (child 6).
In game 3 there were several instances where children 
described the teddy as sitting "IN the chair" rather than 
the target of ON (child numbers 3, 42, 54) and a further 8 
instances where IN THE MIDDLE was given for BETWEEN (child 
numbers 23,33 and 37 in game 1 and child numbers 6, 9, 12, 
22 and 73 in game 3).
Obviously in these circumstances the child could not be 
credited with acquiring the target preposition, since this 
was not actually used (although Johnston and Slobin would 
have included IN THE MIDDLE as an acceptable alternative 
to BETWEEN in their 1979 analysis). However, it still 
felt harsh that children had given good answers and were 
very "close" in terms of accurately describing a locative 
notion, yet received no recognition in the analysis of 
the locative expressions. It is here perhaps that a
distinction could be introduced as to whether the child 
has the appropriate "concept" in circumstances where he or
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she does not use the appropriate preposition. For the
purposes of the Guttman analysis, however, it was 
necessary to set the most appropriate criterion level for 
the definition of acquisition and then adopt the 
correct/incorrect identification labels.
Another potential problem with Guttman scaling is what to 
do with missing data. This is more a problem when 
gathering data in natural settings as there may not be 
data on one of the features you are trying to scale for 
the subjects. If the missing feature is put in as either 
a 0 or a 1 then scalability will be influenced. For my 
results, if there was any missing data, then all the data 
for that particular game was left out of the analysis.
A final problem has to do with context. The context in 
which the feature occurs may be a determining factor in 
the scalability of certain factors. This means that the 
three different environments for the different games may 
have an effect on the actual prepositional notions being 
tested, thus making comparisons more difficult to make.
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4.2.6 Further analysis of the data
Without detracting from the validity of the results 
already obtained by the Guttman scaling technique, the 
opportunity was taken to carry out a short supplementary 
analysis of the data by looking at probabilistic scaling 
which would allow more flexibility than the rather 
deterministic Guttman method. This was done using
Mokken's Homogeneity Model, which looks more at the 
probability of obtaining correct responses (rather than 
the strict Guttman "all or nothing" approach). The Mokken 
analysis would allow for more random variation, which, as 
we saw earlier in section 4,2.3, may be a factor 
contributing towards a poor Guttman coefficient of 
reproducibility,
Mokken's Homogeneity Model was therefore applied to the 
data from all 3 games with the following summary results 
(for full details please see Appendix 7);
Table 11: Mokken scaling results for all games
Scale SignificanceReliability Homogeneity of Probability
Game 1 0.99 0.24 P < 0.001Game 2 0.99 0.26 P < 0.001Game 3 0.97 0.31 P < 0.001
The scaling orders used were the same as for the Guttman
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analysis. In essence, the Mokken results show very good 
reliability for the results from all three games (99%, 
99%, and 97% respectively) which shows that the scale is 
very good at discriminating between individual children. 
The homogeneity figures show how well the overall spread 
of items fits the Mokken model, and although there seems 
to be room for variation, the significance levels of the 
homogeneity indices are all very high (with P < 0.001)
which indicates reasonable scales.
As a high skew was apparent on items A1 and B1 (relating 
to IN scoring very high for games 1 and 2), this was 
omitted to give the following revised Mokken analysis:
Table 12: Adjusted Mokken results (games 1 and 2)
Scale SignificanceReliability Homogeneity of Probability
Game 1 0.97 0.24 P < 0.001Game 2 0.99 0.26 P < 0.001
The figures do not improve by taking out the non­
discriminating items and we see again the very high 
reliability estimates and somewhat lower homogeneity 
figures (there is no hard and fast rule but a figure of
0.3 is often aimed at).
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The Mokken analysis was particularly relevant for looking 
at the results for game 2, the comprehension test, since 
this was the game which recorded the lowest Guttman 
coefficient of reproducibility score (0.799). What we see 
from the Mokken analysis is that the high reliability 
estimates indicate good discrimination between individual 
children: that is, although there is a poor range shown by 
the Guttman scale, there are still fine distinctions 
between children and that the range is sufficient to show 
a cumulative order for the acquisition of prepositions.
Overall then, we see that there is a reliable order for 
data from all three games on the acquisition of 
prepositional expressions.
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4.2.7 Consistency of results between games
As we saw in the discussion of the results earlier, there 
was a very good relationship between the implicational 
scaling data for the two production games (the Guttman 
results for games 1 and 3) and a scale with limited range 
for the comprehension game (game 2). The graph below 
shows the consistency of the results from the production 
games (excluding the additional side facing featured items 
in game 3) based on the Guttman difficulty scores and the 
scaling order for game 1.
Figure 15: Consistency of results from different games
Guttmandifficultyscore
1 .00-
.90-
.80- game 2
.70-
.60-
. 50- game 1.40-
.30-
.20- game 3.10-
ON BEHf BEHIN UNO FROf BESFRO BET
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The comprehension data from game 2 shows that the children 
had much less difficulty in using the prepositions 
correctly than in the other two games (as had been 
expected). Also, as we saw in the discussion of the 
results of game 2, the data did not provide an adequate 
basis for producing a good scale, although the subsequent 
Mokken analysis indicated that the range was just 
sufficient to show a cumulative order. The main anomaly 
from comparing the Guttman results for game 2 with the 
other two games was that even though the spread of 
difficulty is not great, UNDER still does not come a clear 
third in the hierarchy as in the other two games.
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4.2.8 New order of acquisition
As a result of the remarkably good consistency of results
between games, particularly the two production ones, a new 
acquisition order for locative expressions emerges, using
information from the following summary table:
Table 13; Summary table of acquisition based on Guttman scaling results (%)
game 1 game 2 game
IN 99 100 94ON 82 88 81UNDER 78 66 73
BEHINDf 56 66 55BEHIND 52 74 36
IN FRONTf 32 72 21IN FRONT 30 68 20BESIDE 24 68 13BETWEEN 14 69 25
This produces the following general acquisition order 
based mainly on the production data from games 1 and 3 
(since the comprehension data exhibited such a narrow 
range) and excluding the side facing featured data from 
testing for BEHINDfs/IN FRONTfs in game 3. This new
general acquisition order is broadly consistent with the 
predicted order but with earlier positions for featured 
and non-featured BEHIND and IN FRONT:
IN <0N <UNDER <BEHINDf/BEHIND <FRONTf/FRONT/BESIDE/BETWEEN
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4.3 Influence of variables such as age and sex
A further statistical analysis was carried out to look at 
the influence of variables such as age and sex on the 
acquisition of prepositional expressions. This took the 
form of a multivariable test (ANOVA) using an SPSS windows 
package.
4.3.1 Influence of aae
Firstly, the children were divided into 3 groups based on 
their age at the time of the test:
Group 2: age 2;0 - 2?11 (47% of sample)Group 3: age 3;0 - 3;11 (32% of sample)Group 4: age 4;0 - 5;0 (20% of sample)
Number of valid cases = 74
Running the analysis package through the data resulted in 
the following mean scores for each age group ie how many 
locatives were correctly expressed/understood on average 
for a child from each age group for each game:
Table 14: Mean scores by game and age group 
game 1 game 2 game 3
Group 2 4.36 6.09 4.08Group 3 4.86 6.62 4.46Group 4 5.27 8.57 6.33
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As we can see, there is an increase in the number of 
locative expressions acquired with an increase in the age 
of the child for all three games, as would be expected in 
a developmental scale. For game 1, there is a gradual 
increase, and for games 2 and 3 there appears to be a 
larger increase in the number of prepositions acquired 
between age groups 3 and 4. This is perhaps best 
illustrated in graphic form:
Figure 16: Increase in mean number of locativeexpressions acquired by age and game
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mean
mean
mean
o t 2 3age group
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Supplementing the ANOVA tests with Scheffe post hoc 
comparisons (with a significance level of 0.05), we find 
that there is no major discontinuity in game 1 and there 
are no significant differences between any of the age 
groups. In games 2 and 3 a significant difference can be 
found between the oldest and youngest groups. The data 
thus indicate that children in successively older age 
groups produce more locatives than those in the younger 
groups.
Appendix 7 gives full details relating to the analysis of 
the age data including the post hoc Scheffe tests.
Whilst it may not be surprising to see that there is an 
increase in the mean number of locatives produced by 
successively older age groups, it should be remembered 
that age per se is not necessarily a good indicator of 
linguistic ability, and that a widely used measure is that 
of the Mean Length of Utterance (MLU) which computes the 
length of an utterance in terms of morphemes (Brown, 
1973). Despite a considerable amount of critical 
discussion (eg Crystal, 1974; Peters, 1983), because of 
its apparently general nature and the ease with which it 
can be calculated, the MLU continues to be used as a base­
line measure for carrying out studies, for example, on the 
developmental complexity of sentence structure.
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4.3.2 Influence of sex
The gender details for all three games were run through 
the ANOVA test to examine whether the sex of the child had 
any influence on preposition acquisition.
The breakdown of the total sample of children was as 
follows;
Code 1; boys 53% Code 2: girls 47%
The results of a ”t” test analysis of the data showed that 
the girls consistently performed slightly better than the 
boys; that is, they produced a higher number of average 
locatives per game, but that the differences were not 
significant (at the 0.05 level).
Table 15; Mean scores by game and sex 
game 1 game 2 game 3
boys 4.50 6,68 4.56girls 4.94 6.82 4.77
It is interesting, if not statistically significant, that 
the girls consistently produced or understood a higher 
number of locative expressions than the boys, since this 
can be seen in context with the widespread view of girls' 
superiority with respect to almost all aspects of language
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development (and can also be seen in conjunction with the 
recent debate on girls' intellectual superiority compared 
with boys - see Grant, 1994). Reviewing the literature 
on the subject of girls' linguistic superiority back in 
1954, McCarthy wrote:
"The vast accumulation of evidence in the same 
direction from a variety of investigators 
working in different parts of the country [USA], 
employing different situations and methods of 
observation, and employing different analyses 
and linguistic indices, certainly is convincing 
proof that a real sex difference in language 
development exists in favor of girls ... "
(McCarthy, 1954: 580)
However, only a few years later. Tempiin, summarizing her 
own findings, wrote:
"When the performance of boys and girls is 
compared over the entire age range, girls tend 
to receive higher scores more frequently than 
the boys, but the differences are not consistent 
and are only infrequently statistically 
significant."
and she went on to suggest that:
"It may be that the differences which have 
appeared in the literature have been
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overemphasised in the past. It may also be that 
over the years differences in language ability 
of the two sexes have actually become less 
pronounced in keeping with the shift towards a 
single standard in child care and training in 
the last few decades." (Templin, 1957; 145-7)
Similar conclusions are reached in more recent reviews by 
Cherry (1975), Macaulay (1978) and research by Wells 
(1986), supporting the view that what differences there 
are between the sexes are in the rate rather than in style 
of acquisition, but that they are rarely significant and 
do not consistently favour either girls or boys.
The results from my data concerning the acquisition of 
locative expressions by sex are therefore in line with 
results on sex differences from other linguistic areas in 
that there is no statistical significance.
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4.4 Substitutions; errors and alternative expressions
This section looks at some of the prepositions and 
prepositional expressions used in place of the target ones 
and discusses whether they tell us anything about how 
prepositions are acquired.
4.4.1 Classification and outline of section
The overall classification of responses in the study can 
be seen as;
1. CORRECT (ie the target preposition is used); a 
credit is allocated in line with the assumptions 
for analysis given in section 4.2.1. This is 
termed an "appropriate" use of the preposition.
2. A SUBSTITUTION for the target preposition is made 
which may be either an ERROR or an ALTERNATIVE 
prepositional expression. These cases are deemed 
an "inappropriate" use of the preposition from 
the point of view of the analysis.
3. NO PREPOSITION is given either because there is 
no response at all, there is a deictic response 
(pointing and/or saying "there") or the 
preposition is omitted.
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I had envisaged that there would be more prepositional 
omissions (for example, "chair" instead of "ON the 
chair"), particularly by younger children, since both 
French (1987) and Tomasello (1987) reported omissions in 
their studies. There were in fact hardly any "noun only" 
errors; on the whole, if a child was unsure, then the 
response was a deictic one (pointing and/or just saying 
"there") which, if this could not be converted into a full 
verbal response, would be treated as no preposition given 
for the purposes of my analysis.
The main part of this section will therefore be concerned 
with substitutions for the target prepositions,
I shall first consider overextensions p where a preposition 
is used correctly in all its appropriate contexts but is 
also used in other, inappropriate contexts. A detailed 
analysis will then be made of the most outstanding errors. 
which involve confusion between the polar pair of 
oppositions BEHIND and IN FRONT. Other topics to be 
covered in this section include consistency (how 
consistent children are on retesting), perspective (how 
children view things in a different way from adults) and 
some case studies which illustrate avoidance strategies 
and problems with certain prepositions. This will be 
followed by a discussion of the consistency of results 
between games before comparing the results, particularly 
with BEHIND and IN FRONT, with other studies.
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4.4.2 Overextens ions
As we saw in the first chapter of this thesis on cognitive 
and linguistic development, an overextension in first 
language acquisition occurs when a child uses a word to 
refer to an object, action, state or property where an 
adult would not judge it appropriate, in addition to using 
the word to refer to all appropriate referents. For
example, my own son John aged nearly 2 would excitedly
shout "dada" at any passing male adult (!) as well as 
using the word to refer to his own father. Other examples 
are when John used "cuppa tea" to refer to an empty cup
and a cup of coffee as well as to a cup of tea, and sang
out "tea time" loudly first thing in the morning (meaning 
he was hungry and it was time for breakfast).
Underextension consists of the child using a particular 
word to refer only to a subset of the full range of 
referents which are properly labelled with that word in 
the adult language. An example of underextension would be 
use of the word "shoes" to refer to a particular pair of 
shoes and not shoes in general.
In the case of overlap, a word is overextended to refer to 
inappropriate referents, but is only used to refer to some 
and not all of the appropriate references. It may be very 
difficult to distinguish between overlap and overextension 
in practice. An example of overlap is when the word
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"umbrella" was used to refer to open umbrellas, a large 
green leaf and kites, but not to closed umbrellas (Anglin, 
1983).
Young children's words may occasionally display a complete 
mismatch with the adult word, where there is no overlap at 
all between the referential scope of the child's word and 
that of the adult word. True mismatches are only rarely 
reported, probably because observers are unable to work 
out what the child is attempting to say and may not even 
recognize any consistency in the form being produced 
(Bloom 1973). One reported example of a mismatch is where 
"TV guide" was used to refer to television sets but not 
the programme guide (Reich, 1976). My daughter Louisa 
consistently uses the word "ponytail" to refer only to 
elastic hair bands and not to the hairstyle itself (if a 
ponytail is made using a plastic clip she describes this 
as "clip"). This misunderstanding may have come about 
because of the way the word "ponytail" is often used: I
ask her "Would you like a ponytail?" and if she does, we 
select a band and I put it in her hair. Adult use of the 
word "ponytail" may therefore be ambiguous, if not 
misleading. This would seem to be confirmed by the fact 
that Louisa's twin brother also refers to hair bands as 
ponytails.
The four types of extensional error made by young childen
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can be represented as follows:
Figure 17: Different types of extensional error
a) overextension b) underextension
c) overlap d) mismatch
Of the four types of extensional error defined by 
Barrett (forthcoming) and described above, it is over­
extensions and to a lesser extent, underextensions which 
have received the most attention. Overextensions are 
classified by Clark (1993) as falling into two main 
categories: over-inclusions. where children extend a term 
to other entities from the same taxonomy (eg "dada" for 
all men, or calling a cow "pig”)? and analogical 
extensions. where children use a term for objects from 
other taxonomies on the basis of perceptual similarity eg 
when the word "ball" is applied to onions, doorknobs and 
the moon. In Rescorla's work (1980) the most common 
analogical extension was "ball" used for round objects.
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and Bowerman's daughter used "ball" to refer to a variety 
of objects which were rounded and of a size suitable for 
handling and throwing, eg a round red balloon, an Easter 
egg, a small round stone and a round canister lid 
(Bowerman, 1978).
Overextended words do not necessarily have any features in 
common with each other; however, each referent does 
usually have at least one feature with the initial 
referent of the word. For example, one child used the 
word "clock" to refer to clocks, a circular bracelet and 
the sound of dripping water, amongst other things 
(Rescorla, 1976).
The fact that a young child overextends a lexical item can 
be interpreted in different ways. It may mean that the 
child believes that all the objects which he or she names 
with that item belong to a single category and that the 
lexical item provides the adult name for all these 
objects. Thus, when the child refers to both a pig and a 
cow by the word "pig", we can interpret this as 
indicating that the meaning of "pig" for him has to do 
with whatever a pig and a cow may have in common, and we 
would then expect him to use "pig" to name other animals 
sharing these properties - for example, a sheep or a horse 
may also be called "pig" since they are all farm animals. 
Another interpretation is that a child may overextend a 
lexical item, not because he thinks it is the correct
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name, but because he has no better word in his vocabulary 
for the occasion, or because he is unable to remember the 
correct name. Thus, when he calls a cow "pig" it may be 
that this is equivalent to an utterance such as "like a 
pig" or "is that a pig?" If this is the case, we would 
expect him to be able to choose a picture of a pig in 
prefence to one of a cow if he was asked "where's the 
pig?" Indeed, Thomson and Chapman (1977) found that two 
year old children could often point to the picture 
appropriate to a word which they had used on other 
occasions to name an object depicted in the alternative 
picture. However, Kuczaj (1982) showed that the situation 
is more complicated, and that if the child is allowed to 
continue choosing from a number of referents, then with 
each successive choice, progressively less typical 
referents are chosen until overextended referents are 
selected by the (previously overextending) child.
In addition to overextension resulting from categorical 
errors and deliberately stretching the use of an acquired 
word to fulfil a communicative purpose, there may also be 
accidental retrieval of the wrong word from memory eg 
"horse" instead of "donkey"; or the child may make an 
object recognition error eg mistaking a donkey for a 
horse. Misapplication of a word may be made deliberately 
for a humorous effect or in the course of symbolic play 
(eg calling a waste-paper basket put on the head a "hat").
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Barrett (forthcoming) also describes using a word in a
metaphorical manner in order to draw attention to a
perceived similarity or analogical relationship between 
two objects eg producing "train" when perceiving a bridge. 
A child may mispronounce a word (either because of an 
articulatory slip or because of a systematic phonological 
transformation of that word) such that in its child- 
produced form it sounds similar to another word which 
therefore appears to be overextended (eg producing the 
name Martyn as "Mama"). Overextension may also occur when 
a phonologically simple word is substituted for a 
phonologically complex one which the child has difficulty 
in producing eg my son referring to breakfast time as "tea 
time".
Underextension, as we have seen, is the use of a
particular word with too restricted a range of reference 
and it is much more difficult to observe than 
overextension, since usage in the former but not the 
latter case is a correct usage in the adult system. 
Griffiths (1986) argues that underextension, though 
difficult to spot, may be a quite normal and frequent 
stage in learning the meanings of words. In fact,
Griffiths suggests that the characteristic early path is 
for nominals to be underextended first and only later to 
apply to a wider range of entities, perhaps then going as 
far as overextension (Griffiths, 1986: 300). The opposite 
phenomenon, the contraction of referential scope, has also
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been noted (Rescorla, 1981? Barrett, 1982).
According to Clark (1993), children aged one and two 
typically produce both underextensions and overextensions 
and these may involve up to one third of their production 
vocabulary.
Some overextensions seemed evident in the results of my 
study, for example a preposition could be used correctly 
(the target preposition) and then used inappropriately 
elsewhere in the same game. If used more often in 
inappropriate situations, a credit would be withdrawn from 
the correct use. However, there were also occasions
(particularly with BEHIND) where the preposition would not 
be used in the target situation, but would still be used 
elsewhere inappropriately and sometimes elsewhere 
appropriately (cases of overlap). This suggests that the 
children may not always be confident about using a 
preposition in the correct circumstances yet still use it 
elsewhere. Some case studies illustrating this phenomenon 
are given later on in section 4,4.6.
The following table summarises which prepositions were 
used inappropriately more than once per game and also 
shows how often this actually resulted in a withdrawal of 
a credit. (Use of IN and ON in general expressions like 
"in the picture" or "on the card" has been excluded.) The
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number of credit withdrawals is actually quite low (a 
total of 6) reflecting the fact that:
- a child might not lose a credit because one had not 
been gained eg child number 58 who used the
expression NEXT TO on two inappropriate occasions in 
game 3 yet failed to use it in the appropriate 
context ?
- the number of inappropriate uses may not exceed that 
of appropriate ones eg child 24 who said BEHIND on 
two appropriate and two inappropriate occasions.
Table 16 : Inappropriate use of prepositions
Number of cases Number of timesused inappropriately resulting in with­more than once drawal of credit
BEHIND 17 2NEXT TO ] 7BESIDE ] 2 2BY ] 2UNDER 7 1BETWEEN 2 1NEAR 5 n/aWITH 5 n/aROUND 1 n/a
n/a = not applicable (as these were not items beingtested)
The idea of overextensions is taken up again in section
4.5 in connection with theories on the development of word 
meanings.
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4.4.3 Analysis of BEHIND/IN FRONT errors
The confusion between the prepositions BEHIND and IN FRONT 
was the most marked error of all, probably because it 
involved the exact opposite of the target preposition 
sought. There were no noticeable confusions between any 
other two locative expressions, although BEHIND and IN 
FRONT were the only prepositions being tested which had 
exact polar opposites.
I shall first analyse the problems encountered with BEHIND 
and IN FRONT in the three games individually, and then 
see if there is a consistent pattern. The assumptions 
for analysis remain as for assessing the order of
acquisition (and detailed in section 4.2.1).
a) Game 1 - BEHIND/IN FRONT
Most children either produced the correct preposition in 
all required situations or gave no responses at all
(other than a deictic one of pointing or saying "there").
The remainder of the children had responses with
substitutions for BEHIND or IN FRONT. The exact breakdown 
between correct, substitutions (errors and alternatives 
for BEHIND/IN FRONT) and no responses can be seen in Table 
17 which follows:
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Table 17: BEHIND/IN FRONT responses (game 1)
Number of children
BEHIND/IN FRONT all correct 20 26Substitutions for BEHIND/IN FRONT 29 37No preposition given 29 37
Total 78 100
The category of children who had responses with some 
substitutions suggested that BEHIND is normally acquired 
before IN FRONT (as seen earlier in Tables 5 and 7).
The acquisition process often seemed to comprise two 
stages before both locative expressions were used 
competently:
Stage I; no response for IN FRONT, either no response or 
often UNDER/ROUND for BEHIND.
Stage II; BEHIND is mastered (both featured and non­
featured) but children are still unsure of IN 
FRONT. Responses for IN FRONT are:
substitutions ;BEHIND for IN FRONT (error) 38:alternative preps (NEAR/NEXT TO/BESIDE) 34: no preposition given 28:
100:
The early substitution errors with UNDER and ROUND in 
place of BEHIND in Stage I tie in with findings of Judith 
Johnston (1984), where early use of BEHIND was linked to a
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meaning of "hidden by and/or made inaccessible by", a 
meaning which could also be applied to UNDER, especially 
considering some of the early contexts with UNDER eg 
"under the sofa". The UNDER and ROUND substitutions for 
BEHIND in my study would support this interpretation.
As seen from the figures above, BEHIND is the most common 
substitution for IN FRONT in game 1, accounting for the 
vast majority of the total substitutions given at the 
stage when BEHIND has been mastered. Interestingly, there 
were no confusions the other way round, ie IN FRONT 
instead of BEHIND, but BEHIND was also given to mean 
BETWEEN on a number of occasions (6) - in all cases when 
children were in Stage II. This suggests that when BEHIND 
is first learned and used correctly, it may be 
overextended to cover other situations (IN FRONT and 
BETWEEN) where it is not correct.
Incorrect use of a preposition does call into question how 
acquisition is defined for the analysis: should we accept
a child as having acquired BEHIND if he or she makes even 
one inappropriate use? However, as discussed in the 
previous section on extensions, there is an interpretation 
where the child knows BEHIND and overextends it, not 
because he or she thinks it is the correct word but 
because he or she has no better word or is unable to 
remember the correct one. If this is the case, we would 
expect to see less confusion between BEHIND and IN FRONT
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(particularly BEHIND being used for IN FRONT) in game 2 on 
comprehension, which is indeed so (see Tables 18 and 19 
showing higher overall accuracy rates and a much lower 
proportion of BEHIND for IN FRONT substitutions).
There is no evidence that BEHIND was given as a "slip of 
the tongue" or because concentration was lacking: the
children did not self-correct or say "sorry, I mean...." 
as adults often do. This contrasts with semantic slips of 
the tongue that adults make such as muddling up "left" and 
"right" (the most common semantic tongue slip according to 
Aitchison, 1987: 76).
b) Game 2 - BEHIND/IN FRONT
As this was a game of comprehension rather than 
production, there was a higher proportion of children 
getting all the various forms of BEHIND/IN FRONT correct 
than for game 1, and a smaller number getting them all 
wrong or making no response. The precise breakdown of 
responses is given in the following table:
Table 18: BEHIND/IN FRONT responses (game 2)
Number of children
BEHIND/IN FRONT all correct 36Substitutions for BEHIND/IN FRONT 27 No preposition given 15
Total 78
463519
100
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The main error was that the configuration IN was made for 
BEHIND and IN FRONT (and indeed for all the other 
prepositions), in line with the non-linguistic strategy 
for younger children proposed by Eve Clark (1973a). Some 
children consistently put the key IN the box throughout 
game 2, although some changed to "tuck" the key IN with 
the bear when the reference object changed to the bear 
towards the end of the game.
The second largest single error in game 2 concerned the 
configuration of the key being placed IN FRONT of the 
reference object instead of BEHIND. This is in complete 
contrast to game 1 where confusion errors with BEHIND and 
IN FRONT only took the form of BEHIND being used for IN 
FRONT and not vice versa. In fact, the confusion errors 
with the BEHIND and IN FRONT form are not really any more 
predominant than other errors made in this game (see table 
18). What does this suggest then - that BEHIND and IN 
FRONT are confused more with production than 
comprehension? The subject of confusion will be assessed 
again when we come to consider the errors and alternative 
prepositions given in connection with the third game.
Other assorted errors and alternatives in game 2 included 
a number of cases where the configuration UNDER was made 
instead of BEHIND/IN FRONT. This not only adds to
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existing evidence for an early meaning for BEHIND along 
the lines of "hidden and/or made inaccessible by" raised 
by Johnston (1984) and mentioned earlier, but also 
suggests that the configuration cannot be too difficult to 
achieve, despite its poor performance (see Table 9).
A summary of the substitutions (nearly all of them clear 
errors) made with BEHIND and IN FRONT in game 2 is given 
in Table 19 below:
Table 19: BEHIND/IN FRONT substitutions (game 2)
Target Substitution
IN BEHIND INFRONT NEXTTO UNDER OTHER
BEHINDf 8 CM 12 2 1 7IN FRONTf 8 6 2 1 1BEHIND 12 - 0 6 3 5IN FRONT 20 2 2 1 1
—  — •«>Total 48 8 12 12 6 14
Figures given are % of all substitutions (87) made with BEHIND and IN FRONT.
In some respects, the results above may undereraphasise the 
problem with confusion between BEHIND and IN FRONT, since 
there may well be children who were not entirely sure of 
the correct configurations, yet because they happened to 
get them right at the first attempt, would be deemed to 
have mastered the prepositional expressions. This would 
of course apply to all the locative positions being tested
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and not just BEHIND and IN FRONT, but from what we have 
already seen, there does seem to be a special confusion 
relating to the polar opposites BEHIND and IN FRONT.
Those children who exhibited problems with any of the 
configurations in game 2 were asked to repeat the task so 
that I could see if the same responses would be made 
again. This emphasised even more the confusion evident 
amongst the children with the locative expressions BEHIND 
and IN FRONT.
A good example of confusion is given by child number 78 in 
game 2, where all four instances of BEHIND and IN FRONT 
were wrong on the first attempt, two were corrected on a 
second attempt ( at the end of the game ), one changed to a 
different (incorrect) position and one remained incorrect:
Example of confusion between BEHIND/IN FRONT (child 78)
Attemptnumber Targetpreposition Response given (Y = target)
BEHIND 
IN FRONT 
BEHINDf 
IN FRONTf
IN FRONTYBEHINDYIN FRONT NEXT TO BEHIND BEHIND
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c) Game 3 - BEHIND/IN FRONT
There was a larger number of children not getting all
cases of BEHIND/IN FRONT either correct or incorrect in
game 3 than in the previous two games. To a large extent
this must be due to the increased number of BEHIND/IN 
FRONT elements involved in the card game because of the 
more complicated pictures with the side facing featured 
reference objects. There is also the possibility that the 
game itself was more complex as it involved three 
dimensional items being represented in two dimensional 
form. The precise breakdown of responses is as follows:
Table 20: BEHIND/IN FRONT responses (game 3)
Number of children
BEHIND/IN FRONT all correct 7 9Substitutions for BEHIND/IN FRONT 57 75No preposition given 12 16
Total 76 100
As with game 1, there seemed to be observable stages of 
acquisition with many of the children (over 20% of those 
giving substitutions):
Stage I: no response for IN FRONT, either no response or
attempts on BEHIND, particularly the side facing 
featured BEHIND (BEHINDfs). In many cases, the 
children have a different perspective of the
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lion/crocodile picture, seeing the lion as standing 
ON the crocodile rather than BEHIND. This
phenomenon is associated with the younger children 
and can be connected to the work done by Piaget
(1926) on children's cognitive development? the 
children perceive the lion as standing on the
crocodile and their language reflects their thoughts 
(see chapter 1). The way that children view the 
picture of the lion/crocodile could be due to a large 
extent to the fact that the lion is much taller and 
larger than the crocodile behind which it is 
standing. If the animals' positions had been 
reversed, would many of the children have thought
that the crocodile was on top of the lion, or might 
they have interpreted the picture as the crocodile IN 
the lion's legs?
Examples of responses from children in Stage I;
Child Age Target Responsenumber preposition (- = no response)
31 2?10 BEHINDf UNDERIN FRONTf BEHIND IN FRONTBEHINDfs ON TOPIN FRONTfs
51 2?11 BEHINDf ININ FRONTf BEHIND IN FRONTBEHINDfs ON TOPIN FRONTfs
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62 2;9 BEHINDf IN FRONTf BEHIND IN FRONT BEHINDfs IN FRONTfs
UNDER
ON THERE
Stage II: a correct response is usually given for BEHIND
and the child may now attempt IN FRONT. This is 
often a stage of confusion, with BEHIND being given 
in place of IN FRONT (highlighted below with a *). 
Overall, the children exhibiting Stage II behaviour 
seemed to be somewhat older than the Stage I 
children.
Examples of responses from children in Stage II:
Child Age number
3?8
23 4?9
44 3?1
Target Responsepreposition (Y = correct
BEHINDf YIN FRONTf * BEHINDBEHIND YIN FRONT * BEHINDBEHINDfs YIN FRONTfs * BEHIND
BEHINDf YIN FRONTf OUTSIDEBEHIND YIN FRONT * BEHINDBEHINDfs YIN FRONTfs AT THE SIDE
BEHINDf YIN FRONTf * BEHINDBEHIND YIN FRONT * BEHINDBEHINDfs ON TOPIN FRONTfs * BEHIND
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The confusion with BEHIND and IN FRONT occurs primarily, 
although not exclusively, with BEHIND substituted for IN 
FRONT. This appears to be the most significant error made
in game 3, since it is the opposite preposition from that
required (rather than a more vague term used to cover any 
uncertainty with the precise preposition required).
Whilst significant, the BEHIND/IN FRONT confusions were
by no means the only substitutions made in game 3. Table 
21 which follows later shows all the substitutions made. 
I have divided the substitutions into broad categories, on 
the basis of similarity of features and comparison with 
the adult (target) form. The categories form a continuum, 
going from "obvious errors" to "acceptable adult
alternatives" and are intended simply as a guide to 
assessing the substitutions made by the children.
Categories of substitutions
a) Definite errors
These are errors which are immediately obvious as "wrong" 
to an adult observer- For example, child 44 describing 
the picture of the balloon as being "BEHIND the bricks" 
instead of the target "IN FRONT". Other examples are 
child 13 describing the teddy as being "IN the piano" 
instead of "BEHIND the piano" and child 43 describing the
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car as being "IN the house" instead of "IN FRONT of the 
house".
b) "Child-like" errors
These errors reflect a child's way of viewing things but 
are not what an adult would say, even if an adult might be 
able to appreciate why the child makes these errors. For 
example, as discussed earlier in this section, a number of
children (12 to be precise) described the lion on the card
as being "ON TOP of the crocodile" instead of "BEHIND the 
crocodile" (this was the side facing featured item, ie 
BEHINDs).
It is not always easy to distinguish between definite 
errors and child-like ones, since there may well be 
reasons for some of the definite errors which are not 
immediately apparent. Maybe, for example, child 43 
described in a) above had simply forgotten the lexical 
item "FRONT" when saying the car was "IN the house" 
instead of "IN FRONT". Or maybe it was an overextension 
of the preposition IN which had already been acquired. We 
do not know on the evidence available.
In the "chiId-like" group of errors there were also
several occasions when children described the card with
the teddy hiding behind the piano (BEHINDf) as the teddy
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being "UNDER the piano". Technically speaking the teddy 
was stuck down on the card under the picture of the piano, 
but the error was more likely to be made because of the 
"hidden by/inaccessible" logic which has been seen in the 
two previous games (and which relates to the everyday 
situations whereby shoes or toys are hidden and 
inaccessible when they are UNDER the bed, for example).
c) Avoidance strategies
What I have termed "avoidance strategies" were 
particularly evident with the locative expressions IN 
FRONTf and IN FRONT.
For example, when shown the picture of the car in front of 
the house and asked where the car was, some children made 
replies such as
"where the house is"
"on the paper"
"in the picture"
Whilst these answers are not strictly incorrect either 
factually or grammatically (which makes it impossible to 
categorise them as errors as they are a true description 
of a depicted situation), I was left with the distinct 
impression that the target expression was being avoided, 
probably because the child was unsure or did not know what
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it was. Further prompting in these instances did not 
usually bring the required prepositions (and these would 
not be included as correct in the analysis even if they 
were provided). This type of response does give us some 
insight into how the child's developing mind is operating: 
the child seems to realise that a verbal response is 
needed, yet is unable or unwilling to give the required 
response.
Many of the words/phrases which appeared to be used to 
avoid the target preposition fall into the "others" 
category in Table 21 below.
d) Circumlocution
Circumlocution was deemed to have occurred when a more 
vague preposition such as NEAR was used, probably because 
the preposition concerned had not yet been acquired. For 
example, in response to the question "where's the guitar?" 
child 1 replied "NEAR the drum" instead of "BEHIND the 
drum".
One feature of these vague circumlocutions (often NEAR or 
NEXT TO) is that they were often repeated with subsequent 
cards. It was almost as if certain children answered the 
cards as correctly as they could (and remember, they were 
presented in predicted increasing order of difficulty), 
then once they came to their "acquisition limit" they
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switched into a general mode which they felt would 
adequately answer all difficult forthcoming questions, or 
at least give as good a reply as possible.
For example, child 77 who had competently answered all the 
card questions relating to IN, ON, UNDER, NEXT TO and 
BEHINDf then "switched" to using NEXT TO to describe all 
the rest of the cards testing locative expressions (IN 
FRONTf, BETWEEN, IN FRONT and IN FRONT) with the exception 
of BEHIND and BEHINDfs which proved in my analysis to be 
less difficult than in the predicted hierarchy. 
Interestingly, BEHIND was given correctly (the guitar was 
described as "BEHIND the drum") but for BEHINDfs, the 
lion was described with the "child-like" error as being 
"ON the crocodile" which seems to confirm that the mental 
representation children have of this particular situation 
is a definite (albeit "wrong") one; if the child had had 
any doubts about the suitability of his response to the 
lion/crocodile question, would he not have replied "NEXT 
TO" as he had on three previous occasions? This brings to 
mind the quote from Carol Chomsky (1969) that we 
encountered earlier when talking about children 
understanding our sentences: "they understand them, but
they understand them wrongly" (section 4.2.4). Perhaps 
here we could say that this child was not, as he saw it, 
unsure as to how to answer the question of where the lion 
was: he was sure (but got it wrong).
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e) Acceptable alternatives
This group of substitutions were very much alternatives to 
the prepositions required rather than errors. They were 
in fact responses which could have been made by an adult 
without anyone thinking them particularly wrong.
One example of an acceptable alternative was, in response 
to the question asking where the car was, the colloquial 
reply "parked outside the house" (instead of the target 
"IN FRONT of the house").
Other examples of acceptable alternatives included giving 
the response "NEXT TO the crocodile" when asked where the 
lion was (where the side facing featured BEHINDfs was 
being tested and the response "BEHIND the crocodile" was 
expected) and describing the goat as "NEXT TO the horse" 
or "WITH the horse" for the target "IN FRONT of the horse" 
(testing the side facing, featured IN FRONTfs).
Again, there are no clear limits between categories: when 
does circumlocution become an acceptable alternative (eg 
would "NEAR the bricks" be a circumlocution or an 
acceptable alternative?). Much may depend on context and 
the decision on classification will be a subjective one.
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Explanations for substitutions, both errors and 
alternatives, can therefore help us build up a picture of 
the mental representations of locative expressions in 
young children. It is, however, a complex area and the 
evidence from the results here cannot provide us with the 
full picture.
The substitutions given in the table below are detailed 
objectively as what was given in place of what, although 
many of the substitutions have been used as examples in my 
more subjective classification of categories.
Table 21: BEHIND/IN FRONT substitutions (game 3)
Target Substitutions
OUTSIDE WITH OTHERON —BEH FRO IN TOP UNDER NEXT TO* NEAR
BEHf 4 6 1 2FROf 5 - 2 3 5 2 4BEH - 1 — — 1 » 2 1 2 2FRO 8 2 — 1 — 5 1 1 4BEHfs - 1 1 12 5 ““ 1 2FROf s 2 — — 1 11 2 1 2
TOTAL 15 2 9 12 9 3 28 4 8 16
* The NEXT TO column includes the responses BY and BESIDE
Figures given are % of all substitutions (131) made for BEHIND and IN FRONT
There was a considerably higher number of substitutions 
for all forms of IN FRONT compared with BEHIND (around 60%
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compared with 40%), even taking into account the high 
incidence of children giving ON TOP for BEHINDfs (the 
highest individual substitution). Again, this supports 
the earlier data which showed that BEHIND normally appears 
accurately in speech before IN FRONT.
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4.4.4 Children's consistency
As mentioned earlier (in section 4.4.3 above), if the 
children in the study exhibited problems with either the 
production or comprehension of locative expressions, (ie 
made totally inappropriate responses), I would normally 
retest to see if the error was repeated or amended 
(although if a correct response was subsequently given, 
this could not be included in the main analysis).
In cases where I did retest certain items (for instance, 
showing cards that had resulted in interesting 
substitutions again at the end of the game), some children 
showed complete "confidence in their errors" eg child 44 
(shown in the example of stage II in section 4.4.3 above) 
who repeated BEHIND for IN FRONT on all retests.
Other children, however, changed their minds on retesting 
and might answer correctly, give no response, or give 
another incorrect response.
One example of inconsistency was given earlier in section 
4.4.3 by child 78, when the subject of confusion between 
BEHIND and IN FRONT was discussed. This child produced 
incorrect configurations for all instances of BEHIND and 
IN FRONT in game 2. At a second attempt (at the end of 
the game) two configurations were corrected, one changed 
to a different (incorrect) position and one remained
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incorrect.
A further example of inconsistency is seen with child 15, 
described below, who corrected two out of three confusions 
with BEHIND and IN FRONT on repeat testing.
Example of inconsistency on repeat testing (child 15)
Attemptnumber Targetpreposition Response (Y = correct “ = no response)
BEHINDf IN FRONTf BEHIND
IN FRONT BEHINDfs
IN FRONTfs
YY* IN FRONT
* IN FRONT
* IN BACK OF Y
* denotes confusion between BEHIND and IN FRONT
Inconsistency was only prevalent in some of the cases 
where a child was unsure and perhaps working out how to 
use a certain preposition. Another option when the child
was unsure was to use an avoidance strategy - an 
alternative way of expressing him or herself which avoided 
the necessity of using the target preposition. Where the 
preposition had been mastered, there seemed to be a very 
high level of both confidence and consistency.
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The notion of the child changing his or her mind raises 
the question of what can be legitimately concluded from 
the child's failure to produce the target preposition. It 
would be nice to be able to get at cases where this 
failure to produce the target is due to the child not 
having the appropriate linguistic knowledge; but this is 
made difficult in the sort of tasks used in the tests by 
the possibility of the child being uncooperative, 
inattentive and so on.
Retesting certain items also brings with it the 
possibility of the child realising that the task is being 
repeated and trying to remember what was said the last 
time so that this can either be repeated (if the child is 
confident in its earlier response) or change it (if the 
child thinks it is being re-tested because it made an 
incorrect response). I do not intend to delve into this 
particular psychological area and indeed have no evidence 
that children did try to "remember responses" when tasks 
were repeated (perhaps I am assuming that more adult-like 
behaviour applies to this young age group). There was 
evidence, however, that sometimes the children remembered 
the cards, as a couple of times children said "I done this 
one already" (or words to this effect) when re-shown a 
particular card.
What we appear to have is a typical learning pattern: on
the one hand, young children whose prepositional concepts
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and linguistic forms are developing, who have only 
acquired one or maybe two of the easiest locative 
expressions (eg IN and ON). On the other hand, we have 
older children who have acquired many, perhaps even all of 
the locative expressions being tested. In the middle, we 
have this complex area of confusion errors, 
overextensions, circumlocution, avoidance strategies, 
perception differences and more. The uncertainties which 
these children have, and the "certainties which are wrong" 
(eg the perceptual differences) all need to be resolved 
before adult-like acquisition of the prepositions can be 
achieved. This sensitive area is then seen reacting to 
the emotional, physical and intellectual demands of the 
test environment.
Whilst this does make it difficult to interpret the data, 
it does not mean that some of the insights are not helpful 
in our understanding of how the prepositional expressions 
are acquired: for example, it shows us that acquisition
is not a simple process of moving from "no preposition" to 
"full acquisition" with nothing in-between.
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4.4.5 Perspective
Some of the different ways a child has of viewing and/or 
expressing things have already been mentioned:
Firstly, with the picture of the lion standing BEHIND the 
crocodile (see below), young children often described the 
lion as standing "ON TOP of the crocodile" (one child even 
asked where its feet were!)
See discussions relating to this topic in section 1.2 on a 
child's way of viewing things; section 4.2.3 when looking 
at featured items facing the side and section 4.4.3 on the 
errors made with BEHIND and IN FRONT in game 3.
Secondly, children substituted UNDER for BEHIND. For
example, in game 1 some children described the ball as
"UNDER the teddy (or tin)" rather than BEHIND, and
similarly in game 3, the teddy was described as "UNDER the
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piano" rather than BEHIND.
See discussions relating to this particular perspective 
error in section 4.4.3.
Another common answer that didn't provide the target 
preposition or even what an adult would have said, yet 
wasn't entirely wrong, was the use of IN to describe the 
position of the ball in game 1 when the ball was really 
hidden UNDER the blanket. In these cases, I would hide 
the ball again in another UNDER position (usually under my 
dress or under the little chair) and very often the target 
locative would be achieved, despite the fact that the 
subsequent positions also had an element of enclosure 
(which one might have assumed had caused the initial 
substitution of IN for UNDER). This illustrates, I 
believe, the considerable effect that the choice of test 
items has on the results, a recurring issue which will be
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considered again in section 5.1.
The idea of IN suggesting enclosure in the blanket may be 
related to some of Fillmore's work on spatial terms (eg 
1967, 1971) when looking at the prepositions AT/ON/IN in
one- two- and three-dimensional space. Fillmore points out 
that "John is on the grass" treats the grass as a two- 
dimensional surface whereas "John is in the grass" treats 
the grass as a three-dimensional space where John is 
inside the space with grass all around him.
In my study, one thing that some of the younger children
were keen to do was to tuck the picture of the ball into
the top of the stairs in game 3 (even though I was 
supposed to be doing the actions for UP and DOWN1) In 
many ways this was similar to their desire to tuck the key 
in with the little bear and put the key into the box in 
game 2, which supports Eve Clark's work on non-linguistic 
strategies (1973a). Clark's work does not consist of a 
theory of lexical development precisely because lexical 
development is not studied. Non-linguistic strategies 
have no inherent interest in my study, but the evidence
from my research which supports Clark's results (the key
being put in the box or being tucked in with the little 
bear in game 2, and the ball being tucked in at the top of 
the steps in game 3) does illustrate a methodological 
problem. The results where the configuration IN is made 
in game 2, for example, should be treated with caution.
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If the configuration IN is made consistently when testing 
prepositions other than IN, then how can we know that the 
preposition IN itself is known? As we saw from the 
Guttman results from game 2, there was a "no difficulty" 
score of 1.00 with IN. This may reflect everyone having 
acquired IN, but could potentially reflect some not having 
the complete knowledge of the form and meaning of the 
preposition but gaining a credit by simply acting out a 
non-linguistic strategy. This potential problem was one 
thing that I sought to eliminate by taking out IN with the 
Mokken analysis (see section 4.2.6), although in the 
event, excluding IN did not improve the scale at all.
There was also evidence of vivid imaginations and 
attention to detail with some of the cards in game 3, 
particularly the one with the tractor NEXT TO the tree.
with this picture there were responses which were
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"possible" but not really the required answer: 
eg Q: "Where's the tractor?"
A: "On the farm"
"Picking up mud"
"Going past the tree...there's no man (driver)"
To some extent this type of answer may well have been the 
child adopting an avoidance strategy, if unsure of how to 
express him or herself. In other cases, the child would 
avoid a certain preposition, like BESIDE/NEXT TO on one 
occasion, yet use it elsewhere, suggesting that the word 
might be known but not always used in the right context 
(see also the case studies which follow).
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4.4.6 Case studies
The examples given and discussed below as case studies 
help to illustrate some of the errors and other 
substitutions made with perspective. They also show a few 
of the problems and complexities involved with 
prepositions, demonstrating in particular how a word may 
be produced on an inappropriate occasion before it is used 
correctly (see also section 4.4.2 on overextensions and 
the inappropriate uses of prepositions). Most examples 
are taken from game 3, and those given in footnotes are 
"exceptional" ones, that is, they are not the more 
typical types of error that have already been discussed.
Case study 1
Child number: 23 Age: 4 ; 9
This child saw the tractor as BEHIND the tree rather than 
NEXT TO, yet later on in game 3 used BESIDE for IN FRONTfs 
with the picture of the horse and the goat (so he did know 
the word BESIDE). This is further evidence for the 
discovery that young children have a non-adult perspective 
in some cases, ie he did not say the tractor was "BEHIND 
the tree" because he did not know the word for BESIDE and 
thought that BEHIND would be a reasonable alternative: he
said BEHIND because that was how he saw it. As well as 
saying BESIDE instead of IN FRONTfs, child 23 avoided
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other instances of IN FRONT by substituting "outside the 
house" for IN FRONTf (the picture of the car IN FRONT of 
the house) and BEHIND for IN FRONT for the picture of the 
balloon IN FRONT of the bricks (a confusion error). This 
child (a boy) therefore consistently avoided giving the 
response IN FRONT, by giving substitutions (one error and 
two alternatives). At 4;9 he seemed rather old to have 
perspective and confusion errors.
Case study 2
Child number: 49 Age: 2 ; 4
This child made no responses for NEXT TO or BEHIND on 
the appropriate occasions, but said BEHIND for IN FRONT (a 
confusion error or mismatch) and NEXT TO for IN FRONTfs 
(an acceptable alternative but not the target), ie she 
used the prepositions in inappropriate situations before 
being able to use them in appropriate ones.
Case study 3
Child number 58 Age: 2 ; 9
This child avoided saying NEXT TO when appropriate, by 
describing the tractor as "on the lawn", but he did use 
NEXT TO for IN FRONT (both featured and non-featured)
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suggesting that he knows the words but is not yet able to 
apply them in the appropriate situation.
Case study 4
Child number; 59 Age; 3;11
This child gave no response for the card with the tree and 
the tractor (target BESIDE/NEXT TO) yet said BESIDE for IN 
FRONTf (describing the car IN FRONT of the house) and for 
IN FRONTfs (describing the goat IN FRONT of the horse).
Again this suggests that children do not readily describe 
the tractor as being NEXT TO the tree, maybe because:
a) they do not perceive the tractor as being NEXT TO the
tree (but as BEHIND/IN FRONT or they are not sure)
b) the card was not an ideal one for eliciting the target
response of BESIDE (as mentioned earlier in section
4.2.3)
c) a combination of the two reasons.
It is when one is looking in detail at the substitutions 
made that patterns like the perspective errors appear to 
emerge. Another error that became apparent, as we have 
seen, was the application of a preposition in an 
inappropriate situation when not used in the appropriate
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one. This is not overextension since there is no evidence 
that the original target form has been acquired, but does 
suggest that the child is examining and trying to work out 
the correct application of this particular form.
Footnote of less common substitutions
Child Agenumber
60 4;0 MIDDLE given for BETWEEN (not anacceptable alternative) but BETWEEN given for both BEHINDfs and IN FRONTfs,
68 3 ; 3 child seems to avoid IN FRONT bysaying BY for IN FRONTf, "hiding in" for IN FRONT, no response for IN FRONTfs, yet IN FRONT is given for BETWEEN (I)
78 2;10 DOWN given for UNDER, but UNDER givenfor NEXT TO and BEHINDf.
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4.4.7 Consistency of errors between games
Some errors/substitutions were particular to individual 
games (eg the error of putting the key IN in game 2, or 
the perspective error of seeing the lion standing ON the 
crocodile in game 3). Other substitutions were common to 
more than one game: the substitution of UNDER for BEHIND
(seen in all three games to a greater or lesser degree); 
circumlocution, where a more general locative (often NEAR 
or BY) was used when the child was unsure of the precise 
preposition to use (games 1 and 3).
In particular the confusion between BEHIND and IN FRONT 
was a common and salient element throughout all three 
games, where, as we have seen, BEHIND was often 
substituted for IN FRONT and sometimes for other locatives 
as well. This fascinating error, pervading areas of both 
production and comprehension, will be considered in the 
next section to see if the results from my study are 
consistent with other studies.
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4.5 Consistency of results with other studies
It is pertinent to consider whether the interesting 
results with BEHIND and IN FRONT from my research are 
consistent with other work done specifically on locatives 
and whether there is a link with other areas of language 
development. Before assessing this, I shall first examine 
an influential theory of the development of word meanings 
(the semantic feature hypothesis) and look critically at 
some of the problems and subsequent developments in this 
area. I shall then examine the acquisition of relational 
terms (other than locative ones) to see what similarities 
there are. Discussion of studies in this area will also 
introduce the topic of markedness.
4.5.1 The development of word meaning
The componential analysis of word meanings was a key part 
of the semantic feature hypothesis - a developmental 
theory set out in the 1970s by Eve Clark (1973b, 1974).
It should be noted that Clark has now distanced herself 
from this hypothesis, preferring the subsequently 
developed theory of lexical contrast (discussed later). 
However, since much of the empirical work on relational 
terms in the 1970s was infuenced by the semantic feature 
hypothesis, it is worth outlining its main 
characteristics. The basic idea is that the human mind
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(linguistic capacity) has a vocabulary of primitives that 
are used to "decompose" the meanings of words. So, for
example, the meanings of "dog" and "puppy" might be 
partially represented along the lines:
dog puppy
+ ANIMAL + ANIMAL+ CANINE + CANINE- JUVENILE + JUVENILE
The words in capitals represent components of meaning and 
may be assigned a plus ( + ) or minus (-) value. In the 
foregoing example, we see that "dog" and "puppy" are 
identical in their representations, with the exception of 
the feature specification for juvenile, since a puppy is a 
young dog.
Clark's analysis also focused on the fact that some 
semantic features can be organised in a hierarchy. For 
example, the temporal prepositions "before", "after" and 
"while" can be represented as governed by a hierarchical 
organisation of features as follows:
- SIMULTANEOUS + SIMULTANEOUS
ANTERIOR + ANTERIOR while
before after
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Clark's hypothesis was that superordinate features in 
feature hierarchies would be filled in first in the 
child's representation of word meanings and that positive 
feature specifications would be acquired first. In the 
case of the temporal terms above, a specification for 
simultaneity would be part of a word's meaning before a 
specification for anteriority was added, predicting that 
the difference between "before" and "after" would be 
mastered later than the general distinction between 
"before"/"after" and "while". In addition, the priority 
of positive feature specifications in Clark's theory 
predicted that "while" (and "when") would be mastered by 
children earlier than "before"/"after" and that "before" 
would be mastered by children earlier than "after" (see 
also section 4.5.2.d below).
Some early experimental work on children's production and 
comprehension of temporal terms appeared to support these 
predictions with respect to children's understanding of 
"when", "before" and "after" (Clark, 1971). Also, the 
phenomenon of overextension of word use (which was 
discussed earlier in section 4.4.2) was shown to be of 
particular importance to the semantic feature hypothesis. 
Clark (1973b) examined many cases in which children 
(normally aged one to two-and-a-half years old) 
overextended the use of words in a way which could be
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described in terms of a focus on perceptual/semantic 
features common to sets of lexical items. An example was 
the word "moon" being used to refer not only to the moon, 
but to all kinds of round objects. Such overextension is 
compatible with a theory of the development of word 
meanings in which words are initially underspecified or 
underextended (see Griffiths, 1986).
Despite the early supporting evidence, there has been 
considerable criticism directed towards the semantic 
feature hypothesis and, as we have already noted, Clark 
herself has moved away from the original hypothesis. 
Nelson (1974) claimed that the similarity which underlies 
generalisation need not be restricted to perceptual 
dimensions.
"Similarity may be based on many different 
dimensions of which the static perceptual
dimension of shape is only one? others include 
function, action or affect" (Nelson, 1974: 269)
Nelson illustrates this with an example of the 
hypothetical development of the concept "ball", which 
starts off as the representation of the situations the 
child has met with the ball (eg in living room, mother 
throws, picks up, holds etc) rather than being based on 
the physical attributes of the ball itself. Nelson puts 
forward the case for a functional core hypothesis, but
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this, too, has been subject to criticism (see Atkinson, 
1982, and Goodluck, 1991 for discussion of and challenges 
to the functional core hypothesis and semantic feature 
hypothesis).
One problem was that overextensions are not as common as 
semantic feature theory predicted; another that it was 
extremely difficult to identify the relevant sets of
semantic features which make up the meanings of most
words. For a number of reasons, including these, Clark 
has abandoned semantic feature theory and instead proposed 
a theory of lexical contrast (Clark, 1983, 1987, 1990).
According to this theory, the process of lexical 
development is driven by two dominant operating principles 
which are followed by the child: the principles of
contrast and conventionality. The principle of contrast 
means that the child assumes that any new word encountered 
must contrast in its meaning with other words already 
known to the child: this principle therefore leads the
child to search for possible lexical contrasts for that 
word. The principle of conventionality, on the other 
hand, means that the child assumes that there are always 
conventional linguistic forms which can be used for 
referring to particular entities; this principle leads the
child to search for conventional means for referring to
entities.
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So, according to this theory, overextensions in early 
lexical development are due to the child stretching the 
use of a conventional word in order to refer to something 
for which the more appropriate word has yet to be 
acquired. When that more appropriate word is eventually 
acquired, the child searches for the appropriate lexical 
contrasts and rescinds the original overextension.
However, lexical contrast theory has not really been fully 
developed as an explanation of some of the other major 
phenomena which characterise early lexical development 
(such as context-bound word use and decontextualisation - 
see Barrett, forthcoming for details).
Another theoretical explanation for early lexical 
development, first mentioned in chapter 1 of this thesis, 
is prototype theory. According to this, the meaning of a 
referential word is initially acquired, not in the form of 
either semantic features or lexical contrasts, but in the 
form of a prototypical referent or "best example" for that 
word. The child then generalises the word to other 
referents on the basis that they share common features 
with this prototype. This theory can explain why 
overextended words are not always linked by an invariant 
set of common features (the "clock" for bracelet and 
dripping tap example) because they must share features 
with the prototypical referent but do not have to share 
the same common features as each other.
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Prototype theory can also explain the finding that, when 
young children underextend words, it is usually the more 
peripheral referents which are excluded from the extension 
of the word and not the more typical referents (Kay and 
Anglin, 1982).
Prototype theory is popular at the moment, but there is a 
general lack of consensus about what a prototype actually 
consists of, and also a number of other areas in child 
language acquisition that prototype theory does not 
explain (or even address) such as context-bound words (see 
Barrett, forthcoming).
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4.5.2 Acquisition of relational terms
Children's understanding of relational terms is of special 
interest for developmental psychologists, because they are 
frequently used in tests of cognitive development. In 
these tests, the major concern is often not whether the 
children understand the language used, but whether they 
understand the properties of the objects and situations 
which are the topic of conversation. The possibility that 
there is a linguistic barrier to understanding as well as 
a conceptual one operating in these tests was one which 
Donaldson and Wales (1970) set out to explore by carrying 
out a series of experiments on nursery children's 
understanding of terms such as MORE/LESS, SAME/DIFFERENT 
and dimensional adjectives.
a) Dimensional adjectives
The study conducted by Donaldson and Wales (1970) 
comprised a comprehension test and a production test
designed to compare the comparative and superlative forms 
of the opposite pairs BIG/SMALL, LONG/SHORT, HIGH/LOW, and 
FAT/THIN. In the comprehension test, children were shown 
four objects and asked to show the experimenter the 
biggest one, for example, or one which was bigger than the 
one the experimenter identified. In general, the children 
were more accurate with the positive adjective from each
pair than with the negative one (see the discussion on
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markedness below) and this effect was more obvious with 
the superlative items than with the comparative ones. In 
the light of later studies, one of the most interesting 
results from the production test was the fact that 
although there was a general improvement in the 
appropriate use of the terms, there was an indication that 
in the six months between the initial and later testing of 
the same children, some of them had specialised their use 
of BIG in the sense that they no longer used it as a 
general, multi-dimensional adjective, but restricted its 
use to comparison along a single dimension.
With reference to the first main finding, why should 
positive dimensional adjectives appear to be acquired 
before their negative counterparts? Eve Clark (1973b), 
following work by Herbert Clark (1970) on marked and 
unmarked terms, offered an account along the following 
lines.
Marked/Unmarked
For each pair of adjectives, the positive member is 
unmarked according to a number of criteria (for an 
extensive discussion of markedness see Lyons, 1977: 
305ff). As well as being used in explicit or implicit 
comparison
eg "John is taller than Glyn"
"John is tall"
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the positive adjective also has a non-comparative use, 
when it can be seen as simply identifying the relevant 
dimension. Thus we find phrases such as
"6 feet tall"
"5 miles wide"
but not normally phrases such as
"6 feet short" (or even "5 feet 8 short"); or 
"5 miles narrow"
The non-comparative or neutral interpretation can be 
viewed as including one less feature than the comparative 
or contrastive one, and so H Clark (1970), subscribing to 
the psycholinguistic theory that psychological complexity 
directly reflects linguistic complexity, proposed that in 
language development, children would acquire unmarked 
(positive) terms before the corresponding marked 
(negative) ones (see also the discussion by Bartlett, 1976 
on this topic).
Also, when the marked terms did appear, Clark proposed 
that their meaning would often be absorbed into that of 
the unmarked term (see examples of this under MORE/LESS).
Later studies have confirmed the polarity effect, whereby 
the positive term is associated with a higher level of
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accuracy than its negative counterpart (eg Eilers, Oiler 
and Ellington, 1974; Brewer and Stone, 1975).
Another study by Klatsky, Clark and Macken (1973) 
investigated the basis for the polarity effect. They 
argued that the superiority of the positive term could be 
either the result of the children's encountering it more 
frequently in adult speech, or the result of a difference 
in conceptual complexity between the positive and negative 
ends of dimensions. To decide between these explanations 
they took a group of four year olds and taught them 
nonsense words for the positive and negative ends of the 
dimensions of size, height, length and thickness. They 
found that the children had greater difficulty in learning 
the nonsense words for the negative pole than those for 
the positive pole, and concluded that there was a 
conceptual basis to the children's difficulty with 
negative dimensional adjectives and not just a problem of 
less frequent exposure to them in adult speech.
BIG and SMALL appeared to be handled more accurately than 
the other terms by three year old children (Eilers, Oiler 
and Ellington, 1974) which was consistent with Clark's 
(1972) finding that if four year olds are asked for the 
opposite of a dimensional adjective, they are likely to 
substitute either BIG or SMALL for a more specific 
adjective of the appropriate polarity. However, it could 
be argued that the children may have been confusing BIG
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with the more specific term rather than using the more 
general term to mask their lack of knowledge of the more 
specific one.
Even the general terms are not always easy to use 
correctly eg ray son Glyn aged 2;7 who, when asked "Would 
you like a little more?" replied "I'd like a BIG morel"
The semantic feature hypothesis applied to dimensional 
adjectives did not really make any predictions about the 
appearance of forms in the lexicon, but only about the 
order of development of understanding these forms.
Some of the findings from studies on relational terms have 
been difficult to accommodate within the semantic feature 
hypothesis, but Carey (1978) made proposals which differed 
from the semantic feature hypothesis in two main respects.
Firstly, the child acquires semantic information about
polarity before he or she acquires information about
dimensionality. One source of evidence for this is 
provided by Brewer and Stone (1975) which shows that,
given the array in Figure 18 which follows and asked to 
choose the shortest one, children's errors respect 
polarity but not dimensionality, ie the erring child will 
make the error of choosing D rather than the error of 
choosing A.
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Figure 18: Polarity versus dimensionality
A B D E
Which one is the shortest?
Other tests involved an array where the spatial properties 
were questioned using inappropriate dimensional adjectives 
(eg FAT and its related forms FATTER and FATTEST when 
items in the array differed only in terms of height). 
Responses appeared to indicate that children use polarity 
information in the inappropriate adjectives.
Carey's position is consistent with Clark in that the 
learner first acquires the dimensionally undifferentiated 
adjectives BIG and LITTLE, providing what Carey terms a 
"core comparative structure". Because the differentiated 
adjectives are syntactically similar to BIG and LITTLE it 
is suggested that this core comparative structure is 
overgeneralised to these adjectives before the appropriate 
dimensionality features are acquired, leading to a 
situation where BIG is synonymous with TALL, WIDE, FAT etc 
and SMALL is synonymous with SHORT, NARROW, THIN etc, 
resulting in the sort of error described.
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b) MORE and LESS
One of the most common words children use in very early 
language development is MORE, frequently requesting extra 
food or drink (eg "more milk") or the repetition of a 
pleasurable activity (eg "more swing"). Such examples 
are often related to the adult lexical form "another" (eg 
"another drink"/"another push on the swing"). The child's 
use of "more" may even be used in contexts where it is 
equivalent to "the other" eg my son Gareth searching for 
the missing bits of a puzzle ("where more gone?" ie "where 
are the other pieces?"). From these examples, it is clear 
that the meaning of the word MORE still has a long 
development ahead of it, even if it has appeared early on 
in speech.
In contrast, LESS appears late in children's speech and 
may even have a restricted use in the speech addressed to 
children. It has been suggested that children's early 
encounters with this term may be in utterances such as 
"give him less" where some quantity is being offered and 
the comparison is unspecified (Elliot, 1981: 131).
Donaldson and Balfour (1968) devised eight types of 
settings in which their children (aged 3;5 to 4?1) could 
be asked for judgments involving MORE and LESS or asked to
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carry out instructions involving the same terms. All made 
reference to two cardboard apple trees, each of which had 
six hooks on which a number of cardboard apples could be 
hung. The children were asked to make static comparisons 
of the two trees, to imagine and carry out transformations 
of the number of apples on the trees and, in a follow-up 
study six months later, to change the number on a single 
tree in accordance with a specific instruction. The 
overall result was that the children did not discriminate 
between items which involved MORE and those which involved 
LESS, and in general their reponses were those appropriate 
for the MORE items. Only one child was consistently 
correct on the LESS items.
These results lend suppport to Eve Clark's theory if they 
are interpreted as indicating that nursery children 
understand MORE and interpret LESS to mean MORE. Clark's 
claims can be represented by the following three stages;
1.
2.
3 .
more
less
more
less
more
less
+ AMOUNT] 
+ AMOUNT]
+ AMOUNT]+ POLARITY]
+ AMOUNT]+ POLARITY]
+ AMOUNT]+ POLARITY]
+ AMOUNT]- POLARITY]
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There is, however, a problem concerning the non­
comparative use of MORE in the first stage (Clark 
describes MORE and LESS as being used only in the nominal 
non-comparative sense to begin with). Whilst it is 
possible to argue a (weak) case for MORE being unmarked 
relative to LESS on the basis of its relatedness to MUCH 
(versus LITTLE), it is not the case that MORE, unlike the 
unmarked dimensional adjectives, has the specialised task 
of naming a dimension. This calls into question whether 
there is indeed a coherent notion of markedness.
It is also difficult to relate the non-comparative usage 
in the comprehension of nursery school children in 
Donaldson and Balfour's study (where MORE and LESS seemed 
to be interpreted as SOME under some conditions) to 
Clark's theory where this usage is presented as taking 
place near the beginning of lexical development which 
would normally be taken as pre-nursery.
It is possible to conclude that the semantic feature 
hypothesis suffers from important defects when applied to 
the acquisition of MORE and LESS (as it does for the 
dimensional adjectives).
Other research has also investigated the topics of MORE 
and LESS and found that children certainly do have 
difficulty with the comprehension of LESS, but they do not
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necessarily give it a consistently wrong interpretation. 
Palermo (1973) replicated the Donaldson and Balfour study 
and found that even some seven year olds were still 
performing well below chance on LESS items. Palermo 
(1974) compared the ability of three and four year olds to 
judge "Which has less?" when applied to apple trees, 
beakers of water and linear arrays, and found that on all 
these tasks there were some four year olds and even more 
three year olds who made systematic errors on the 
question. These children stuck to their erroneous 
interpretation of LESS even in the face of a strong 
inducement (sweets) to bias their choice in the correct 
direction.
Townsend (1974) extended the investigation to questions in 
which an explicit standard was mentioned (eg "Who has more 
apples than Carl?"). He found that three to five year 
olds did well on MORE instructions but performed only at 
chance on LESS items.
Carey (1978) included a condition in which the comparative 
adjective was replaced by a nonsense word and found that 
the response patterns for LESS items and nonsense items 
were similar. Since it is not likely that one would wish 
to argue that the children had a semantic reading 
available for the nonsense word, this experiment points 
out the danger of concluding from these results anything
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about the meaning of LESS for the children other than the 
fact that it appears to cause them considerable 
difficulty.
One source of difficulty was explored by Pike and Olson 
(1977) who deduced from their results that some children 
quite simply seem to see an arrangement in terms of which 
has the greater quantity (and then have to reinterpret the 
arrangement to judge a statement which uses the word 
LESS).
Trehub and Abramovitch (1978) also showed that when 
nursery children were asked to point to one of two piles 
of objects they had a strong tendency to point to the pile 
with the greater number of objects, even when the 
instruction contained no reference to MORE or LESS.
Children do sometimes have surprising difficulty in 
judging which arrangement has more items in it. Four year 
old children, in particular, frequently use length as a 
criterion of quantity (Siegel, 1977) to the exclusion of 
considerations of density, so that they will judge that a 
row of three counters spread out is bigger than a row 
where five counters are placed close together (see 
following figure).
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Figure 19; Length as a criterion of quantity
Which row has more counters in it?
There is some indication (Bever, Mehler and Epstein, 1968) 
that younger children are less susceptible to this 
illusion and Weiner (1974) has reported that three year 
old children can perform above chance both on MORE and on 
LESS judgments of quantity, applied to rows of objects.
We can conclude then that nursery children's judgments of 
relative numérosity are unreliable and that proper 
application of MORE and LESS* is still developing.
Footnote
* Throughout this section we have seen studies looking at 
MORE and LESS, yet no reference to FEWER. I have always 
understood that plurals do not take LESS (eg LESS manpower 
but FEWER men - see Fowler's Modern English Usage) and can 
only conclude that one should ask "which tree has FEWER 
apples" rather than "which tree has LESS apples" 
(although no doubt this would complicate matters even 
furtherI)
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c) SAME and DIFFERENT
Various studies have asked children to select an object 
which is the same as or different from one indicated by 
the experimenter. These studies are not tracing the 
development of descriptions of quantity, but are
frequently discussed along with such studies largely 
because the initial results were similar to the systematic 
confusion found for MORE and LESS. Donaldson and Wales 
(1970) found that their children were as likely to choose 
a maximally similar object to the standard whether the
instruction asked for one that was "the same in some way"
or one that was "different in some way".
As in the case of MORE and LESS, much of the subsequent
discussion has centred on whether the two terms are
indistinguishable for the young child and also on what the
positive term (SAME) means for the children. I do not
intend to review all the literature in this area, but
would like to make a number of observations and draw on 
other related studies.
With SAME and DIFFERENT, it becomes particularly clear how 
difficult it is to separate information about semantic 
development from considerations of the development of 
cognitive skills, such as estimations of quantity? from
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social skills, such as assessing the reasons behind the 
experimenter's questions; and from other features of 
language use, such as the use of determiners and anaphoric 
reference (referring back to something previously 
expressed).
As a test of the relation between cognitive and linguistic 
development, Sinclair (1967) took a group of "conservera" 
as defined by Piaget's standard tests showing the ability 
to conserve (see section 1.2.1) and asked them to describe 
pairs of objects such as two pencils of different lengths. 
She found that most of the non-conservers used absolute 
adjectives in their descriptions ("This pencil's long and 
this one's short") while over 70% of the conservera 
compared the lengths. Similarly, if the objects varied on 
two dimensions, such as length and width, the conservera 
tended to coordinate the dimensions in their descriptions 
("This pencil's longer but thinner than that one"), while 
the non-conservers treated each dimension separately. 
This difference in language use between the groups shows 
that an important factor in conservation may be the 
ability to attend to features of the visual array in a 
particular way. Sinclair then demonstrated that training 
the non-conserving children to describe the objects 
comparatively, and by co-ordinating the dimensions, did 
not help them to conserve when they were tested later.
It is evident that cognitive, linguistic and interactional
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factors are too closely entwined in these tests to make it 
useful to try and see language as dependent on cognition 
or the reverse.
Experiments by Donaldson (1978) tested children's 
understanding of the meaning of ALL and EVERY. It should 
be noted that even the youngest children in the 
experiments (aged three) had some understanding of the 
meaning of the quantifiers ALL and EVERY. For example, 
faced with an array of toy garages with doors that open, 
three year olds were generally accurate in verifying 
whether a statement such as "all the garage doors are 
open" is correct or not. However, children were 
frequently wrong in verifying the accuracy of statements 
in sentences that involved a quantifier and more than a
single set of entities - for example, a set of garages and
a set of cars.
Donaldson found that children appear to focus on one of 
the sets of entities and evaluate the truth of a statement 
with a quantifier with respect to whether a particular 
quantifier relationship holds for that set. Children 
were asked to evaluate the correctness of the following 
sentences
(1) All the cars are in the garages
(2) All the garages have cars in them
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when faced with one of either of two situations; a row of 
four garages, three of which contained cars; or a row of 
four garages, each of which contained a car plus an 
additional car (not in a garage) at the end of the row. 
For adults, (1) is true in the first of the two situations 
and false in the second, and (2) is false in the first 
situation and true in the second. Many children said, 
however, that both sentences were false in the situation 
where there is a row of four garages, three of which 
contained cars, and that both sentences were true in the 
situation where there are four garages and five cars. 
Thus the children respond consistently as if they were 
responding to the question "Does every garage have a car 
in it?"
The basic pattern of results just described has been found 
in a number of studies and appears to be grounded partly 
in perceptual and partly in linguistic factors. In the 
example just described, perceptual properties (the greater 
salience of the garages than of the cars) may account for 
the fact that children consistently responded as if they 
were answering the question "Does every garage have a car 
in it?" rather than "Is every car in a garage?" which 
would produce the opposite of the responses observed. 
Further studies by Philip and Takahashi (1990) looked at 
the quantifier EVERY (rather than ALL) and also found a 
pattern of responses suggesting that children have their 
own interpretation of the test questions.
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This provides another example of the problems encountered 
with empirical work and suggests that caution must be used 
when assessing the results of any test with children.
d) BEFORE and AFTER
We saw in the previous section describing the semantic 
feature hypothesis that the temporal preposition BEFORE 
(positive feature) would be mastered earlier than AFTER. 
Eve Clark's work on the comprehension of BEFORE and AFTER 
provides a good example of the interplay of the 
acquisition of semantic features and non-linguistic 
strategies. She describes four stages in this 
development;
I Whilst understanding that BEFORE and AFTER involve 
the ordering of events in time, the child formulates 
his/her actions on the basis of an order-of-mention 
strategy; whatever is mentioned first happens first 
(note that we could also get stage I behaviour if the 
temporal conjunctions were missed out/replaced - see 
Carey, 1978 for discussion).
Ila The child understands utterances containing BEFORE, 
but AFTER continues to be at stage I.
Ilb AFTER is more fully specified but incorrectly, so 
that the child interprets it as if it had the meaning
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of BEFORE. Thus the child is now consistently 
correct on BEFORE utterances and consistently 
incorrect on AFTER utterances.
Ill The child is able to distinguish BEFORE from AFTER 
and consistently responds correctly in the tests.
In trying to provide an explanation as to how the feature 
value [+/- PRIOR] is involved in the acquisition of BEFORE 
and AFTER, leading to the transition from Stage lib to III 
above, H Clark (1973) proposed that the system of 
prepositions, conjunctions etc encoding temporal concepts 
in English is based on the following spatial metaphors:
BEFORE (temporal) = BEFORE (spatial) = IN FRONT (spatial) 
AFTER (temporal) = AFTER (spatial) = BEHIND (spatial)
Clark argued that the child's concept of the space in 
front of him/her develops more quickly and is more 
elaborate than the child's concept of the space behind 
him/her. In addition, the space in front of the child can 
be viewed as positive, when compared to the space behind 
him, thus establishing links between the pair BEFORE/AFTER 
(positive and negative) and pairs of words discussed 
earlier in this section.
According to H Clark, FRONT is therefore seen as positive 
and unmarked (referring to the visually perceptible end of
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a dimension) whereas BACK is negative and marked, as it 
reflects the negative end (the obscured, far side). This 
means that IN FRONT should be learned first, since it is 
the unmarked term, and BEHIND later - something which is 
in direct contrast with the findings in my study. 
However, other studies also have findings that contradict 
the idea that IN FRONT is the unmarked term which is 
learned first and these will be discussed in the following 
section (4.6). Note that unmarked and learned first are 
taken as definitionally linked here. This is one way to 
view markedness, but it is not the only one (it is not 
appropriate here, however, to survey the whole complex 
area of other ways of looking at markedness).
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4.6 BEHIND/IN FRONT in other studies
Determining the exact nature of the concepts of BEHIND and 
IN FRONT is no easy task, as contemporary linguists and 
psycholinguists have discovered (Bierwisch, 1967; H Clark, 
1973; Cohen Levine and Carey, 1982). At least part of the 
problem is the complex nature of the concepts themselves. 
What is the principle which allows us to know what the 
fronts of various objects are? H Clark (1973) pointed out 
that the front of an object is usually the side that is 
prominent in some way, but this is only true for one type 
of front, namely featured (or intrinsic) fronts such as 
those found with a house, horse or television. The front 
of an object with an intrinsic front does not change from 
day to day, nor does it change from situation to 
situation. BACK (or BEHIND) is generally defined most 
easily as the part of the object opposite to the front; 
and though both FRONT and BACK are each sides, the term 
THE SIDE refers to those sides which are neither front nor 
back.
With non-featured items, another locational system is 
defined not by the intrinsic characteristics of the object 
but by the speaker's own spatial relation to the object.
The complexity of this situation did not escape Alice in 
Lewis Carroll's "Alice in Wonderland" (first published in
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1865), when told that one side of a large mushroom will 
make her grow taller and the other side will make her grow 
shorter:
"Alice remained looking thoughtfully at the 
mushroom for a minute, trying to make out which 
were the two sides of it; and as it was 
perfectly round, she found this a very 
difficult question." (Carroll, 1994: 60)
Kuczaj and Maratsos (1975) devised a variety of tasks to 
explore the concepts of BACK and FRONT: children placing
objects in relation to themselves; touching the front or 
back of certain featured objects (eg hippo, spoon); 
placements with featured and non-featured objects (eg 
beads, cube) and a "generalization task" where boxes 
represented a gumdrop machine (gadgets on sides/top) and a 
spaceship (gadgets inside) and the child was asked to 
touch the front/back of the machine involved after a short 
directed play.
Kuczaj and Maratsos found that children appear to acquire 
the notion that FRONT and BACK are opposites before they 
have a general understanding of either term (although if 
FRONT/BACK is a linguistic opposition, it is not at all 
clear what it would mean for one term to be acquired 
without the other; from a Saussurean/Jakobsonian 
structuralist perspective, the position would be
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impossible). Children in the study were then seen to 
simultaneously acquire both terms correctly (there was a 
slight but non-significant tendency for children to 
understand IN BACK OF more accurately than IN FRONT OF), 
with the term SIDE being acquired well after FRONT and 
BACK. Correct use of FRONT and BACK began with reference 
to the self and spread to objects with fronts (in line 
with results obtained by Hall, 1975). H Clark (1973) 
maintained that it is from knowing what is the front that 
one can work out the back. Thus Kuczaj and Maratsos' 
findings are not in line with H Clark's predictions (1973) 
that FRONT is acquired earlier. Locative comprehension 
data reported by E Clark (1977) also revealed no 
significant difference in difficulty between the two 
forms.
Other writers, including Johnston and Slobin (1979) have 
argued that acquisition of BEHIND should precede IN FRONT 
because of the greater communicative and cognitive 
salience of IN BACK OF (the Italian, Serbo-Croatian and 
Turkish data confirmed this, although the English data did 
not for featured objects). Adults and children use BEHIND 
(or BACK OF) more frequently than IN FRONT (Wells, 1975) 
and this may well be because there is more need to tell 
someone that an object is behind and perhaps hidden by 
another than there is to say that an object is in front of 
another and in full view (see also Appendix 1 suggesting 
that the real life situations are reflected in children's
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books). If an object is in front of something else and 
one person asks where it is, the other person may 
reasonably look and point and say "There". It is not 
necessary to relate the object to another in the 
environment. On the other hand, if the object is behind 
another and cannot efficiently be indicated by gesture, it 
will be more informative if it is related to another 
landmark by linguistic means - "It's behind x". Thus, 
the child learns that BEHIND generally relates one object 
to another, but he or she may not realise that IN FRONT OF 
can also serve a similar function. It is not until the 
age of about six years, according to data from Cox (1979, 
1981a and c) that the locative meanings of both IN FRONT 
OF or BEHIND are mastered.
In the study done in Britain by Cox (1979) with children 
aged 2;2 to 8;10, children's comprehension of IN FRONT and 
BEHIND was examined. Children were asked to place a ball 
either BEHIND or IN FRONT OF another ball. The finding 
that the BEHIND instruction is understood earlier than the 
IN FRONT OF one also contradicts H Clark's hypothesis. 
Cox suggests that H Clark's assignment of the labels 
"positive" and "negative" to the prepositions is 
incorrect. Whereas FRONT (positive) and BACK (negative) 
refer to opposite sides of the mid-point (the person) of 
the horizontal-frontal dimension, Cox points out that the 
action of putting one object IN FRONT OF or BEHIND another
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takes place at the positive end of the dimension, ie IN 
FRONT OF the subject. Perhaps the object which is placed 
BEHIND the other and therefore further towards the 
positive end of the dimension is conceptually easier (Cox, 
1979: 374).
Cox also had some interesting data on the confusion 
between BEHIND and IN FRONT. Responses were classified as 
correct, opposite or other. Whereas the youngest children 
made a variety of placements, older children mostly made a 
correct or opposite placement. There was a distinct 
difference between placements though: most four-year-olds
who were asked to put their ball BEHIND placed it 
correctly; of those asked to put it IN FRONT, however, 
nearly as many placed the ball on the far side as placed 
it correctly. Again these results tie in very well with 
those from my own study: not only is there agreement about 
understanding BEHIND before IN FRONT (it appears to be 
acquired earlier), but this manifests itself in a similar 
way (BEHIND is substituted for IN FRONT). To some extent 
this may be natural, since it suggests that children are 
at least restricted to the same dimension, even if the 
opposite term is understood. On the other hand, there is 
little evidence of other opposite locational terms being 
confused.
In a study by Cox and Ryder Richardson (1985) with 
children aged three to ten years, descriptions of the
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spatial relationship between two objects were examined. 
The youngest children often just gave deictic responses, 
the five year olds began to use spatial terms such as AT 
THE FRONT/BACK or environmental landmarks (eg "the red 
ball is towards the window"). By age six, spatial terms 
predominated, and adult groups were found to use spatial 
terms exclusively. BEHIND, as opposed to AT THE BACK, was 
also found to be particularly an adult term.
Susan Cohen Levine and Susan Carey (1982) set out to test 
the prediction that the words for BACK and FRONT would 
precede the concept (a sort of Sapir/Whorf position in 
development). Their study consisted of two non-linguistic 
tasks (orienting toys) and one comprehension task. The 
results of their study actually confirmed the opposite of 
that predicted in that a complex disjunctive concept of 
"front-back" orientation was found to precede any 
knowledge of the words FRONT and BACK. The non-linguistic 
tasks were 1) to line up various featured toys (doll, 
horse, car, house etc) in a parade and 2) to place each of 
the toys where it could talk to a doll held by the 
experimenter (the canonical encounter task). In the 
linguistic (comprehension) task the child's knowledge of 
the words FRONT and BACK was assessed by asking the child 
to point to fronts and backs of featured toy objects from 
various categories (human, animal, vehicle, inanimate).
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Like the results from my study, Cohen Levine and Carey 
found that BEHIND was acquired before IN FRONT and that 
there were errors where BEHIND was interpreted for IN 
FRONT on the comprehension task. One other interesting 
feature from this study was when children were asked to
point to either the FRONT or BACK of objects and many
pointed just to the back. (This was also the case with my 
twins when, aged 1;8 and asked to point to their back/ 
front, they were only able to point to their back and
either made no response for the "front" request or pointed 
instead to their back.) In case this phenomenon might be 
a behavioural preference (and children would point to the 
back of something regardless of what was said), Cohen 
Levine and Carey asked the children in their study to
point to the object's "wug". In response to this, the 
children either indicated its TOP or looked puzzled and 
did nothing.
Another relevant study looking at the locatives BEHIND and 
IN FRONT is that done by Judith Johnston (1984). Like my 
investigation, hers was based on the earlier work done by 
herself and Dan Slobin (1979). This time she used more 
natural elicitation procedures by using puppets (rather 
than employing isolated where-questions as used in the 
Johnston and Slobin tests). The puppet story procedures 
appeared to be more effective in eliciting target 
locatives and an early use of BEHIND and IN FRONT with 
large reference objects was explored. Thirty-three
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children aged 2;7 to 4;7 told puppets where to look for 
missing objects and the results indicated an order of 
acquisition for (American) English "consistent with prior 
reports" (Johnston, 1984; 407). However, there were some 
interesting findings through manipulating features of the 
reference objects. For example, the relative size of the 
reference objects was varied and included:
non-featured and taller (T) than the located object 
(eg a can, tree) 
non-featured and virtually flat (N) (eg bracelet, 
plate)
ordinary featured (F) (eg doll, truck)
The order of difficulty produced by the data was:
ON <IN <UNDER <NEXT TO <BACK(T) <BACK(F) <FRONT(F) 
<BACK(N ) <FRONT(T ) <FRONT(N ).
The children's responses to these items suggested a new 
parameter of meaning in the early uses of BEHIND and IN 
FRONT. Prior research (E Clark 1977, Johnston & Slobin 
1979, Kuczaj & Maratsos 1975) had established that 
children use or understand BEHIND and IN FRONT for 
featured reference objects before non-featured ones. The 
new data suggested that the developmental picture is more 
complex by identifying an early use of BEHIND which is not 
bound to any feature of the reference object, but to the 
invisibility and inaccessibility of the located object.
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To my mind it is logical that there may be factors other 
than the nature of the reference object which could affect 
the responses made by children and this is another reason 
why experimental results should be viewed with caution
(see section 5.1). The following stages for the 
acquisition of BEHIND and IN FRONT are speculated by 
Johnston:
a) A child begins by speaking of things BEHIND or IN 
FRONT of his/her own body. The meaning focus seems 
to be on "inaccessible" and/or "hidden" compared with 
"visible".
b) The child recognises the relationship of spatial 
proximity implicit in the self-reference contexts in
a) above and adds this notion to previous meanings. 
This enables him/her to use BEHIND for relationships 
to reference objects other than self ie the BACK(T) 
configurations which are larger/taller than the 
located object. The meaning of BEHIND here may be 
glossed as "next-to-and-made-inaccessible/invisible- 
by". Temporary uses of IN FRONT to mean "next-to-and- 
visible" also occur.
c) The child recognises the relationship of object-part 
previously implicit in self-reference contexts in a). 
This enriched understanding plus the proximity notion 
from b) leads to new uses of BEHIND and IN FRONT with
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featured objects in the BACK(F) and FRONT(F) 
configurations. Meanings here may be glossed as 
"next-to-the back/front of".
d) The child recognises the relationship of order 
previously implicit with the larger objects in b). 
Re-analysis leads to new uses of BEHIND in the non­
featured/flat configurations and then to analogous 
extensions for non-featured IN FRONT glossed as 
"first/second-in-the-line-of-sight".
Although this picture is consistent with the locative data 
to date, it is not yet complete, since it does not cover, 
for example, when and how the child differentiates between 
the meanings of UNDER and BEHIND (an error common to both 
Johnston's and my own research). It does appear, however, 
to make a useful contribution to the explanation of why 
BEHIND is so often acquired before IN FRONT and also 
emphasises the importance of the type of reference object, 
a subject which will be considered in the next chapter.
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5 MATTERS ARISING AND SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
There are a number of issues arising from the results of 
my research which will be covered in this chapter. I 
shall first consider the change in position of BEHIND and 
IN FRONT (both featured and non-featured forms) compared 
with the predicted order. The most likely explanation for 
this earlier acquisition of BEHIND and IN FRONT seems to 
be that my results reflect a simpler testing method (as 
child, tester and featured objects were all aligned - see 
discussion in chapter 4). This raises even more important 
issues, namely the influence of testing methods and 
materials on the results of experiments and, as a 
consequence of this, how reliable and comparable 
experimental data are. I shall examine these concerns 
in section 5.1, before looking at possibilities for 
further research in section 5.2.
Another issue which has been discussed during the course 
of this thesis has been the definition of acquisition and 
how to measure it (see, for example, sections 3.2, 4.2.1 
and 4.2.5). Whilst implicational scaling (the Guttman 
analysis) may be the best statistical procedure to apply 
to studies on the acquisition of locative expressions, it 
should not be forgotten that this produces an order of 
difficulty which is then equated to one of acquisition. 
If acquisition and difficulty are definitially linked then
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there may be no problem, but one should still be careful 
to ensure that the testing method does not include 
anything which might make producing or understanding a 
target preposition harder and thus affect the results (see 
5.1.C below).
5.1 Importance of testing materials
My research study was designed to be as simple as possible 
and to minimise any extraneous task demands. This was 
particularly the case for the prepositional expressions 
BEHIND and IN FRONT where I ensured that the featured 
items were facing both myself (the experimenter) and the 
child at all times, except for the additional test items 
in game 3 to look at side facing featured items. The 
increase in difficulty experienced by the children with 
these additional, more complicated, items provided a 
strong indication that the nature of the test can affect 
the results. Insofar as my tests were successful in 
minimising task demands, their results may be more 
indicative of the nature of the locative expressions than 
those of other studies. What has become increasingly 
clear, however, is that all experimental data should be 
treated with caution.
We have seen many examples of the influence of testing 
materials/method throughout this thesis, and it may be
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useful here to recall some of them:
a) Nature of reference object
When looking at the acquisition of BEHIND and IN FRONT we 
saw that a key role is played by the reference object and 
whether it is featured or not. Johnston and Slobin (1979) 
predicted that BEHIND/IN FRONT with featured objects (such 
as houses and dolls) would be mastered before non-featured 
ones (such as drinking glasses and tins) and this seems to 
be confirmed by the results from my study. Johnston's 
(1984) study also introduces additional categories of 
"non-featured and taller" and "non-featured and virtually 
flat" reference objects. All this information undoubtedly 
helps us assess how children relate to reference objects 
when acquiring locative prepositions, but it does stress 
the importance of testing materials and orientation and 
also raises the question of classification - when, for 
example, does a tall reference object become one of normal 
height?
b) Nature of object to be located
There is an interaction between the nature of the object 
to be located and that of the reference object, ie if the 
object to be located is small, the reference object is 
relatively larger, and vice versa. This is important in 
connection with Johnston's (1984) proposals on the
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development of BEHIND and IN FRONT along the lines of 
"inaccessible/made invisible by" and "visible".
We also saw in Bavin's (1991) study that the orientation 
of the items to be located could influence the child's 
selection, eg with an array of four small dogs facing the 
child and a featured reference object (cow) facing away, 
there was some confusion as to which dog was "at the back 
of the cow"- This brings us to the topic of deictic and 
non-deictic uses of locative expressions (see Figure 10 in 
chapter 1) and the whole question of children being able 
to take account of different points of view.
Another example of the importance of the object to be 
located was seen in Cox's work (1981b) where she found 
that placing a man behind a wall was enough to elicit 
partial occlusions whereas placing a ball behind a ball 
was not (see section 1.2.2). Even calling something a 
wall rather than a block made a difference, and these 
contextualised tasks seemed to be particularly important 
for the younger children (four-year-olds) in drawing 
tasks.
Further work by Cox (1985a) looking specifically at task 
materials has shown that the more similar the two objects 
in a scene, the less likely the children are to use 
partial occlusions; instead they tend to separate the two
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objects when drawing them. Cox suggests that it is 
asymmetry between the objects in the scene which leads the 
older children particularly to use partial occlusion 
whereas similarity leads them to separate the objects. 
There is still no clear explanation for why this is.
c) An extra dimension
When considering the significance of a low Guttman
coefficient of reproducibility, the possibility of an 
extra dimension was raised (section 4.2.3). The point 
was made that if any part of the test involved something 
different (eg an extra skill like reading in a 
mathematical test) then this could have an effect on the 
test results. With many tests, such a big difference may 
not be apparent, but there might still be subtle 
differences in the tasks involved.
I have wondered whether the poor performance of UNDER in 
the comprehension test of my study (game 2) was linked in
any way to an extra task demand - perhaps the test
materials did not allow the key to be "hidden" enough for
the younger participants (although the picture of a ball 
clearly visible "UNDER the table" in game 3 did not prove 
to be a problem). Another, more likely, explanation may 
be the physical co-ordination needed to place the toy key 
UNDER the plastic box in game 2 compared with the other 
tasks of placing the key straight down on something:
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either ON the box itself or on the chair surface (BEHIND/ 
IN FRONT/NEXT TO to the box). The configuration IN the 
box, whilst also requiring physical co-ordination, may be 
more familiar to children because of experience with 
"posting" games and, as we saw in chapter 2, this is the 
first choice non-linguistic strategy adopted by young 
children (E Clark, 1973a).
It is also possible that, as a whole, the task demands for 
testing production in game 3 (the card game) were slightly 
harder than those for game 1 (the hide-and-seek game with 
real objects) because the children were looking at 
pictures (two-dimensional) representing three-dimensional 
things (see section 3.4.3 commenting on the more abstract 
and sophisticated nature of the card game). This might 
contribute to the fact that all but two of the Guttman 
scores were slightly lower in game 3 than for game 1 (see 
section 4.2.8).
Another example of an extra dimension was seen in section 
1.2.3 on conversational role taking and deixis, where the 
terms HERE and THERE were considered. Charney (1979) 
claimed that the results from her tests differed from 
previous ones because her instructions were simpler, eg 
"which one is over here/there" rather than asking the 
child to "make the dog over here/there turn round" or 
"make the horse over here/there jump up and down", which 
required the child to work out not only which object
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should be selected but also what action should be 
performed. If the child has a limited processing 
capacity, he or she may use most of it on deciding which 
action to perform and may then fall back on a near-self 
location for the other part of the task. This could 
explain why most of the youngest children in Clark and 
Sengul's (1978) study (average age 3;3) did not contrast 
the terms HERE and THERE but picked up the animal on their 
own side of the table regardless of the instruction and 
speaker position.
d) Child's interpretation
We considered the problem of experimenters simply failing 
to get the message across to children when asking them to 
draw what they see (section 1.2.2), I also mentioned what
could be termed a "trying to please" factor where children
may want to draw what they think is wanted. In the
examples considered earlier relating to the child's point 
of view as an artist (section 1.2.2), what the
experimenters really wanted was for the child to draw 
exactly how each object appeared, eg one ball partially 
occluding another or a picture of a cup with the handle 
facing away. The child may interpret this as being asked 
to draw two balls or a picture of a cup.
In section 4.5.2, when considering Donaldson's work (1978)
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on children's understanding of the meaning of ALL with 
more than one set of entities (eg cars and garages), we 
saw that children consistently responded as if they had 
been asked the question "Does every garage have a car in 
it" ie they made their own interpretation of the question.
This preference for an alternative interpretation of the 
question was also apparent in studies by Philip and 
Takahashi (1990) who were looking at the quantifier EVERY. 
They used picture cued question response tasks and found, 
for example, that a question such as "Is every pig eating 
an apple?" elicited a relatively high number of incorrect 
("no") responses, as did the question "Is a pig eating 
every apple?" when applied to a picture of three pigs and 
two alligators, each of which was eating an apple. The 
children appeared to be interpreting both questions along 
the lines of "Is it always the case that a pig is eating 
an apple?"
The child's understanding of the task demands is therefore 
important if the results are to be assessed correctly.
Another example of the danger of misinterpreting results 
by drawing the wrong conclusions was shown earlier 
(section 4.5.2) when Carey (1978) replaced the word LESS 
with a nonsense word and found that the response patterns 
were similar.
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e ) Children's perspective
À child's way of viewing things is a subject which has 
cropped up regularly throughout this thesis, and in many 
ways it ties in with the foregoing paragraphs on the 
child's interpretation of the test demands. The evidence 
from my study showed that the youngest children (aged two 
to three) often had a very different interpretation of the 
picture in game 3 and saw the lion standing ON TOP of the 
crocodile rather than BEHIND, as had been expected.
This difference in perspective may also be evident in 
other areas (see section 4.4.5). For example, in game 1 
the ball was hidden UNDER the blanket, yet was sometimes 
described as being IN (perhaps because the ball was in 
contact with the blanket which suggested a sense of 
enclosure?)
The card of the tractor and tree in game 3 to test the 
locative expression BESIDE/NEXT TO may also be another 
example of how the choice of test materials may affect the 
results (see section 4.2.3), and indeed it would be very 
interesting to conduct further research to look more 
closely at the whole area of the influence of design 
method and materials on experimental results.
What can we conclude then from looking at the importance
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of test materials? Certainly that test design is not 
something to be taken lightly, and that if we are 
interested in linguistic capacities, maybe we should 
attempt to minimise extralinguistic task demands as much 
as is possible. We should also remember that any data 
must be treated with caution.
Given all these problems with empirical testing, 
particularly the vulnerability of experimental data, 
should we continue to carry out experimental research at 
all, and what alternatives are there? Diary studies, 
mainly carried out by the linguist or psychologist parent, 
were the first studies on language acquisition and they 
began to appear over a hundred years ago (see Ingram, 1989 
for a full discussion of both methods and theoretical 
orientation in the field of child language acquisition). 
After the first world war, the emerging form of psychology 
which became known as "behaviourism" led to establishing 
norms through the observation of large numbers of children 
and, from the late 1950s, a third method used in 
collecting data on language acquisition became popular 
(longitudinal language sampling), whereby a child is 
visited at predetermined intervals for a reasonable length 
of time with the purpose of collecting a representative 
sample (eg Brown's 1973 study of Adam, Eve and Sarah). I 
doubt if diary studies or longitudinal studies of children 
could prove any less prone to the criticism we have
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examined in relation to the influence of materials in 
testing, as there is still the influencing factor of 
context affecting the child's perceptions and responses 
(if anything, this would be harder to observe and control 
outside experimental conditions).
So, what do experimental studies tell us about the nature 
of the mental representation of linguistic objects and are 
they worth carrying out? Empirical studies can provide 
insights into how children go about learning linguistic 
forms, as we have seen in this thesis, and they can also 
be useful in helping to cut down the number of variables 
under consideration. They can be used to test out certain 
models and the tests can be repeated to see if the results 
can be repeated (or to see if there is any change over 
time with the same subjects). Perhaps we should conclude 
that experimental data are important because they can give 
us information about a specific area, but that we should 
be aware that they can be easily influenced and 
consequently should be treated with caution. From this, 
we should deduce that it is also difficult to compare 
results from different experiments without looking 
carefully at the methodology involved.
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5.2 Scope for further research
As mentioned earlier in section 4.1, there is a mass of
data available from my study, and many opportunities there
for further analysis, some of which are listed below:
a) a comparison of performance in the three games by 
children individually (for example, did a child make 
the same mistakes in each game?)
b) an examination of the child's position in his or her 
family - do single children perform better because 
they have more individual attention? It was 
interesting to note that the two children who did not 
co-operate very well were both boys aged 3;2 with a 
young baby sibling (from different play sessions).
c) a more detailed analysis of how children coped with
the incongruous items in the third game.
d) a full analysis of all substitutions.
There are also opportunities for new research to look at
some of the interesting areas in more detail, for example;
e) further investigation into the area of perspective,
raised by the children's interpretation of the lion 
standing on the crocodile.
f) a more detailed examination of the comprehension of
258
locative expressions, perhaps with younger children 
to obtain a greater range of results.
g) a more thorough investigation of children's 
understanding of OUT OF and OFF, perhaps in 
combination with a more extensive selection task.
h) a detailed, structured examination of BEHIND and IN 
FRONT using a variety of test situations (both simple 
and complex).
Another issue which has been discussed in this thesis is 
the question of when exactly a locative should be 
considered acquired. For example, BEHIND may appear 
correctly early on, yet it is also used in substitutions 
and overextensions in other situations. If a child 
frequently extends a locative to inappropriate contexts, 
it can be argued that he or she does not really know the 
meaning of that locative at all. But what if the 
overextension is only occasional and does not overshadow 
correct usage? Is it because the child knows that he or 
she is using it incorrectly but has not yet mastered the 
appropriate expressive means? The whole area of 
overextensions, uncertainty and the definition of 
acquisition would also be an interesting one to explore in 
more detail.
There are also semantic issues which would be looked at in 
more detail: if something is "at the back of the
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wardrobe" it would probably be in a different position 
from "behind the wardrobe". An interesting supplementary 
study would be to test British children (and adults) on 
placements AT THE BACK OF as well as BEHIND with 
laterally-placed featured objects for instance.
Another area for further research which suggests itself is 
the whole area of concepts versus linguistic 
manifestation. What evidence could be found for the child 
having the appropriate concept in circumstances where he 
or she does not use the appropriate locative expression? 
This might lend support to the idea of Johnston and 
Slobin's (1979) "waiting room", which in itself presents 
an appealingly neat way of looking at the whole question 
of the acquisition of locative notions.
Last, but by no means least, I think one of the main 
issues arising from my research which could usefully be 
studied in more detail has been the importance of testing 
materials, as we saw in the foregoing section. This is 
something, however, which applies not just to locative 
expressions, but is also relevant to other empirical 
studies from varying disciplines.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
I took the finding from Johnston and Slobin's (1979) study 
that children would acquire locative prepositions in a 
certain order based on a combination of cognitive and 
linguistic factors and decided to test this order with 
British children. My study involved eighty children aged 
between 2;0 and 5?0 and used three games to cover both 
the production and comprehension of prepositions. I 
achieved results which suggested that there is a general 
order, and that this appears to be broadly consistent with 
the order which was being tested. The order arrived at 
using the data from my study is:
IN <0N <UNDER <BEHINDf/BEHIND <FRONTf/FRONT/BESIDE/BETWEEN
This is the same as the predicted order in many respects: 
the initial order of the prepositions IN, ON, UNDER and 
the fact that BEHIND and IN FRONT with featured objects 
occur before their non featured counterparts. However, my 
order differs from the predicted one in that BEHIND and IN 
FRONT (both featured and non-featured) occur at an earlier 
stage, thus shifting BESIDE and BETWEEN to later 
positions. Also, non-featured BEHIND occurs before 
featured IN FRONT suggesting that BEHIND is acquired in 
both forms before IN FRONT.
The prepositions BEHIND and IN FRONT were in fact
261
considered in some detail, since this proved to be an 
important and interesting area for errors, as BEHIND was 
frequently given instead of IN FRONT. This endorses and 
adds to evidence from other findings in this particular 
area.
The reason why BEHIND and IN FRONT appear earlier in the 
results from my study compared with the predicted order 
is, I have proposed, primarily because of simpler testing 
methods to elicit different "types" of BEHIND and IN 
FRONT. Evidence to support this can be seen from the 
results in game 3 where more complicated cards showing 
featured animals facing the side were involved. Here, the 
results for BEHIND and IN FRONT dropped considerably, and 
if combined with the other results for featured BEHIND and 
IN FRONT, would significantly lower the overall scores.
In conclusion, therefore, a general order for locative 
prepositions can be confirmed. There may, however, be 
deviations within this order, particularly with the 
prepositions BEHIND and IN FRONT, depending on context and 
circumstances, especially the type of reference object and 
type of object to be located, as well as the position/ 
orientation of the speaker and hearer. As a consequence 
of the extreme importance of testing methods, all 
experimental data should be treated with caution.
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APPENDIX 1
Examples of locative expressions in children's books
The following excerpts from popular books for young 
children are intended to demonstrate how, along with 
everyday situations, some locative expressions (eg IN 
FRONT OF) occur less frequently than others.
1. Where's Spot? by Eric Hill (a lift the flap book)
Is he BEHIND the door?Is he INSIDE the clock?Is he IN the piano?Is he UNDER the stairs?Is he IN the wardrobe?Is he UNDER the bed?Is he IN the box?There's Spot! He's UNDER the rug.
2. Spot's Birthday Party by Eric Hill (lift the flap)
Spot has found someone BEHIND the curtain ... and someone IN the cupboard.... look UNDER the coat!... Spot knows who's BEHIND the door. Who's that UNDER the table?
4. Postman Pat's Treasure Hunt by John Cunliffe 
(no specific illustrations to go with the prepositions)
They lifted cushions; they looked UNDER chairs and BEHIND chairs; they peered BEHIND the television-set and AMONGST the coats that hung on the back of the door.
287
5. Postman Pat's Rainy Dav by John Cunliffe
(no specific illustrations to go with the prepositions)
The rain banged on the roof of the van and rattled on the windows. IN the fields, the sheep huddled BEHIND the walls.
6. Here and There by Sara Lynn (illustrated)
DOWN the stairs ON with the boots OUT of the house THROUGH the gate OVER the log ACROSS the stream UNDER the hedge UP the hill ALONG the wall and INTO the pondi
7. Ned and the Jovbaloo by Hiawyn Oram
...not that meeting a Joybaloo had been easy for Ned. He'd looked IN everything, UNDER everything, THROUGH everything, BEHIND everything.
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APPENDIX 2
Age and sex distribution of children
Age (years ;months)
5 0 X4 114 104 9 o4 8 o o o4 7 X4 6 X X o4 54 4 X4 3 o4 24 1 o o4 0 o3 11 X3 10 X o X3 9 X X o3 8 o3 7 o3 6 X o3 53 4 X3 3 o X3 2 X o o (O) (3 1 o X X X o o3 02 11 o o o X o2 10 X o o O X2 9 o o X X2 8 X o o2 7 o X o X X X2 6 X X X O2 5 o2 4 o X X2 3 o2 2 o X X2 1 o o2 0 X X
Key
o boy X girl( ) no co-operation
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a) Information on child
CHILD LANGUAGE ACQUISITION RESEARCH
Name of child .................................................
Date of birth ..................................................
U g e  ........... ...................
Brothers/sisters + ages .....................................
iNursery/playgroup/childminder ..............................
Other details ..................................................
Contact details:
lame of mother ..................................................
address ...........................................................
’hone No .........................
ate of testing .................................................
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b) Response chart for the hide-and-seek game
a: 1U  10:: 1C  114] 1CO 114] 1I1 cn14] 1 CO  1 ■o •H<  1 (— 1 4->O  1 •rH Ü)O  1 X: 0Z  1 <  1 u 4->H] 1 4-t M-41Q  1 o oXI 1 Q> 0M  1 e 0 4-»E  1 (Ü cn 0U  1 z <C a
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14] 1 X :
14] 1 4-) C n
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Û  1 c
t— i I O  0
a r  1 c a
V4 =
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• H  0
C-i t 4 J  U
C <  1 C 0<  1 - H  X :
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•r-J4-1 4-14-1 •H x:Ü 0 cn0 o *HU a cdU 0 Xl 0o k, 4-1 5u a 0 0
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x: 4J 4-1 04-1 X '—- — ' X0 0 U-t 00 c X X 00 c X X X CU0 X o 0 X o 0•H u "O X X 0 X X X0 0 -H -H 4-4 5 •r4 U-t•o 0 X X X >.C C c 0 0 X 0 0 X X■H O p X X •H X X -r4 0
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c) Response chart for the putting game
H  I S I C I 
u  I 
IU I Z I H 1 
E h  I 
Eh  I O 1 
PL, I
Eh  I CÜ I
S IU I 
I
K  I 
C O  I 
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P k  I 
C O  I W I 
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1 c n
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<  1 r— i X
O  1 " H 0
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d) Response chart for the cards
CHILD LANGUAGE RESEARCH
Name of child ..........
Age ..............
Date of testing .......
RESPONSE CHART CARDS
preposition where's correct pointing/ no response otherthe ... "there"
1 . in cat
2. on teddy
3. under ball
4 . next to tractor
5 . behind (f) teddy
6 . in front (f) car
7. between hat
8. behind guitar
9 . in front balloon
10. behind (s) 1 ion
11. in front (s ) goat
12. under * televis
13. over * umbrel1
14. around * basket
15, top ball
bottom
down
up
incongruous
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APPENDIX 4
Picture of items used in hide-and-seek-game
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APPENDIX 5
Picture of items used in putting game
296
APPENDIX 6
Picture of cards used in third game
297
298
fi m
299
300
301
302
303
APPENDIX 7
Statistical details
page
Sample of data used for the statistical analysis .... 305
Guttman Scalogram Analysis; results for game 1 .....  306
Guttman Scalogram Analysis: results for game 2 .....  307
Guttman Scalogram Analysis: results for game 3 .....  308
Guttman Scalogram Analysis; results for game 3 excluding BEHIND/IN FRONT with side facing featured objects  ........................... 309
Mokken Homogeneity Model: results for game 1 .......  310
Mokken Homogeneity Model: results for game 2 .......  311
Mokken Homogeneity Model: results for game 3 ........ 312
Mokken Homogeneity Model: results for game 1 w/out IN. 313
Mokken Homogeneity Model: results for game 2 w/out IN. 314
SPSS: Age data, game 1 ..............................  315
SPSS: Scheffe test, age data, game 1  ................ 316
SPSS; Age data, game 2................................  317
SPSS: Scheffe test, age data, game 2 ................. 318
SPSS: Age data, game 3 ..............................  319
SPSS: Scheffe test, age data, game 3 ...........   320
SPSS: Sex data, game 1................................  321
SPSS: Sex data, game 2 ..............................  322
SPSS: Sex data, game 3................................  323
304
SAMPLE OF GAME DATA FOR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
columns 
a b c game 1 game 2 game 3
1 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 02 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 03 2 4 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14 2 3 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 05 2 3 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 16 2 4 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 17 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 08 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 19 1 4 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 110 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 011 2 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 012 2 3 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 013 2 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 014 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 015 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 016 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Key
column a column b
column c =
child number sex: 1 - boy2 = girl age group:2 =  2;0 -  2;113 = 3;0 - 3;114 = 4;0 - 5;0
1 = credit for preposition 0 = absence of correct preposition 9 = missing data
prepositions listed in order of testing
Examples
Child number 8 is a girl in the oldest age group with credits for all prepositions tested.
Child number 7 is a boy in the youngest age group only with credits for IN (game 1), IN (game 2) and IN and ON (game 3).
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GUTTMAN: RESULTS FOR GAME 1
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ** The Psychometric Analysis Package (PAP). *
* *
* A programme for the multivariate analyses of ** psychometric data. ** *
* ** Written by Sean Hammond ** Department of Psychology ** University of Surrey ** 1986, 1988, 1990 ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Guttman Scalogram Analysis
An analysis of data in the file named \working\lizl.dat Number of cases read was 71 on 9 items.
Number of profiles fitting the model = 10Number of Profiles not fitting the model = 11
Number of possible profiles = 512Number of observed profiles = 21Ratio of observed to possible profiles = 0.041
Item Order Item Name % on 0 % on 1 Difficulty
1 A1 IN 1.408 98.592 0.9862 A2 ON 18.310 81.690 0.8173 A3 UNDER 22.535 77.465 0.7755 A5 BEHINDf 43.662 56.338 0.5638 A8 BEHIND 47.887 52.113 0.5216 A6 IN FRONTf 67.606 32.394 0.3249 A9 IN FRONT 70.423 29.577 0.2964 A4 BESIDE 76.056 23.944 0.2397 A7 BETWEEN 85.915 14.085 0.141
Coefficient of Reproducibility = 0.937Minimal Marginal Reproducibility = 0.740Scalability Coefficient = 0.759
306
GUTTMAN: RESULTS FOR GAME 2
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ** The Psychometric Analysis Package (PAP). *
* ** A programme for the multivariate analyses of ** psychometric data. *
* *
* ** Written by Sean Hammond *
* Department of Psychology ** University of Surrey ** 1986, 1988, 1990 ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Guttman Scalogram Analysis
An analysis of data in the file named \working\lizl.dat Number of cases read was 74 on 9 items.
Number of profiles fitting the model = 6 Number of Profiles not fitting the model = 28
Number of possible profiles = 512Number of Ratio of observed profiles = observed to possible 34profiles = 0.066
Item Order Item Name % on 0 % on 1 Difficulty
1 B1 IN 0.000 100.000 1.0002 B2 ON 12.162 87.838 0.8784 B4 BEHIND 25.676 74.324 0.7439 B9 IN FRONTf 28.378 71.622 0.7167 B7 BETWEEN 31.081 68.919 0.6896 B6 BESIDE 32.432 67.568 0.6763 B3 UNDER 32.432 67.568 0.6765 B5 IN FRONT 32.432 67.568 0.6768 B8 BEHINDf 33.784 66.216 0.662
Coefficient of Reproducibility = 0.799Minimal Marginal Reproducibility = 0.746Scalability Coefficient = 0.207
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GUTTMAN: RESULTS FOR GAME 3
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ** The Psychometric Analysis Package (PAP). *
* ** A programme for the multivariate analyses of ** psychometric data. *
* *
* ** Written by Sean Hammond ** Department of Psychology *
* University of Surrey ** 1986, 1988, 1990 ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Guttman Scalogram Analysis
An analysis of data in the file named \working\lizl.dat Number of cases read was 77 on 11 items.
Number of profiles fitting the model = 11Number of Profiles not fitting the model = 27
Number of possible profiles = 2048Number of observed profiles = 38Ratio of observed to possible profiles = 0.019
Item Order Item Name % on 0 % on 1 Difficulty
1 Cl IN 6.494 93.506 0.9352 C2 ON 19.481 80.519 0.8053 C3 UNDER 27.273 72.727 0.7275 C5 BEHINDf 45.455 54.545 0.5458 C8 BEHIND 63.636 36.364 0.36410 CIO BEHINDfs 67.532 32.468 0.3257 C7 BETWEEN 75.325 24.675 0.2476 C6 IN FRONTf 79.221 20.779 0.20811 Cll IN FRONTfs 80.519 19.481 0.1959 C9 IN FRONT 80.519 19.481 0.1954 C4 BESIDE 87.013 12.987 0.130
Coefficient of Reproducibility = 0.835Minimal Marginal Reproducibility = 0.759Scalability Coefficient = 0.314
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GUTTMAN; RESULTS FOR GAME 3 - excluding BEHIND/FRONT side facing
featured objects
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ** The Psychometric Analysis Package (PAP). *
* ** A programme for the multivariate analyses of ** psychometric data. *
* *
* *Written by Sean Hammond *** Department of Psychology ** University of Surrey ** 1986, 1988, 1990 ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Guttman Scalogram Analysis
An analysis of data in the file named \working\lizl.dat Number of cases read was 77 on 9 items.
Number of profiles fitting the model = 10Number of Profiles not fitting the model = 22
Number of possible profiles = 512Number of observed profiles = 32Ratio of observed to possible profiles = 0.063
Item Order Item Name % on 0 % on 1 Difficulty
1 Cl IN 6.494 93.506 0.9352 C2 ON 19.481 80.519 0.8053 C3 UNDER 27.273 72.727 0.7275 C5 BEHINDf 45.455 54.545 0.5458 C8 BEHIND 63.636 36.364 0.3647 C7 BETWEEN 75.325 24.675 0.2476 C6 IN FRONTf 79.221 20.779 0.2089 C9 IN FRONT 80.519 19.481 0.1954 C4 BESIDE 87.013 12.987 0.130
Coefficient of Reproducibility = 0.882Minimal Marginal Reproducibility = 0.763Scalability Coefficient = 0.500
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MOKKEN; RESULTS FOR GAME 1
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *The Psychometric Analysis Package (PAP),
A programme for the multivariate analyses of psychometric data.
Written by Sean Hammond Department of Psychology University of Surrey 1986, 1988, 1990
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
Cummulative Stochastic Scaling Using Mokken's Homogeneity Model
Inter-Item Homogeneity Coefficients
A7 A4 A9 À6 A8 A5 A3 A2 A1
A7 1.000A4 0.247 1.000A9 0. 335 0.374 1.000Â6 0.292 0.371 0.815 1.000A8 0.151 0.218 0.348 0.440 1.000À5 0.127 0.178 0.290 0.371 0.791 1.000A3 0.048 0.092 0.096 0.139 0.203 0.209 1.000A2 0.037 0.071 0.094 0.107 0.244 0.289 0.235 1.000A1 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.016 0.018 0.049 0.064 1.000
Scale Statistics
Item Name Difficulty Homogeneity Delta Probability
A7 0.141 0.828 8.119 0.000A4 0.239 0.647 8.179 0.000A9 0.296 0.821 11.156 0.000A6 0.324 0.889 12.208 0.000A8 0.521 0.894 12.096 0.000A5 0.563 0.875 11.601 0.000A3 0.775 0.661 6.986 0.000A2 0.817 0.816 7.939 0.000A1 0.986 1.000 2.953 0.004
Scale Reliability Scale Homogeneity Scale Delta Probability
.9999 .2457 19.9115 0.0000
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MOKKEN; RESULTS FOR GAME 2
*************************************************** The Psychometric Analysis Package (PAP). ** ** A programme for the multivariate analyses of ** psychometric data. ** ** ** Written by Sean Hammond ** Department of Psychology ** University of Surrey ** 1986, 1988, 1990 ***************************************************
Cummulative Stochastic Scaling Using Mokken's Homogeneity Model
Inter-Item Homogeneity Coefficients
B8 B3 B5 B6 B7 B9 B4 B2 B1
B8 1.000B3 0.349 1.000B5 0.408 0.507 1.000B6 0.408 0.568 0.568 1.000B7 0.536 0.395 0.577 0.395 1.000B9 0.497 0.360 0.418 0.418 0.514 1.000B4 0.408 0.327 0.495 0.383 0.357 0.487 1.000B2 0.180 0.241 0.288 0.241 0.258 0.241 0.341 1.000B1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Scale Statistics
Item Name Difficulty Homogeneity Delta Probability
B8 0.662 0.518 10.283 0.000B3 0.676 0.484 9.873 0.000B5 0.676 0.577 11.764 0.000B6 0.676 0.526 10.713 0.000B7 0.689 0.540 10.954 0.000B9 0.716 0.549 10.850 0.000B4 0.743 0.574 10.810 0.000B2 0.878 0.816 10.287 0.000B1 1.000 0.971 0.022 0.980
Scale Reliability Scale Homogeneity 
.9999 .268
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Scale Delta 
21.3163
Probability
0,0000
MOKKEN; RESULTS FOR GAME 3
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
The Psychometric Analysis Package (PAP). *
*A programme for the multivariate analyses of * psychometric data. *
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Written by Sean Hammond Department of Psychology University of Surrey 1986, 1988, 1990
Cummulative Stochastic Scaling Using Mokken's Homogeneity Model
Inter-Item Homogeneity Coefficients
C4 C9 Cll C6 C7 CIO C8 C5 C3 C2 Cl
C4 1.000C9 0.157 1.000Cll 0.234 0.669 1.000C6 0.138 0.612 0.534 1.000C7 0.214 0.412 0.281 0.469 1.000CIO 0.035 0.305 0.454 0.243 0.203 1.000C8 0.097 0.290 0.379 0.279 0.289 0.577 1.000C5 0.070 0.172 0.142 0.189 0.241 0.295 0.364 1.000C3 0.035 0.091 0.091 0.098 0.099 0.180 0.186 0.411 1.000C2 0.018 0.018 0.039 0.023 0.015 0.069 0.088 0.148 0.349 1.000Cl 0.010 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.023 0.013 0.018 0.053 0.134 0.216 1.000
Scale Statistics
Item Name Difficulty Homogeneity Delta Probability
C4 0.130 0.358 4.936 0.000C9 0.195 0.627 10.590 0.000Cll 0.195 0.666 11.241 0.000C6 0.208 0.590 10.090 0.000C7 0.247 0.522 9.019 0 . 000CIO 0.325 0.594 10.140 0.000C8 0.364 0.671 11.192 0.000C5 0.545 0.764 10.915 0.000C3 0.727 0.836 9.945 0 . 000C2 0.805 0.521 5.437 0.000Cl 0.935 0.733 4.652 0.000
Scale Reliability Scale Homogeneity Scale Delta Probability
.9711 . 3112 21 .3659 0.0000
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MOKKEN: GAME 1 WITHOUT "IN"
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *The Psychometric Analysis Package (PAP).
A programme for the multivariate analyses of psychometric data.
Written by Sean Hammond Department of Psychology University of Surrey 1986, 1988, 1990* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Cummulative Stochastic Scaling Using Mokken's Homogeneity Model
Inter-Item Homogeneity Coefficients
A7 A4 A9 A6 A8 A5 A3 A2
A7 1.000A4 0.247 1.000A9 0.335 0.374 1.000A6 0.292 0.371 0.815 1.000A8 0.151 0.218 0.348 0.440 1.000A5 0.127 0.178 0.290 0.371 0.791 1.000A3 0.048 0.092 0.096 0.139 0.203 0.209 1.000A2 0.037 0.071 0.094 0.107 0.244 0.289 0.235 1.000
Scale Statistics
Item Name Difficulty Homogeneity Delta Probability
A7 0.141 0.827 8.118 0.000A4 0.239 0.645 8.164 0.000A9 0.296 0.820 11.148 0.000A6 0.324 0.889 12.201 0.000A8 0.521 0.893 12.052 0.000AS 0.563 0.874 11.546 0.000A3 0.775 0.655 6,835 0.000A2 0.817 0.812 7.767 0.000
Scale Reliability 
.9712
Scale Homogeneity 
.2405
Scale Delta Probability 
19.6921 0.0000
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MOKKEN: GAME 2 WITHOUT "IN"
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *The Psychometric Analysis Package (PAP).
A programme for the multivariate analyses of psychometric data.
*
*
*
*
*
** Written by Sean Hammond* Department of Psychology* University of Surrey* 1986, 1988, 1990* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Cummulative Stochastic Scaling Using Mokken's Homogeneity Model
Inter-Item Homogeneity Coefficients
B8 B3 B5 B6 B7 B9 B4 B2
B8 1.000B3 0.349 1.000B5 0.408 0.507 1.000B6 0.408 0.568 0.568 1.000B7 0.536 0.395 0.577 0.395 1.000B9 0.497 0.360 0.418 0.418 0.514 1.000B4 0.408 0.327 0.495 0.383 0.357 0.487 1.000B2 0.180 0.241 0.288 0.241 0.258 0.241 0.341 1.000
Scale Statistics
Item Name Difficulty Homogeneity Delta Probability
B8 0.662 0.518 10.283 0.000B3 0.676 0.484 9.873 0.000B5 0.676 0.577 11.764 0.000B6 0.676 0.526 10.713 0.000B7 0-689 0.540 10.954 0.000B9 0.716 0.549 10.850 0.000B4 0.743 0.574 10.810 0.000B2 0.878 0.816 10.287 0.000
Scale Reliability Scale Homogeneity Scale Delta Probability
.9913 0.2628 21.3163 0.0000
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SPSS: AGE DATA, GAME 1
Variable GAMEl By Variable AGE
O N E W A Y  -
Analysis of Variance
Source D .F
Between Groups 2Within Groups 66Total 68
Sum of Squares
9.0618443.1411452.2029
MeanSquares
4.53096.7143
F FRatio Prob.
.6748 .5127
Group Count Mean
Grp 2 Grp 3 Grp 4
Total
332115
69
4.36364.85715.2667
4.7101
StandardDeviation
2.78182.37252.4339
2.5788
StandardError 95 Pet Conf Int for Mean
484351776284
3104
3.37723.77723.9188
TOTOTO
4.0907 TO
5.35005.93716.6145
5.3296
GROUP MINIMUM MAXIMUM
Grp 2 Grp 3 Grp 4
TOTAL
1.0000.00002.0000
. 0000
9.00009.00009.0000
9.0000
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SPSS: SCHEFFE TEST, AGE DATA, GAME 1
O N E W A Y
Variable GAMEl By Variable AGE
Multiple Range Tests: Scheffe test with significance level .05
The difference between two means is significant ifMEAN(J)-MEAN(I) >= 1.8322 * RANGE * SQRT(1/N(I) + 1/N(J)) with the following value(s) for RANGE: 3.54
- No two groups are significantly different at the .050 level
316
SPSS: AGE DATA, GAME 2
O N E W A Y  -
By Variable GAME2 Variable AGE
Analysis of Variance
Source D .F . Sum of Squares MeanSquares FRatio FProb.
Between Groups 2 Within Groups 69 Total 71
61.7111429.7889491.5000
30.85566.2288 4.9537 .0098
Group Count Mean StandardDeviation Standard Error 95 Pet iConf Int for Mean
Grp 2 Grp 3 Grp 4
34 6.0882 24 6.6250 14 8.5714
3.01882.2614.9376
.5177 5.0349 .4616 5.6701 .2506 8.0301
TO 7 TO 7 TO 9
.1415.5799.1128
Total 72 6.7500 2.6311 .3101 6.1317 TO 7 .3683
GROUP MINIMUM MAXIMUM
Grp 2 Grp 3 Grp 4
1.00001.00006.0000
9.00009.00009.0000
TOTAL 1.0000 9.0000
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SPSS: SCHEFFE TEST, AGE DATA, GAME 2
O N E W A Y
Variable GAME2 By Variable AGE
Multiple Range Tests: Scheffe test with significance level .05
The difference between two means is significant ifMEAN(J)-MEANCI) >= 1.7648 * RANGE * SQRT(1/N(I) + 1/N(J)) with the following value(s) for RANGE: 3.54
(*) Indicates significant differences which are shown in the lower triangle
G G G r r r 
P P P
2 3 4Mean AGE
6.0882 Grp 26.6250 Grp 38.5714 Grp 4 *
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SPSS : AGE DATA , GAME 3
O N E W A Y  — — ^ — —
By VariableVariable GAME 3 AGE
Analysis of Variance
Source D.F. Sum of Squares Mean F Squares Ratio FProb.
Between Groups Within Groups Total
27173
54.5195544.0345598.5541
27.2598 3.5576 7.6625 .0337
Group Count Mean StandardDeviation StandardError 95 Pet Conf Int for Mean
Grp 2 Grp 3 Grp 4
352415
4.08574.45836,3333
2.97412.08473.1997
.5027 3.0641 TO .4255 3.5780 TO .8262 4.5614 TO
5.10745.33868.1053
Total 74 4.6622 2.8635 .3329 3.9988 TO 5.3256
GROUP MINIMUM MAXIMUM
Grp 2 Grp 3 Grp 4
.00001.00002.0000
11.00009.000011.0000
TOTAL .0000 11.0000
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SPSS: SCHEFFE TEST, AGE DATA, GAME 3
— — — — — O N E W A Y  —
Variable GAME3 By Variable AGE
Multiple Range Tests: Scheffe test with significance level .05
The difference between two means is significant ifMEAN(J)-MEAN(I) >= 1.9574 * RANGE * SQRT(1/N(I) + 1/N(J)) with the following value(s) for RANGE: 3.54
(*) Indicates significant differences which are shown in the lower triangle
G G G r r r P P P
2 3 4Mean AGE
4.0857 Grp 24.4583 Grp 36,3333 Grp 4 *
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SPSS; SEX DATA, GAME 1
t-tests for independent samples of SEX
Variable Number of Cases Mean SD SE of Mean
GAMEl
SEX 1 SEX 2 3633 4.50004.9394 2.6242.549 .437.444
Mean Difference = -.4394
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances; F== .341 P= .561
t-test for Equality of Means 95%Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff Cl for Diff
EqualUnequal .70,71 6766.77 .484.483 .624 (-1.685, .806).623 (-1.683, .804)
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SPSS; SEX DATA, GAME 2
t-tests for independent samples of SEX
Variable Number of Cases Mean SD SE of Mean
GAME 2
SEX 1 SEX 2 3834 6.68426.8235 2.6822.611 .435.448
Mean Difference .1393
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances; F= .093 P= .761
t-test for Equality of Means 95%Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff Cl for Diff
EqualUnequal .22.22 7069.49 .824.824 .625 (-1.387, 1.108).624 (-1.385, 1.107)
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SPSS: SEX DATA, GAME 3
t-tests for independent samples of SEX
Variable Number of Cases Mean SD SE of Mean
GAME 3
SEX 1 SEX 2 3935 4.56414.7714 2.9722.777 .476.469
Mean Difference = -.2073
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .106 P= .746
t-test for Equality of Means 95%Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff Cl for Diff
EqualUnequal — .31-.31 7271.87 .758.757 .671 (-1.545, 1.130).668 (-1.540, 1.125)
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